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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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20 July 1990

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## Debate on Draft CPSU Statutes Continues

### Academy of Sciences Proposes Variant

90UN1885A Moscow POISK in Russian No 17,  
28 Apr 90-3 May 90 p 5

[Article by the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Dialogues about the Party: On the Necessity of Consolidation of Democratic Forces Within the Party"]

[Text] We already told about the second conference of the USSR Academy of Sciences party organizations (POISK No 14, 1990). There they vehemently discussed various drafts of CPSU Rules. Having turned to the draft of the Central Committee, scholars dwelled on its "academic" version of Rules. They had no intention of accepting this draft of the platform, instead of which a resolution was proposed. The text of this resolution we call to your attention.

1. The CPSU is experiencing a sharp crisis, caused by the fact that the theoretical, ideological and organizational principles of the building and functioning of the party do not correspond to real life. In many party organizations there is an increase in destructive opposition to its various platforms, giving rise to a threat of dissidence.

We think that the impending schism will not further the resolution of the crisis within the party and society. Democratic renewal of society is possible on the basis of their mutually acceptable unity.

2. Published platforms do not give an objective, valid answer to the major questions at the current moment: 1) reasons for the crisis, 2) essence of the crisis, and 3) way out of the crisis for the party and society.

The conference urges communists and party organizations, supporting various drafts of CPSU platforms, to decisively support the immediate conducting of a series of workers' "round tables" on an equal footing for working out a general program of action for resolution of the crisis and development of a new party Program concept for discussion at the 28th CPSU Congress. We think that the proposed drafts of the platform do not rule out the possibility of consolidation on the basis of the following fundamental principles and goals.

#### Fundamental Principles:

- acknowledgment of a man's higher social value;
- priority of a man's rights to ecological safety, survival of human society, progress of civilization, and availability of his fruits to all peoples;
- priority of common spiritual values and interests of the personality above class values and interests in the preservation of class analysis of social reality;

- priority of constitutional, democratic methods of receiving and implementing power and the prohibition of forcible means of seizing power and decisions of political, national, and economic problems of society;
- prohibition of dictatorship of any class or social group in the political life of present-day society;
- prohibition of every form of monopolism in ideology, politics, economics, culture, science or information;
- community of workers' interests;
- realization of the principle of tolerance toward other world views and social movements, not by advocating violence, but by opposing national intolerance and hatred;
- willingness to collaborate with all democratic forces of society.

#### Fundamental Goals in the Social and Spiritual Sphere:

- realization of rights and freedoms of the personality on the basis of priority of consistent humanism, democracy, social justice and nonviolence;
- priority development of culture, education, health care, and sciences as necessary sources of social progress with a guaranteed future;
- strengthening and developing spiritual and historical values of the native land.

#### In the Political Sphere:

- formation of a democratic multi-party society with division of legislative, executive and judicial power;
- transfer to a true federation of peoples and nations entering into the Union on the basis of a new Union agreement;
- securing the protection of citizens' social and personal interests, advanced by the USSR constitution, and restoration of peoples' and nations' violated rights;
- strengthening of rights of the electorate at the local level.

#### In the Economic Sphere:

- implementation of citizens' economic freedom on the basis of equal rights of government, collective and individual forms of property, and establishment of constitutional guarantees of their inviolability;
- creation of a system of citizens' maintenance of social stability and social economic protection by way of smoothing out social inequality;
- combination of a planned initiative with a market regulated by economic methods.



**In Our Opinion, Party Reform is Possible on the Basis of:**

- rejection of dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, formation of a new concept of the communist party, regarding as of paramount importance workers' expression of political interests, and struggling in the elections for the right to be governing;
- analysis of activities and determining the responsibility of the party and its leaders for the results and consequences of the totalitarian regime in the country;
- conducting of a complete democratization of inner-Party life on the basis of reform of the party's organizational structure and acknowledgment of the determining role of primary organizations;
- expansion of organizational and financial rights of primary party organizations and development of horizontal structures;
- acknowledgment of the possibility of the existence of political platforms, guarantee of minorities' rights, including the right to use the mass information means;
- securing of party members' free will through direct secret election from among multiple candidates of all leading party structures;
- realization of the principle of independence of electoral controlling organs, subordination of the information and executive organs and apparatus to the higher organs of party organizations;
- securing openness in activities of all organs and party structures;
- urgent liquidation of privileges and advantages in the party.

3. Conference participants do not have a claim on ways out of the crisis and call forth all constructive forces in the party and society in their search.

Under the conditions of this acute crisis in which we find ourselves, reliance on emotions, in our opinion, is least of all conducive to a way out of it. Therefore, the conference urges all communists and all party organizations of the country toward constructive dialogue, toward the search for accord on the basis of unity of principles and pluralism of methods.

Conference participants turn toward the CPSU Central Committee with the proposal to take the initiative in organizing a series of "round tables."

**Issue of Other Parties Ignored**

90UN1885B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian 12 May 90 p 4

[Article by A. Medvedev, CPSU Member and Analytical Engineer, reporting from Moscow: "Without Considering the New Conditions"]

[Text] I will speak plainly: the present version of the draft CPSU Charter does not personally satisfy me. And here is why.

The CPSU Charter does not take into account the political situation in the country and the appearance of new political parties.

Almost all articles of the Charter regard the party and its party organizations as separate political organizations. But already this does not correspond to the present reality! In the future, as far as the emergence of all new political parties, this situation will only be aggravated. Therefore, a special division is needed: "CPSU in the structure of USSR political parties."

The CPSU organizational structure is only imaginable when based upon a division according to workplaces and places of residence.

We will ask, however, the question: how will other USSR political parties be established? Also according to workplaces? In that situation we would not get any production work done—it would be nothing more than a debating club.

The last recent elections in local Soviets showed that at the election of deputies the population expressed a preference for those candidates who live on the election okrug territory. But we, like before, want to construct party work based only upon workplaces (for the working) and upon place of residence—only for retirees!

From the proposed draft CPSU Charter it is not clear how the party, competing with other political parties and movements, will lead the pre-election struggle for deputy seats for its members.

And this is under conditions of a multi-party system in the present democratic society—the fundamental form of activities and struggles for power of each party! Here then only the party will be ruling and leading when its members, competing with members of other parties at the present democratic elections, will receive the people's confidence to rule!

At the very least, the divisions of the proposed draft CPSU Charter appear strange among the party organs and Armed Forces, KGB forces, and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). If the CPSU establishes its political organs and party organizations there, then other parties will be doing the same thing. Do you mean this is permissible? The Army and internal forces should be outside the parties and subordinated only to constitutional organs and to the President.

And lastly, the question about party property is not completed. On the one hand: "The party's property and monetary means are the party-wide property" (paragraph 37). On the other hand: "...the party committee...establishes its apparatus, and material and financial base"...(paragraph 21); "party organizations independently use at their discretion its budget, obtaining an

increase in revenues and securing the transfer to self-financing..." (paragraph 38).

So to whom, in such a case, does the CPSU Perovskiy Raykom (Rayon Committee) of the city of Moscow belong: to the entire CPSU, to the RSFSR Communist Party which is presently being created, or to the Moscow city party organization, or only to the Perovskiy rayon party organization?

#### Elective Positions in Party Apparatus

90UN1885C Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 12 May 90 p 4

[Article by V. Bobkov, corresponding member of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, reporting from Minsk: "Who Should Be Working in the Apparatus?"]

[Text] I think that the new charter mechanism should surmount existing power of the party apparatus, from which elected organ members, leaders of lower party links, and rank-and-file communists are alienated.

I understand that one cannot bring the role of the apparatus to nothing. A highly qualified, able-bodied apparatus is a necessary and reliable assistant in the realization of electoral organ decisions. But precisely that—an assistant.

In my view, it is appropriate to unite into one whole the electoral organ and apparatus. This means that communists elected into the party committee should leave their previous work and transfer directly into the party apparatus to work. Candidates for membership into the Party Committee can remain at previous work, but their involvement in activities of commissions for inspecting party organization work and in preparing decisions is mandatory. If it is so, I think the continuous fight for power between the apparatus and electoral organ will end, electoral organ members' responsibility will be increased, and the Party Committee decree will assume greater weight.

The Party Committee will not then be formed on the basis of official position held: secretaries of the Party Committee, heads of organizations, chief economic administrators...Right now, they enter the committees and decide practically all questions. At the same time the backbone of the Party Committee apparatus is left virtually without the vote—instructors, heads of sectors, deputies of department heads—on whose shoulders lies the main work burden. Although all the flak for dereliction of duty falls on those in the electoral organs, and not on those who represent it several times a year.

#### Inequities of Past Unchanged

90UN1885D Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 12 May 90 p 4

[Article by Voytekunas, reporting from Voronezh: "One is a Private, the Other is a General..."]

[Text] I am reading in the draft Charter about the organizational structure in the party: "Party organization, uniting communists in a given territory, is higher in relation to parts of its organizations."

That is to say that everything is as before. There will be a first kraykom secretary; there will be a simple worker. It would seem that both are party members. But no! One is a private, the other a general! And in 70 years in this hierarchy nothing has changed—the same abyss, both in possibilities and in relation to business.

V. I. Lenin established the party for accomplishment of distinct social reforms with the goal of helping oppressed classes free themselves from oppressors. The goal was achieved by the October Revolution. Up until now the party, as a political structure, has not had a party goal. And not one party document directed at the good of the people was fully realized.

The party acknowledged that it and the command-administrative system are guilty of the downfall of tens of millions of people, in the destruction of the country's economic structure and our surroundings. But the party did not do anything in order to guarantee that the horrors, nightmares and until now distortions and catastrophes it organized and implemented, will not be repeated.

#### USSR Deputies View Political, Economic Models for Federation

90UN1914A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 5 May 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "USSR: Federation? Confederation? Cooperation? Political and Economic Models: Notes from an Open Forum of the USSR People's Deputies Club"]

[Text] In a discussion on the topic given in the title, that was held on 20 April in the USSR Supreme Soviet building on Kalininskiy Prospekt, 27, the participants included Fedor Burlatskiy, Mikhail Bocharov, Yuriy Shcherbak, Lyudmila Arutyunyan, Mikhail Bronshteyn, Klara Khallik, and many other USSR people's deputies, as well as scientists and specialists in the area of national-state structure in the USSR and foreign countries.

There is scarcely any need to convince anyone of the timeliness, much less the topicality, of this discussion: this topic figures in practically all the sessions of the commissions and houses of our country's Supreme Soviet. And the question as to what our country's structure will be in the future is a question that is definitely not an idle one, but, rather, one that requires right now its detailed and complete analysis. The diametrically opposed opinions (from "single and indivisible" to the necessity for the immediate disbanding of all the republics and autonomies "to their national apartments," and then everyone can live in the way that God proposes for

him) not only does not preclude the need for a search, but, on the contrary, confirms its vital necessity.

At a press conference that was held on 27 April in the building of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet, R. Nishanov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities, stated that the decision concerning the secession of any republic from the USSR should be made by "the entire Soviet nation," by all the inhabitants of the Union. There is a definite amount of logic in such views. However, in this instance the principle of the right of nations to self-determination (up to and including secession) is transformed into a fiction, an empty formality. With this approach to the problem, no one will want to "release" anyone, giving as the reason the fact that no one should have any advantages or privileges that others do not have. "How are they better than we are?" is the principle that will enable the Administrative-Fiat System to preserve the unitary state, the semblance of the "monolithic solidarity of the Soviet nations in a single harmonious family"...

It is, however, important from the very beginning to determine that every point of view, every position on this question has the right to exist. Today there is no administrative level, there is no group of persons or any single individual, who possesses the final Truth. Any position, even the position that is most radical or dogmatic in content, certainly has a kernel of reasonableness. Therefore, in the discussion the most important thing is not to lose that kernel, not to throw the baby out with the bath water. The participants in the forum at the People's Deputies Club were called upon to keep that in mind.

#### **Fedor Burlatskiy: "Don't Cancel the Accumulated Experience"**

For example, the experience of old Russia. I frequently wonder about this: why did Russia succeed in uniting around itself various nations and states (and not only Slavic ones)? The trans-Caucasus, the Muslim nations of Central Asia, where their own state system had existed not just for centuries, but even for millennia, prior to their inclusion in the Russian empire.

Today many people explain this by the application of violence and by the oppression exerted by the Russian autocracy. Of course one should not disregard that factor. But for some reason I am convinced that violence did not actually play the main role. The main role was played by the width of the approach when forming the single state system. And I hope it will not seem strange to you if I say that the tsarist government showed a large amount of flexibility when forming interrelationships between the central authority and the "vassal" states. Suffice it to recall that Finland retained its parliament, Poland retained its Diet, and an emir sat in Bukhara... They all were subordinated to the Russian crown, but no one demanded of them the use of identical forms of government or of political or religious life. No one

attempted to make any changes in their traditional way of life, their mores, their customs...

Of course, when thinking about the prospects for our federation, it is also necessary to look beyond the confines of our own country, where we can also find beneficial experience that we can use. But we must use it not mechanically, but, rather, with a consideration of our own peculiarities. In this sense it is of interest to us.

For example, the United States of America. Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov referred frequently to this example and he dreamed of transferring—in one form or another—the American model to our soil. This appears to be extremely tempting: to subdivide the country into approximately equal parts that would be the subjects of federation, and then delegate to the central authority whatever the individual state is unable to do (but this does not limit its freedom, "does not interfere with its life"), and everyone is content...

Of course, it is impossible to transfer this model mechanically to our conditions. But, in my opinion, it does make sense to think a bit about how we can use it. Yes, our peculiarities dictate a special approach. We cannot tell the Ukraine, "Subdivide into equal parts." Nor can the Russian Federation do this, without taking into consideration the interests of the various ethnic groups living on its territory... We are dealing, according to our Constitution, with a union of sovereign states. Although, from the point of view of the interrelationships between the federal authority and the authority in the outlying areas—in the states—the U.S. experience can prove to be beneficial. How is the division of authority carried out? What does this give to the local agencies of self-government and to the center? All this deserves attention.

There is also very interesting experience in Yugoslavia, both positive and negative. And that experience should also not be disregarded. Because we are dealing not only with state authority and structure, but also with party authority and structure: social institutions and other structures. And it is typical that practically the same problems arise in Bulgaria that arise in our country—conflict on the basis of nationality, at the basis of which conflict lies the difference in the economic development of the various republics. And so today some of them are also raising the question of seceding from the federation...

And, finally, there is the classic experience of the Swiss confederation, which we also cannot ignore.

But the main thing for us is to answer the question: what do the nations want? The Ukrainian nation, the Russian, the Lithuanian, the Bashkir... And how can their natural striving for independence and sovereignty be combined with the just as natural interests of integration and the exchange of all the modern achievements of civilization and culture? How can we build a house where everyone can feel comfortable and cosy?

Personally I assume that the best model would be the establishment of a definite version of the Common Market, and, in the beginning, it would not be a bad idea to carry out what is being done today within the confines of CEMA: the equivalent exchange of commodities at world prices. Of course, this could not be done in the course of a single day.

Under these conditions, not a single nation or republic could feel that it is being eaten up or robbed.

And it would be a flexible political structure in which every republic would find its own place, whether it be a union republic or an autonomous republic. And it would not be mandatory to call that structure a **federation**. It could still be called the **UNION**. You should call a cat a cat...

Then each republic could have separate treaties with other republics, and separately with the Union. Or, rather, treaties governing the **union**. These treaties must stipulate the rights and duties of all the members of the Union: which ones belong to the republics themselves, and which are delegated to the center.

In a word, we have before us a very broad field for analysis, comparisons, and conclusions.

**Mikhail Bronshteyn: "The Sanctions Against Lithuania Are Having an Impact Throughout the Country..."**

The fact of the matter is that the petroleum products obtained after the refinement of the crude oil in Lithuania used to supply all the Baltic republics, as well as Pskov and Kaliningrad oblasts in RSFSR. And in order to prevent them from suffering from the sanctions that were applied in Lithuania, an alternative scheme for supplying them by sea is being thought up. But this will be more expensive for the country! And there is yet another factor: the "petroleum blockade" is most painful within Lithuania itself for the enterprises of union subordination. That is, the power tactics being used as a result of the decisions that were hastily made are having a reverse effect. Today it is impossible to chop through that knot. Everything in the country is interrelated too closely.

The situation in Lithuania is very indefinite. Prior to the election of the republic's Supreme Soviet, Brazauskas' chances seemed to be much more preferable than those of Landsbergis. But, as everyone knows, Brazauskas was seeking other ways to resolve the question of Lithuania's sovereignty... However, the application of sanctions on the republic and the strong-arm pressure exerted on it from the center greatly reinforced Landsbergis' positions. And one must realize clearly that any party, any movement, any leader in the national republics who removes from the "banners" the slogan of independence will prove to be outside of politics, will lose authority, and will be perceived as a traitor to the interests of the nation.

There is a very different understanding of independence among the various categories of the population, and even within homogeneous ethnic groups—both among the Russian-speaking population and among the indigenous inhabitants of the republics. And if we carry out a detailed analysis of the possible paths and scenarios for secession from the USSR, we will succeed in finding a solution that satisfies both the interests of the nations inhabiting the particular republic (we are speaking, for the time being, specifically of the Baltic republics), and the interests of the Union.

Currently, in the discussions of the secession by the republic, one hears the dominant chord of "divorce." But even this chord has several versions. There is "divorce Moscow-style"—the law governing secession, a law that we—the USSR Supreme Soviet—recently enacted. The essence of this law is actually to use methods of force to prevent a divorce. If one continues the simile, this law stipulates a prolonged and rowdy divorce trial, with both sides submitting evidence to support their side of the dispute... Long years of haggling, under conditions of extreme instability and the "heating up" of extreme, radical movements within the republics—that is what this law entails.

True, at such time people express the cautious hope that within the five years stipulated by the law someone will change his mind or something will change... But one does not have to possess an excessively rich imagination to realize that actually, during all these years, the tension will only increase. This can be precisely forecast if one is guided by the law that was mentioned. It is for good reason that it was immediately christened the "law of nonsecession." Essentially speaking, it is the law of going down a blind alley.

Another scenario is "divorce Lithuanian-style." It also is rather simple: "I was married against my will. I never loved you. Let's get divorced, but you will have to give me everything you own as compensation for the damages you inflicted on me."

Similar scenarios are also seen in other republics. With slight differences. For example, in some respects the Estonian version resembles the Moscow version: a transitional period is provided for. That is, it is a prolonged dispute with indefinite consequences, in a "state of suspension"...

Let us analyze, using Estonia as an example, the placement of the forces among the inhabitants of the republic. With the Estonians, it is more or less clear: for them the question of sovereignty does not cause any doubts. But among the Russian-speaking segment, everything is by no means as simple as Comrade Kogan depicts it in the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is definitely not so simple. A sociological survey shows that no more than 20-25 percent of the non-Estonians are obvious adherents of the International Movement. These are the people who were unable to adapt to the local conditions, or who did have sufficient time to do so. They exist everywhere. In

Moscow they are "affectionately" called the "limit." You know what the attitude toward them is in Moscow... These people have the least secure position socially, and in the event that anything happens they will be the first people to become unemployed. Therefore they are afraid of changes more than anything else. Others may or may not like them, but it is necessary to understand them. The international movement expresses the interests of this group. And this is natural, and is how things should be...

There is also another group—which is approximately equal in size. It is made up of republic inhabitants of other nationalities who have been integrated, who know the language or at least understand the Estonians' aspirations.

But the absolute majority of Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia are somewhere between these two groups. For the time being, they are wavering. They understand the justness of the Estonians' demands, but they also cannot pull up their roots and leave Estonia. Moreover, they are afraid of becoming second-class citizens. Because a number of statements and even actions in the republic have created a basis for such fears. But the further development of the situation in Estonia and Latvia will depend largely on with whom this segment of the population will go. It depends on the answer to the question: where will these republics go?

Let us consider the alternate versions of the "divorce scenarios." The Lithuanian version... It seems to me that the current leadership in Lithuania has proven to be short-sighted. We had discussions many times both with Brazauskas and with Vilkas, and they had their own paths to independence, which, incidentally, were completely different from what we see now. Because the fact of the matter is that today there cannot be any absolute independence. In one way or another, all countries are united—up to and including the nonalignment movement. We are all dependent upon one another. We are all "tied" to one another on this small planet. Therefore what we need is not the "Moscow" scenario or the "Lithuanian" scenario, but a working version of it. It is necessary not to get a divorce, but to build the marriage in a new way.

I would like to continue this simile even more. Research has shown that a marriage for love is not necessarily the strongest or the longest-lasting. Love comes and goes. An arranged marriage is more lasting.

I understand, for example, that it was necessary for us literally to use force to prevent the French prisoners of war whom we had liberated from tearing to pieces the Germans who had previously been their jailers. The hatred that the French prisoners had for Germans surprised even us Soviet soldiers and officers.

But what do we see now? Today, united by the Common Market, France and West Germany are the truest and most reliable allies and partners.

It is necessary to build relations on the basis of interest. On mutual and solid economic interest. The marriage for love did not work out. Nor did the marriage against one partner's will. Consequently, it is necessary to have an arranged marriage. Once again I refer to the experience of the Common Market: every state is a sovereign state. France is France; Germany is Germany. England and Italy... At the same time a completely realistic concept develops: they are all EUROPEANS. No one loses his individuality, but at the same time they are united.

When the draft of the USSR Law on Rights (that is not the exact name of it, but one that conforms to its meaning) was being discussed, I proposed three points that were not accepted. But I would like to repeat them here:

1. Within the confines of the USSR, differentiated forms of treaty relations between the Union and the sovereign republics can be established.
2. The economic basis of the unification of sovereign states into the Union is the formation of a common union-wide market in which the participants enjoy equal rights, advantages, and the protection of their economic interests. That is: without that market you have benefits; outside of it, you may trade if you like, but not at world prices... Incidentally, then, Lithuania would have thought 20 times about whether or not to leave the union market. And...
3. The political basis of the unification of sovereign states into the Union is mutual assistance in defending their territorial integrity and peaceful development. So that everyone would be assured that the Union will defend it against any aggression from without.

Those are the three basic principles that, in my opinion, should form the basis of a future Union treaty.

The Baltic republics have always had their own special status. That area either was the "corridor" through which usurpers passed, and then there remained out of the population of that same Estonia—after wars, cholera, and the plague—only approximately 100,000 persons... Or, when the trading caravans traveled through that area and the Hanseatic League existed, the beautiful city of Tallinn and the beautiful Riga and Vilnius arose, and those regions flourished. Which version will be chosen today?

#### Yuriy Shcherbak: "Why Did the Dinosaurs Die Out"?

Sometimes a wild idea pops into my head: that someone very evil is deliberately tightening up the screws and increasing the tension in the republics, in order to destabilize the system and cause our country to collapse. Although, in principle, I do not believe in all those plots that people in various places frighten us with from time to time. But it is difficult to get rid of that impression. Although actually, of course, objective laws governing the development of society exist.

In general it seems to me that the time has come to use within the country the experience accumulated by our MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. Today one of our most progressive ministries among those that are operating in a spirit of the way of thinking is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And I think that its rich potential for concluding international agreements and for finding MFA decisions that are acceptable for all sides could very easily be used within the country also. Perhaps my idea will seem strange—the idea of transforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into the Ministry of Internal Affairs—but today is the time to look for untraditional decisions...

(Remark from the floor: "But only provided the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] will not be given the responsibility of executing the functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the international scene!..." General animation in the auditorium.)

I agree with the correction.

I want to make certain refinements. It would seem that today's discussion will only indicate the path along which the search for decisions should be made. It will only designate the points of contact among us. And it would be naive to count on any rapid answers if the questions took so long to mature and to become so painful.

But two extreme points of view concerning the problem, it seems to me, should be immediately cut off. They are the view of the Union from imperial positions and the attempt again to "destroy to the very foundation."

I think that everyone present will agree with me that the Soviet Union in the form in which it currently exists (and we have today vestiges still of the Stalinist model of a totalitarian state) has become obsolete and cannot exist any longer. To this I can add—as a biologist and as a physician who used to study organisms—that this tremendous country, if there is supercentralization of its administration, cannot exist, just as the dinosaurs could not exist and withstand competition in the course of natural selection with other organisms. It is precisely because they were unable to adapt to the conditions of the evolution of the animal kingdom. Those supertremendous organisms, controlled by a minuscule brain, proved to be less tenacious of life, less viable, than other animals.

From the point of view of cybernetics, incidentally, such a cumbersome system, practically speaking, is uncontrollable, and we are seeing this today in the example of the helplessness of our more than 50 union ministries...

Many people agree today that it is necessary to restructure that union and to build it on new principles. And those who dream nostalgically about the past, who want to return to the mustachioed generalissimo, are also biologically doomed.

This also reflects partially on the work of our Supreme Soviet. We pass a large number of laws and decrees, and in a few days or weeks we see that they are not working. Either they are already obsolete, or they are unjust... We spend a large amount of time and energy on this, but the end result is absolutely zero.

It seems to me that one of the reasons is that the document drafts that are presented to sessions of the Supreme Soviet are rough and poorly thought-out and have not been worked out in detail. Therefore I make a suggestion for the people's deputies who share our positions: representatives of RSFSR, the Ukraine, Estonia, Armenia, Yakutia, and other republics have gathered here, and we must create a concrete political document. Not today, and not tomorrow—hastiness is improper here. But we must gather once again—many times, if necessary—and prepare that kind of document. Because the Soyuz [Union] deputy group has been created. They are people of the old design. They are very aggressive. They are in favor of an "indissoluble Union"... They make very wise statements, because everything is completely clear to them!

But, as for us, everything is far from clear. It would seem that it is necessary to create our own group and to come forward with **OUR** document at the Supreme Soviet, addressing both the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and all the people's deputies. Because what is happening today, it seems to me, is destructive.

Using the example of the Ukraine, I will say (although I am accused of separatism, although that is far from the true situation, because in the Ukraine many people accuse me of having "sympathies toward Muscovy"): if the question of the formation of autonomies on the basis of nationality is resolved **right now** in our republic, it will lead only to the collapse of the Ukraine. I have heard here the question of the attitude of our Estonian comrades to creating for them an autonomy in the northeast, where basically non-Estonians live, and I particularly like Klara Semenovna Khallik's answer: if there is a free Estonia, we would be in favor of such an autonomy. And it is the same situation in the Ukraine. If, right now, autonomies were formed in Galitsia, the Crimea, in Donetsk Oblast, and other regions where residents of other nationalities are concentrated, then we will get a Ukraine without Kharkov, without Donetsk, without Odessa, and, finally, without Kiev. I don't want to see that kind of Ukraine! I have just one Ukraine, the one where I was born, the one where I live and where I want to die. Yes, division of the land according to national principles, as occurs in the FRG, is possible. But provided that it will be resolved in a free and independent Ukraine by its nations.

**Mikhail Bocharov: "The Richest Country, That Is Eking Out a Pauper's Existence"**

I have in mind the RSFSR, in whose name I would like to speak today, especially since I was elected an RSFSR people's deputy. On 16 May the 1st Congress of RSFSR

Soviets will begin its work. In my opinion, this actually should become a historic event.

Why, then, has it happened that a republic (and, essentially speaking, the country) that possesses the largest amount of dry land and the richest natural resources, is eking out such a miserable existence? Entire regions have been deserted, without even mentioning the destruction of culture and art or the collapse of agriculture, industry, and other spheres.

I have heard here comparisons between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Facts are cited concerning the attitude taken by the legislative and executive authority in the individual states toward the federal government... And there are those who want to present the union republic on the state level. Including the RSFSR, with its 150 million persons... Moreover, when discussing the forms of presidential government—even before the adoption of the institution of the presidency itself—people speaking at the Supreme Soviet recommended taking as a model the experience of France, America, Italy, and a number of other countries. But is it really possible in this respect to compare our state formation (which a few people continue stubbornly to call a country, or a power, although the very name speaks for itself: the UNION of Soviet Socialist **REPUBLICS**) with Western models?

Let us continue the discussion about names. The largest republic is called the “**RUSSIAN** Soviet **FEDERATIVE** Socialist Republic.” It is part of a **FEDERATIVE** formation—the USSR. A federation as part of a federation... You know, it is very complicated for a nonjurist to understand that tautology. It's like “buttery butter”... And as for attempting to equate all this to the United States, you'll just have to excuse me!

I have a few questions in this regard. For example: why isn't the RSFSR, which has on its territory a large number of autonomous republics and other national-territorial formations, represented in the United Nations as a sovereign state? Why are there no embassies from the Russian [RSFSR] state in the capitals of foreign states? Because Russians can be found throughout the world, in almost every country (including every union republic) in more than an adequate number. But for some reason Russians constantly undergo all kinds of unpleasantnesses, including those within the Soviet Union. Russians are accused of driving tanks into other republics and usurping their sovereignty (Note by V. Ivanov: That accusation was made in a statement).

As you can see, there are more than enough grounds for accusations leveled at the Russian nation. By “Russian nation” I understand all the nations that are part of the Russian Federation.

Let us consider yet another problem.

Our country, our Union, is a union of **distributors**, rather than producers. We have become accustomed to distributing absolutely everything. But the most terrible thing is

that we have equalized all the union republics in this distributive mechanism. We all lived identically poorly; the so-called “union budget” was identically distributed; and all the questions, even those in the area of culture, were identically resolved from the center. Why, for example, does the Union need a USSR Goskomsport [State Committee for Sports]? Isn't every republic actually able to resolve its own national problems that are linked with the development of sports?

I think that the law governing the sovereignty of the Russian Federation will probably be considered at the 1st Congress of RSFSR Soviets. Probably with the enactment of that law this great power will finally obtain the right to be called precisely that—a **POWER**, a state.

I do not want to say that the Russian Federation will secede from the Union. But it is possible that, after that congress, there will arise that new Union that many of those who spoke here mentioned: a **UNION OF COMPLETELY EQUAL STATES**, which all the union republics can enter **VOLUNTARILY** if they so desire (and, possibly, not only those republics, but also the East European countries). It will be—on a new economic basis—much more powerful than the present one.

But what is happening so far? There continues to be tension in the national republics: in Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Baltic republics... But we today want halfway measures to preserve the empire. But let's think a year, two years, or five years ahead. Let us refer to the experience that others have had.

So, possibly, the renewed Russia in some manner will use the experience of the United States. Then, probably, every autonomous republic in the RSFSR will receive many more rights than every individual state [in the United States] has today; and more legislative and executive power than those same states. Every autonomous republic will receive in the RSFSR government some kind of ministerial portfolio so that it can participate realistically in carrying out the executive power on the level of the entire country.

At least these suggestions are currently being considered—for their presentation to the 1st Congress of RSFSR Soviets.

Let's take a look at Europe. By 1992—in any case, this is what is planned—Europe will join that very Union that we already have today. But we certainly should decide right now what the economic basis for the development of each union republic should be. From the point of view of commodity exchange at world prices.

We are currently considering and enacting laws governing taxes and pensions, although we are well aware that in three or four months those laws (already enacted) will have to be repealed, since the changeover to the new prices will immediately entail changes in the entire taxation and pension system, wages, and other financial systems.



It seems to me that it ought to be possible right now, at the Union level, to employ a form similar to the European parliament, creating under it potentially powerful commissions that could coordinate definite economic activity of the union republics. Especially since, in the republics right now, the makeup of their Supreme Soviets and governments is changing (and in a few places has already changed). But we in the USSR Supreme Soviet are rushing to enact new laws, before new state agencies are elected in the republics. Why? Because we are promulgating laws that will soon be repealed by the Supreme Soviets in the republics. On the grounds that every republic is a sovereign state (as is stated in the Constitutions of the USSR and the republics themselves)... So let's just read through those different versions! But for some reason we don't do that. We stubbornly enact at the Supreme Soviet law after law, and then, two or three months later, we throw up our hands and say, "Again we failed to think about what would happen tomorrow..."

We are talking about the farsightedness of our Supreme Soviet and every USSR people's deputy. And yet the formation of new agencies of authority is coming to an end in all the republics and certainly the time has already come to prepare to sit down at the negotiations table. And to determine how all of us are supposed to act when the changeover is made to market relations and to world prices. It is a very serious question! The Central Asian republics will prove to be in the most disadvantageous position, and the Russian Federation will prove to be in the most advantageous one. According to preliminary estimates, the difference when changing over to world prices constitutes neither a lot, nor a little—31 billion foreign-currency rubles in a positive balance of trade in favor of Russia (after all the settlements for shipping in and out the commodities and raw materials). For other republics—the Ukraine, the trans-Caucasus republics, the Baltic republics, Belorussia—the balance of trade is also tentatively expected to be positive, but in miserly amounts: tenths or even hundredths of a billion rubles (foreign-currency, I emphasize).

(Question from the floor: "But what if such autonomous republics as Bashkiria, Tataria, or Yakutia raise the question of their secession from the RSFSR?")

Already that question arises constantly at sessions of USSR Supreme Soviet. I think that we will be able to resolve it at the negotiations table...

The discussion was recorded by Vyacheslav Ivanov, SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA special correspondent, at the session of USSR Supreme Soviet. Tallinn-Moscow-Tallinn.

Editorial note: If you have noticed, today's series of related articles dealt chiefly with the prospects of the STATE structure of the renewed USSR. Many statements made by participants of the discussion are by no

means indisputable, and it is difficult to agree with certain of their statements. Nevertheless all the positions deserve attention.

In the next few issues the newspaper intends to publish another series reporting on the same discussion, where the central place will be given to the national and demographic aspects of the problems, about which many interesting and unexpected judgments were also expressed.

Incidentally, this division, of course, is very arbitrary, inasmuch as all aspects of life in a multinational state are closely intertwined and substantially influence one another.

### Procedures, Strategy of Legislative Process Examined

90UN1882A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 90  
Second Edition p 2

[Article by Yu. Kalmykov, chairman of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation, under the rubric "Platform of the People's Deputy": "Strategy of Law-Making"]

[Text] Our parliament is at the beginning of the road. It has accumulated considerable law-making in less than a year. But it is premature to say that it is perfect. I would like to touch upon two problems in this connection: the law-making procedure and the ways of improving it, and the legislative strategy of the Supreme Soviet in general.

The recently adopted regulations for the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet contain a special section dealing with the procedure involved in the discussion of USSR draft laws, other acts deliberated by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and USSR Supreme Soviet and its organs. The drafts are submitted to parliament for consideration by the organs, organizations and individuals vested with the right to initiative legislation. However, this rule is not always adhered to. Draft laws find their way into committees and commissions which are discussed in working groups, without their prior presentation by the organs and individuals entitled to do so. For example, our legislation committee has seen draft laws on the freedom of consciousness and on public organizations, which nobody has submitted as part of legislative initiative. We should resolutely abandon such practice.

Officially registered, the draft laws are submitted for consideration to the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, one of which is recognized as the head one. All drafts are simultaneously sent to our committee on legislation for consideration. It acts as the head committee in a number of instances, making sure that they are prepared for discussion and are debated in parliament.

The Supreme Soviet committees and commissions either establish preparatory commissions or set up working groups directly. They discuss the submitted drafts in



detail, formulate articles and specific rules. Unfortunately, this procedure is not always enforced, because of lack of coordination in the work of committees and commissions.

It also happens that a draft law is taken up for discussion, but the conclusions made by the head committee are put aside, so to speak, and the deliberations on a document start virtually from scratch. Because of this, some drafts undergo three and not two hearings: deputies and committees (commissions) submit written amendments after the first hearing and make new proposals and express new ideas during and after the second hearing.

Two proposals have to be implemented at least to avoid this. First, a special coordination group should be set up whose task will be not just to inform the committees and commissions concerned about the forthcoming discussion of particular items of legislation, but also to ensure that their representatives took part in the drafting and final polishing of the documents. Second, it makes sense to establish a strict rule under which written amendments should be adopted only before and immediately after the first hearing. This will help parliament to save time which it needs so badly.

Another topical issue is the quality of the laws approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is crucial for parliament to draft effectively working acts. Otherwise, we face the danger of falling into the old ways, when the adopted laws were watered down, overpoliticized and contained general appeals and slogans rather than clear-cut normative rules.

I think that the overall quality of laws is higher today than it used to be in the past. But occasionally we make unforgivable mistakes. One example is the fundamental laws of the USSR and union republics on court procedures adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in the November of last year. The norm (article 14), which has no direct bearing on it, was included at the request of several deputies in the document which was otherwise thoroughly discussed and well prepared. The matter of allowing an attorney to be present from the moment a suspect is apprehended is a new and progressive rule, but it should be incorporated not in the act in question, but in the fundamentals of criminal court procedures in the USSR and union republics. By enshrining the rule allowing an attorney's presence at the moment of apprehension in the wrong document, we have created a host of questions facing practitioners, such as the rights enjoyed by an attorney at the given stage of the process, who is supposed to pay his fees, what should be done when the attorney named by the suspect is busy, and so on. In other words, the mechanism of implementing the right to protect the defendant's interests, the right stipulated by law, was not established (it could not have been established in the given act). Therefore, the fundamentals of criminal court procedures had to be altered.

Leading legal scholars, first of all representatives of the all-Union research institute of Soviet building and legislation, should be drawn more actively into drafting the laws passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to put them at an appropriate level. It would be expedient to set up a group of scholars in each parliamentary committee and each commission which would assist in preparing draft legislation, give expert opinion on the acts submitted, and provide advice for people's deputies.

The draft law can pass through three stages of discussion. The first one involves the discussion of its concept, fundamental principles and ideas by a committee or a commission. Naturally, this is the job for people's deputies. The second, to be addressed by qualified lawyers, should include the formulation of specific norms and rules. Finally, the last stage should deal with the process of discussing the prepared draft law by a committee (commission), with the participation of both deputies and representatives of legal science.

Now about the second problem, i.e., the strategy of legislative work. The USSR Supreme Soviet has passed about 40 laws over the period under review (approximately, in one year). One cannot regard the number of the acts approved sufficient, given the processes of restructuring taking place in the country which require ever new normative decisions. But this is not the point. The point is that the Supreme Soviet should outline a general perspective of drafting major decisions and adopting normative acts in relatively large series. Very often we are just following the events, hastily drafting acts which regulate certain conflict situations, or which deal with the development of relations which cannot be always described as the most important.

The USSR Supreme Soviet can be credited with passing the law on urgent measures on upgrading pensions and social security of the population; the fundamental laws of the USSR and union republics on leasing; the fundamental laws of the USSR and union republics on land; and the law on property. However, the plans drawn up a year ago, at least in the legislative committee, provided for drafting three groups of acts, those associated with the economic, political, and legal reforms. While we succeeded in passing such fundamental economic laws as the fundamental laws on leasing, the fundamental laws on land, and the law on property, we are late in passing the laws on taxing the profits of enterprises and organizations, the general principles of economic management and administering social and cultural sphere in the USSR and union republics. Slow progress is made in drafting legislative acts dealing with further political reform, the laws on the press, on public organizations, and the freedom of conscience. The drafting of the documents defining the process of implementing the legal reform has slowed down as well. The USSR Supreme Soviet should expedite the implementation of its own programs and should submit all the draft laws, as planned, for their first reading at least before the parliamentary break.

It is only the law on socialist enterprise whose passage raises some doubts. It is virtually impossible to incorporate in one law the same principles regulating respective relations, since soon enterprises are going to be based on different types of property - the property of citizens, collective, and state property. Given this situation, should not we follow a different path and, taking into account new economic conditions, re-word the law on state enterprise, amend the law on cooperatives, and draft a law on joint stock companies and a law on small businesses? These and some other acts could enshrine the status of respective enterprises, taking into account their specific conditions of operation and their economic foundations.

The USSR Supreme Soviet is completing its first year of work. It should formulate the strategy of law-making for the forthcoming period on the basis of its accumulated experience. It should embrace the drafting of fundamental laws affecting the most important areas of public relations. Such fundamentals are special acts. They regulate the most important public relations, on the one hand, and lay the groundwork for elaborating republican legislation, specifically, for passing republican codes, on the other hand. The acts adopted in the 1960s and 1970s simply do not work under the conditions of perestroika, or slow down the development of new public relations in some instances.

The demographic situation has been deteriorating in the country, and the employment problem has emerged. A considerable number of skilled workers move from state enterprises to cooperative organizations. New types of property imply the emergence of new types of labor organization at respective enterprises. These and other problems make it imperative to draft urgently new fundamental laws on labor.

The situation is as bad, as far as the solution of the housing problem is concerned. There are quite a few reasons for this. One of them lies in the fact that housing legislation is becoming outdated very fast and thus fails to account for present-day trends in economic development, nor to reflect the general desire to have the principle of social justice enforced in this important sphere of public relations. Under the guise of democratizing legislation, the acts were passed in the early 1980s which enabled some groups of the population to have considerable surplus of housing space, while giving others the "right" to modest accommodation, often without basic amenities. The loopholes in housing legislation leave room for abuses in allocating housing. The facts mentioned above make it imperative to address the problem of drafting new fundamental laws on housing for the USSR and union republics.

Simultaneously, we should define the most important spheres of public relations that need to be regulated anew in special laws. For example, when the law on property was discussed, many deputies spoke in favor of providing adequate protection for the items of intellectual property.

Indeed, we do not have the best copyright protection for the works of literature, science and art, nor for inventions. Moreover, our legislation is very dissimilar to the respective legislation in other advanced countries. We should revise the existing acts and adopt two new laws as soon as possible, if we intend to make tangible headway in scientific and technological progress - the copyright law and the inventor's right. The main aims we should try to achieve are to regulate relations among creative professionals and the users of their work through an agreement, eliminate any type of diktat on the part of government organs, and establish reasonable duties and taxes, on par with the requirements existing in international practice.

It is the right moment to address the environmental problems at a good legislative level. These problems are assuming a universal, global character; it looks like that all states without exception will have to deal with them on the priority basis in a couple of years. Unfortunately, our legislation on environmental protection is behind the command of the time as well - it has reflected departmentalism and the administrative-command methods of regulating respective public relations to a great extent.

I think we should draft and pass a single law on environmental protection which would provide for a system of large fines for harming nature. It is only serious property sanctions, part of which are to be applied against the specific culprits, which are capable of putting an end to the deleterious consequences of the economic activity in which many enterprises are engaged and of meaningfully improving the country's ecological situation.

I would like to make the following point in conclusion. The USSR Supreme Soviet is flooded now with various draft laws submitted by the organizations and individuals who are seeking their passage. Those initiating a law regard their draft as the main and the most important one. One can understand such attitude. However, one should realize that the USSR Supreme Soviet should focus primarily on the solution of the fundamental problems facing the state.

#### **Komsomol Central Committee Adopts Resolutions, Appeals**

*90US0928A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 90 pp 3-4*

[Decrees, Resolutions and Appeals adopted at the First Komsomol Central Committee Plenum]

[Text] On 4 May 1990, the First Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee was held in Moscow. Upon instructions of the 21st Komsomol Congress, the Plenum reviewed the draft resolutions and appeals submitted by the discussion centers, clubs and congress delegates and adopted the corresponding decisions on them and these are now published in today's issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

## DECREE

**On Principles for the Forming and Basic Functions of the Permanent Commissions and Councils of the Komsomol Central Committee**

1. To agree to the principles for the formation and the basic functions of the permanent commissions and councils under the Komsomol Central Committee (appended).
2. To instruct the Komsomol Central Committee Buro together with the leaders of the commissions and councils to work out and submit for review by the Second Central Committee Plenum a Draft Regulation on the Formations of the Komsomol Central Committee as well as proposals on the structure and personnel of their working groups.

**On Principles of Formation and the Main Functions of the Permanent Commissions and Councils of the Komsomol Central Committee**

Proceeding from the functions and powers of the Komsomol Central Committee as outlined by the 21st Komsomol Congress, on the basis of the equal representation of the principals of federation on each of the commissions and broad representation of the categories of youth on the councils of the Komsomol Central Committee as well as the free choice of the commission and council, the proposal is made to form six permanent commissions and three councils of the Komsomol Central Committee.

Here it is to be kept in mind that the membership of the permanent commissions is determined by the representation of one Central Committee member from each principal of federation (that is, at present 19 persons). The membership of the councils could, along with the Central Committee members who are representatives of the principals of federation, also include other members of the Komsomol Central Committee, congress delegates and representatives from the various categories of youth.

**Permanent Commissions of the Komsomol Central Committee and Their Basic Functions**

1. The Komsomol Central Committee Commission on the Questions of Regulating Internal Komsomol Relations

Its main functions are related to the following:

- Forecasting the development of the Komsomol, informational-analytical activities, controlling internal Komsomol relations;
- Coordinating the normative base for the principals of federation, settling arising contradictions, observing the inalienable rights of the principals of federation and the rights of the organization;

- Explaining and interpreting the provisions of the Komsomol Bylaws, exercising control over the observance of the Bylaws, carrying out the program documents and resolutions of the Komsomol Congress and the All-Union Komsomol Conferences;

- Studying and disseminating the work experience of the Komsomol organizations and providing practical aid to them;

- Studying the Komsomol cadres and aktiv in scientific and educational institutions under the Komsomol Central Committee, conducting scientific research and providing procedural aid to the institutions of learning of the Komsomol organizations;

- Determining the dates and working out the procedure for holding pregress reports and elections to the Komsomol, other all-Union acts and measures as well as the procedure for electing delegates to the Komsomol conference and congress;

- Working out the drafts of enforceable documents on the questions of registering Komsomol members as well as storing and issuing the blanks of Komsomol documents.

2. The Komsomol Central Committee Commission on Sociopolitical Problems and Civil and Cultural Initiatives of the Youth

Its main functions are:

- Working out the main political guidelines in Komsomol activities;

- Study and analysis of the sociopolitical processes and events occurring in the society, among the youth, and preparing draft decisions on these questions;

- Collaboration with the youth sociopolitical organizations and movements in the nation;

- Supporting the patriotic and cultural initiatives of the youth;

- Assisting in the development and furthering of morality and the spiritual concerns of the younger generation;

- Creating conditions for the free development of the individual and for the disclosure of its creative potential;

- Propagandizing a healthy way of life;

- Developing a system of youth mass information media;

- Determining the political line of the Komsomol press;

- Analysis of the development trends in the mass information media.

3. The Komsomol Central Committee on Cooperation With State Bodies and Social Organizations

Its main functions are the following:

- Activities related to representing Komsomol interests in the all-Union bodies of state power and social organizations;
- Working out forms and methods for Komsomol cooperation with all levels of soviets, executive bodies of power, coordinating and assisting the activities of the group of USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol;
- Expert evaluation of legislative and executive enactments submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet and to the government in the aim of defending the interests of the youth, working out proposals for plans of national socioeconomic development on the questions of state youth policy;
- Studying the socioeconomic situation of the youth in society and coordinating scientific research in this area.

#### 4. The Komsomol Central Committee Commission on International Collaboration

Its basic functions are the following:

- Elaborating the priority areas for the international activities of the Komsomol;
- Elaborating the position of the Komsomol on the most important questions of international life and submitting proposals on the development of Komsomol international ties;
- Coordinating the international ties of the principals of federation and carrying out representation of the interests of the Komsomol Central Committee in international measures.

#### 5. The Komsomol Central Committee Financial and Economic Commission

Its main functions are the following:

- Working out the ways for the development of the Komsomol economy, supervising the carrying out by the Komsomol Central Committee subdivisions, the specific financial and economic activities in the Komsomol and related to the centralizing of such type activities in the state;
- Drawing up and submitting to the Plenum the Komsomol Central Committee budget;
- Supervising the activities of the enterprises and economic subdivisions of the Komsomol Central Committee;
- Reviewing the questions of allocating the funds formed on the level of the Komsomol Central Committee from the profit of the enterprises and economic organizations of the Komsomol Central Committee between the principals of federation;

—Forming and approving the plans and limits of capital investments;

—Distributing the funded material resources;

—Working out and approving the enforceable documents of the Komsomol Central Committee within the limits of the powers defined by the 21st Komsomol Congress;

—Resolving conflict situations over the questions of ownership and finances as arising between the principals of federation.

#### 6. The Komsomol Central Committee Commission on Interethnic Relations and Regional Problems of Youth

Its main functions are related to the following:

—Studying and forecasting problems which influence interethnic relations and the international education of youth and on this basis elaborating proposals for the involvement of Komsomol organizations in harmonizing interethnic relations;

—Working out proposals of the Central Committee (together with the Komsomol Central Committee Commission for Cooperation With State Bodies and Public Organizations) on the problems of the Soviet Federation, defining, when necessary, the forms and methods of effective involvement of the Komsomol Central Committee in realizing state and public measures to normalize relations between the youth in different regions of the nation;

—Considering the international and national interests of the Komsomol organizations in working out and adopting any decisions of the Komsomol Central Committee;

—Working out and implementing general Komsomol and regional specific programs for improving the social infrastructure of regions, employment of the youth, ecology and other problems.

#### Komsomol City Councils and Their Basic Functions

##### 1. The Komsomol Central Committee Council for Problems of Working Youth

The basic functions of the council are as follows:

—Forecasting the development of the all-Union Komsomol associations on the basis of the commonness of socially significant interests of the working youth;

—Working out specific programs and coordinating the activities of the Komsomol organizations in protecting and realizing the interests of the different social groups of the working youth;

—Generalizing and disseminating the advanced experience of the work done by the primary Komsomol

organizations of the working youth, providing them practical aid and coordinating scientific research on the given question;

- Participation in organizing the training of the cadres and the aktiv;
- Organizational and procedural support in implementing socially significant initiatives of the Komsomol organizations of working youth;
- Coordinating the activities of the Komsomol Central Committee departments and subdivisions in working with young workers;
- International youth collaboration in the labor area.

## 2. The Komsomol Central Committee Council for the Problems of Student Youth

The Committee for Student Youth Affairs of the Komsomol Central Committee Council

The basic functions of the committee are:

- Working out the position of the Komsomol Central Committee on the social and legal defense of students, initiating the appropriate legislative enactments;
- Assisting the democratization and humanization of education, broadening the rights and powers of the students in the managing of institutions of learning;
- Support and development of creative initiatives, associations and movements of the student youth, including socially significant ones;
- Working out programs aimed at realizing the interests and abilities of the students.

The Student Committee of the Komsomol Central Committee Council

The basic functions of the committee are:

- Informational-coordination and methodological on the questions of the activities of the Komsomol committees of VUZes and technical schools;
- Protecting the specific interests of the Komsomol students (and the student youth as a whole) in the socioeconomic sphere;
- Organizational-political in running a dialogue with the student associations operating within the USSR Constitution;
- Supervisory-executive—in analyzing the fulfillment of the decisions of the All-Union Student Forum by the Komsomol Central Committee as a co-participant in the Forum;
- Organizational-procedural—for participation in international collaboration in the sphere of education, student exchange, carrying out the contacts of the Komsomol committees of the VUZes and technical

schools with international and national student organizations (together with the Komsomol Central Committee Commission for International Collaboration);

- Expert evaluation—in assessing the draft documents of the state bodies and social organizations, including the Komsomol, on questions involving the interests of the students of the higher and specialized secondary institutions of learning.

## 3. The Council for Youth Problems of the USSR Armed Forces

The main functions are the following:

- Coordinating the activities of the Komsomol organization councils of the Army and Navy, the Border and Interior Troops and the Komsomol Central Committee in working out a scientifically sound overall concept for the role of the Komsomol organizations in the troops, providing practical aid to them in development, assisting the processes of the democratizing of their activities;
- Cooperation of the Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, the Border and Interior Troops with the principals of federation on the questions of preparing youth for military service, providing social amenities for the young servicemen and the members of their families, personnel being discharged into the reserve and using their potential in implementing socially significant affairs and creating conditions for them for active participation in the political life of society;
- Support patriotic and athletic-tourist youth movements and initiatives including exploratory (working to perpetuate the memory of the defenders of the motherland) and exploratory-rescue (participating in eliminating the consequences of disasters) detachments, physical culture and tourist trips, games, competitions, defense-patriotic and historical-patriotic associations of Young Armymen and social movements.

## RESOLUTION

### On Student Youth

The changes occurring in the nation as yet have little changed the situation of the student youth. The absence in the nation of a real dependence of the quality of a person's life upon his education and professionalism impedes the restructuring of both the school as well as society as a whole.

The new status of public education as a state-social system has as yet not been realized in a majority of the institutions of learning. Up to now, they remain politically backward and a materially poorly-off sphere.

In relation to the school and the student youth, the Komsomol also has been guilty of relying on the "residual principle." This is one of the main mistakes in the

activities of the Komsomol. The loss by the Komsomol of influence on the students has been accompanied by a decline in the authority of the Komsomol among the youth. The changes occurring in the political system of society are being reflected in the school and are creating a new situation in the activities of the student Komsomol organizations.

1. The Komsomol Central Committee considers it essential to work out and adopt legislative enactments to protect the rights and liberties of children and juveniles and establish an effective mechanism for their legal and social protection.

The Central Committee Plenum supports the proposal by the delegates of the 21st Komsomol Congress on forming young citizen chambers in all levels of soviets as well as adopting a law governing the labor of students during time free of studies.

2. The Komsomol Central Committee favors the democratization and humanization of public education and feels that its content should include the experience of world and national culture.

3. The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum links the renewal of the Komsomol to a new attitude toward the Komsomol students and defines work with them as a most important undertaking for the Komsomol. The new attitude of the Komsomol toward the student youth is based on a factual recognition of its positive role not only in the future but also today. This presupposes the establishing of favorable conditions for realizing the rights and potentials of each student, for his free and all-round development and active involvement in social processes.

The Komsomol Central Committee turns to the Komsomol committees with a proposal to guarantee the representation of students in the elective Komsomol bodies and assist in the organizational unification of Komsomol students within the territorial Komsomol organizations.

The main condition for the emergence of the Komsomol student organizations from the crisis is a turn toward the individual and its moral development.

The Komsomol Central Committee considers it essential for the Komsomol to participate in creating conditions for the intellectual development of juveniles and youth, for forming a sociostate system for disclosing and supporting young talent; for the development of the corresponding creative associations. It is to assist in the development of: the Union Educational-Scientific Society, the Fund for the Intellect of the 21st Century and the Young Railroaders Fund, the Youth Naval League and in working out and implementing a national youth program for the International Space Year (1992). To create conditions for the most favored labor activities of seniors during time free of study at school plants, in agrarian associations, student cooperatives and self-supporting Komsomol enterprises as well as other enterprises and organizations. The interethnic contacts of the

school youth should be broadened. The necessity has arisen of creating under the Komsomol committees a legal and psychological-pedagogical services for the students, a specialized weekly for juveniles as well as the All-Union Information Agency for Children and Juveniles Entitled Yunpress.

The Komsomol Central Committee gives particular importance to creating an atmosphere among the student youth of mutual understanding and sincerity making it possible to avoid conflicts over nationality, social, political, religious and other grounds.

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum supports the initiative of holding all-Union assemblies of Komsomol students.

**Decree of the First Komsomol Central Committee Plenum Relating to the Resolution of the Student Club of the 21st Komsomol Congress**

1. To instruct the Student Committee of the Komsomol Central Committee Council on Problems of Student Youth [hereafter termed the Student Committee] to work out in 1990 a Program "The Komsomol and Student Movement."

To make the Student Committee responsible for coordinating the activities of the Komsomol organizations in the higher and specialized secondary schools, the student Komsomol structures, the carrying out of contacts and collaboration with student youth associations of a professional and social bent on the basis of the priority of the student interests per se, as well as coordinating the work to carry out the decisions of the forum, and representation of the interests of the Komsomol Central Committee in the state bodies and social organizations.

2. The Komsomol Central Committee Buro with a 3-month period is to discuss proposals on forming the All-Union Student Fund for providing aid to students and support for talented youth and submit this for review to the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.

3. To instruct the Student Committee prior to 1 September 1990 to submit a proposal on publishing an all-Union student newspaper for discussion by the Komsomol Central Committee Buro.

The Komsomol Central Committee Buro is to adopt the necessary measures for publishing an issue of an all-Union student newspaper in January 1991.

4. The Student Committee is to broaden in every possible way collaboration of the student organizations in the VUZes and technical schools and the student Komsomol structures with international, regional and national student organizations, societies of foreign students as well as the practice of international student exchanges.

5. To instruct the USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol to come out in support of the decisions of the

Student Club of the 21st Komsomol Congress in discussing the USSR Law on Taxation and the Principles of the USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Public Education.

#### On Rural Youth

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum supports the initiative of the delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress on establishing a Rural Youth Club and considers it advisable to turn this into a permanent one.

The Komsomol Central Committee Buro is instructed:

- Together with the USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol to work out a program for the activities with rural youth and, using the right of legislative initiative, to work for the adoption of legal enactments aimed at the full satisfaction of the interests and needs for viable labor, everyday life and leisure of the rural young men and women;
- To study the question of Komsomol participation in creating an All-Union Fund for the Rebirth of the Countryside as a voluntary social organization to restore the economy of the countryside and maintain its cultural and moral values.

#### On the Komsomol and Youth Policy in the USSR

The Komsomol Central Committee voices serious concern and alarm over the complex economic situation, the state of the intellectual, physical and moral health of the younger generation. The youth, with the declaring of equal rights and liberties, actually have fewer opportunities in realizing these in comparison with the other categories of the population.

In considering it necessary to eliminate the economic and social inequality of the youth, the Komsomol Central Committee:

- Supports the basic areas of state youth policy as outlined by the Draft Law on the General Principles of State Youth Policy in the USSR and is in favor of its most rapid adoption;
- Instructs the USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol in the USSR Council of Ministers to resolve effectively the question of working out primary and long-range measures aimed at a fundamental improvement in the socioeconomic support of young citizens and young families and putting under its supervision the preparation of the draft of the Law on the State and the Young Citizen;
- Considers as a most important area of Komsomol activity the participation in creating a mechanism for implementing youth policy in the USSR and resolving the problems of the young person both through the state bodies as well as by their own forces;
- Favors the creation of regional youth programs;

—Favors collaboration with political parties, trade unions and other social organizations in carrying out a youth policy;

—Proposes as urgent measures the establishing within the legislative, executive and court bodies subunits dealing with juvenile and youth affairs and directly concerned with working out and implementing a youth policy on all levels of the administering of society;

—Turns to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Matters with a proposal to adopt the recommendations of the Committee to the local soviets on creating committees, permanent commissions and other deputy bodies for youth affairs;

—Favors the setting up along with a state social service for youth affairs, analogous services and centers of social, including youth, organizations;

—Supports the practice of creating commissions in the elective Komsomol bodies on questions of youth policy;

—Instructs the Komsomol Central Committee Buro to organize and hold seminar conferences and meetings of Komsomol committee representatives with the participation of young people's deputies on the questions of cooperation of the Komsomol and the soviets, the activities of permanent deputy bodies on youth affairs in the aim of working out uniform approaches (considering regional features, nationality and cultural traditions) in forming and implementing a state youth policy in the USSR. The Komsomol Central Committee insists on more effective and constructive actions by the nation's leadership to solve the socio-economic problems of the youth.

#### DECREE

#### On Developing Economic Initiative of the Youth

The attaining of the political aims of the Komsomol under the conditions of the radical restructuring of Soviet society is possible only by placing the specific interests of the youth at the center of the Komsomol's attention and by creating conditions for implementing its initiatives. The civil development of the youth having been turned into the opportunity for real participation in state life, can no longer be viewed within the context of the economic mechanisms of the obsolete monopolistic-state forms. A key problem for the Komsomol is at present the elaboration of a flexible, integrated mechanism of economic opportunities for the Komsomol, and creating a system of relations of its own physical plant with the state and other social organizations in the aim of the maximum involvement of the youth in creative labor.

This mechanism makes it possible to realize the initiative of the youth and the desire of the young men and women to participate in independent economic activity,

it provides employment for the youth, it develops creative activeness and educates new economic thinking and a generation of modern leaders.

Over the last 2 years, the Komsomol committees with the support of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have set up a network of enterprises operating under principles of complete cost accounting and self-financing and aimed at solving youth problems, the production of goods and the rendering of services and the implementation of socially significant charitable projects and programs.

At the same time, recently the national government and its financial bodies have not shown proper understanding of the importance and conditions for the functioning of the youth enterprises within the Komsomol system or an interest in their development.

This has been reflected in the recent decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Ministry of Finances as well as in the Draft USSR Law on the Taxes of State, Leased, Cooperative, Social and Other Enterprises, Associations and Organizations. The adopting of the law in its proposed wording would lead to the curtailment of the activities of the youth enterprises and to the halting of their financing for a whole series of social and charitable programs, and would deprive over 200,000 young workers of jobs. Under the conditions of the absence of a consistent state youth policy, this step would significantly weaken the economic opportunities and financial base of the youth, having eliminated, in essence, the socioeconomic complex producing products and services with a total of around 3 billion rubles.

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet and USSR Council of Ministers:

- To review the attitude toward solving youth problems, and provide assistance in establishing the organizational, legal and financial-economic mechanism for integrating the sector of the youth economy in the infrastructure of the national economy;
- Considering that the youth social organizations and their enterprises, as a part of the national economic complex, are a source for the financing of social programs coordinated with the local soviets, the expenditures of the youth social organizations and enterprises on solving social problems should be considered as a portion of the payments under the tax rates to the state and local budgets;
- To provide for the incorporation of the Komsomol enterprises in the state system of material-technical supply.

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum instructs the USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol to introduce these proposals to the USSR Council of Ministers and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Plenum instructs the Komsomol Central Committee Financial and Economic Commission:

- To work up and submit to the USSR Council of Ministers a packet of proposals on developing the economic initiative of the youth;
- For coordinating the economic activities of the Komsomol, for working out legislative and enforceable enactments and for collaboration with the state directive bodies, within the structure of the personnel of the Komsomol Central Committee an economic administration is to be set up;
- To work out a system for classifying the youth enterprises considering the possible attitude toward the given category of enterprises with various forms of ownership and submit this for approval to the USSR Council of Ministers;
- On the basis of the youth institute and the republic and zonal economic schools, to open up a managers school for raising the economic and legal knowledge of the Komsomol workers and the leaders of the Komsomol enterprises;
- For the social, political, economic and legal defense of the youth enterprises, to work out a packet of enforceable documents concerning the procedure for the establishing and operation of Komsomol enterprises and to approve these within a month after the adopting of the Law on the Socialist Enterprise;
- To hold a constituent conference on establishing a trade union for the employees of the youth enterprises.

#### **On the Draft Resolution of the 21st Komsomol Congress on Komsomol Property**

Proceeding from the Komsomol Bylaws and the congress resolutions adopted pursuant to them as well as considering the proposals of the discussion center on the Financial and Economic Activities of the Komsomol, the delegation from the Amur Oblast Komsomol Organization and the Komsomol delegates, the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decrees:

To instruct the Komsomol Central Committee Financial and Economics Commission to work out a Regulation on Money and Other Types of Property of the Komsomol and to submit a proposal on a mechanism for the collective disposal of Komsomol property by the principals of federation, for distributing income formed on the level of the Komsomol Central Committee and establishing within this the share of the principals of federation.

#### **On Komsomol Mass Information Media and Publishing Activities**

The Komsomol Central Committee proceeds from the view that in a society in which the press is not free, the citizen is also not free. For this reason we favor the adoption by the Third Session of the USSR Supreme



Soviet of a press law in a version which would provide democratic standards corresponding to the provisions of the Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements.

Considering the amendments incorporated by the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies in the USSR Constitution, political pluralism and a multiparty system are becoming a reality. The Komsomol supports the establishing of other youth publications and the development of co-publishing activities for the Komsomol committees and the state and social organizations on the basis of a commonness of interests, goals and tasks, as well as the initiative of the Komsomol organizations and the journalists from a number of the RSFSR oblasts for publishing regional sociopolitical newspapers for the youth along with their print organs. The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau is to study the possibility of establishing a Komsomol Press Association.

The Komsomol Central Committee is convinced of the need to democratize the relationships of the editors and the Komsomol organizations.

The relationships of the Komsomol organizations and their press organs should be based upon the programs approved by the founder for the activities of publications and editorial bylaws which define the status of the print organs and the procedure for the organizing of editorial staffs. The right of the founder in approving, choosing or appointing an editor should within the procedure defined by the editorial bylaws conform to the opinion of the editorial collective.

The Komsomol Central Committee expresses serious concern over the desire of the publishing houses to resolve a portion of their problems at the expense of youth publications and is insisting on the elimination of the "residual principle" in the material and technical support of the youth editorial personnel and in resolving the social and domestic problems of the journalists. The Komsomol organizations as the founders and their print organs establish their relations with the publishing houses on the basis of trilateral agreements within the framework of the current economic standards and financial norms and the profit obtained from publishing activity is to be distributed on the basis of a long-term contract.

The Komsomol Central Committee favors the economic independence of the editorial collectives. The editorial personnel of the Komsomol print organs should be given the rights of a legal entity and also provided with the right and opportunity of all Komsomol publications to be distributed over the entire territory of the USSR and abroad, regardless of the place and the status of the publication.

The Komsomol Central Committee favors the accelerated development of the Young Guard Printing and Publishing Association, the opening up of affiliates of the printing-publishing association, the construction of new printing capacity for the publishing houses of the

Komsomol committees. In line with this, it would be possible to propose that the CPSU Central Committee establish a joint commission with the Komsomol Central Committee for managing the independent publishing activities of the Komsomol.

The Komsomol Central Committee recognizes the advisability of establishing a nonstate public TV company which would also bring together the centers of cable and satellite television and considers it essential to improve the quality and increase the volume of youth broadcasting, including in the minority languages.

The Komsomol Central Committee recommends that the Komsomol mass information media in their activities consider the specific features and interests of the youth in the Union republics and autonomous formations, the various social groups and categories, as well as the life of the army Komsomol, and more actively carry out the idea of consolidating all constructive political forces in society, and in a balanced and constructive manner depict the problems of Komsomol life. Under present-day conditions, the Congress considers the achieving of social concord in the nation as the most important task of the Komsomol press.

In considering the particular importance and complexity of the problems related to the youth mass information media, at one of the nearest plenums of the Komsomol Central Committee they should examine the question of "The Komsomol Mass Information Media and Publishing Activities."

#### **On the Appeal to the Peoples and Young Persons of the USSR**

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decrees:

1. To support the "Appeal to the Peoples and Young Persons of the USSR" adopted by the Discussion Center of the 21st Komsomol Congress on "The Komsomol and Interethnic Relations."
2. To publish the given appeal in the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

#### **Appeal to the Peoples and Young Persons of the USSR**

The nation is beset by interethnic conflicts caused by the failings of "barracks socialism," by oppressions against entire peoples and by violating the rights of the national minorities. People continue to be defined by national features. Blood is being shed and people are dying. Children and young people are the first to suffer from the interethnic conflicts.

The measures initiated by the authorities have not provided stability. Methods of economic or political pressure merely exacerbate the situation. Regardless of the adopted decisions, the restoring of the violated rights of the formerly relocated peoples has not been fully carried out. This creates mistrust in interethnic relations as well as for the central and local authorities. If in the future the situation develops in a similar manner, then

the difficult process of renewal and democratization will be stalemated and the hopes of each people to self-determination and national rebirth will not be realized.

The delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress appeal to the reason and conscience of all USSR citizens, regardless of national affiliation, religious belief or political views. In the name of higher justice, of establishing good-neighbor relations, a firm national peace and for the future of our children and grandchildren, we urge that you rise above the old insults, forget about the discord, be ready to make reciprocal concessions and seek out mutually acceptable solutions together.

We call upon the mass information media for objectivity, balance in publishing materials on the problems of interethnic relations. We consider as inadmissible propagandizing nationalism and chauvinism in any form whatsoever. We propose that all political forces and national movements give up the demands of ultimatums and unilateral actions for a period of one year, until April 1991, and enter into a dialogue for the sake of compromise, for the sake of civil peace and not total confrontation.

Adopted by the Discussion Center of the 21st Komsomol Congress on "The Komsomol and Interethnic Relations" and Supported by the First Komsomol Central Committee Plenum

#### **On Condemning Instances of Vandalism Against Monuments to V.I. Lenin**

The qualitative changes occurring in the political system of the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe have been accompanied by a reassessment of the historical past and a new social conscience is being shaped.

These changes are directed at creating and developing humane democratic societies under the law and these are characterized by respect for the individual and the law while violence, historical nihilism and the defamation of monuments are unacceptable.

In this context, particularly alarming are the announcements of instances of vandalism against the monuments of V.I. Lenin. These barbarous actions are incompatible with the standards of a civilized society.

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decisively condemns such actions. We appeal to all persons of goodwill to prevent the outburst of extremist passions. We are in favor of applying the law against the initiators and participants in such actions.

#### **On the Ecological Situation in the City of Ufa in the Bashkir ASSR**

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decrees:

To instruct the Komsomol Central Committee Buro to review the question of the ecological situation existing in

the area of the city of Ufa in the Bashkir ASSR in the aim of providing concrete aid from the nation's Komsomol organizations.

#### **On the Youth Program of the International Space Year**

1. The appeal by a group of delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress on the Youth Program of the International Space Year (1992) has been taken into consideration. It is to be published in the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

2. To instruct the Komsomol Central Committee Buro to review the proposals by the Presidium of the All-Union Youth Aerospace Association Soyuz [Union] on the participation of the Komsomol committees and Komsomol organizations in working out and implementing the Youth Program of the International Space Year.

#### **1992—International Space Year**

The United Nations has declared 1992 to be International Space Year. The proposals to hold International Space Year have been voiced by scientists and the public in our nation and abroad. These were discussed at a forum devoted to the 30th Anniversary of the Space Age (Moscow, 1987), at the 39th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation [IAF] (India, 1988).

In 1988, the Forum of Space Agencies for the International Space Year was formed and this included representatives of 15 nations, including members of the European Space Agency.

Within the preparations for the Space Year, a number of national and international projects has been announced and these assume the broad participation of youth in them. By 1992, the United States is planning to begin to loft the first modules of the orbital station Liberty (with participation of nations from Western Europe, Canada and Japan). It has been proposed that a project be implemented for a global aerospace education with the aid of the satellites Mission to Planet Earth, the Project International Space University is already being implemented and so forth. The United States has officially proposed that sessions of the IAF and COSPAR, major scientific forums, be held in 1992 on its territory.

Considering the great interest of the Soviet and foreign youth in space research in the USSR, the Komsomol Central Committee, the USSR Gosobrazovaniye [State Education Committee], the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Ministry of General Machine Building, the All-Union Youth Aerospace Society Soyuz have proposed within the International Space Year to work out and implement on Soviet territory a special Youth Program.

The Youth Program of the International Space Year could include the organizing of a practical scientific conference of the International Space University in 1992 on Soviet territory, the conducting of national and

international flight space camps for students, the carrying out of a series of experiments proposed by the youth on real Soviet biosatellites, international exchanges of young researcher groups in the area of space biology, medicine, ecology, technology, equipment and so forth, including in the space flight program missions to carry out experiments proposed by the youth, the holding of Lessons From Space from on board the orbital station Mir.

The implementation of the program will make it possible to draw the attention of Soviet youth to the problems of space research, to develop equipment and technology, it will provide new conditions for familiarizing juveniles with knowledge on scientific principles, it will help in developing the extensive intellectual and technical conversion of cosmonautics into education and the national economy and ultimately will tell positively on forming the nation's intellectual potential.

The preparations for and the holding of the Youth Program of the International Space Year will encourage the development of the material-technical, economic, scientific-procedural base for working with youth in the sphere of intellectual creative activities and make it possible to broaden and strengthen international collaboration among the students and scientific youth in different countries on the matter of the peaceful development of space.

By 1992, it would be possible to create the first stage of a Technical Center in the city of Kaliningrad of Moscow Oblast, space camps in Kaluga, Krasnoyarsk and Gagarin of Smolensk Oblast, a youth observatory in Zelenchuk (Karachayevo-Cherkessian Autonomous Oblast of Stavropol Kray) and a Space Center at the USSR VDNKh [Exhibit of National Economic Achievements].

The First Komsomol Central Committee Plenum has supported the proposal of the delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress School on the involvement of the Komsomol organizations and Komsomol committees in working out and implementing the Youth Program of the International Space Year as a component part of the work being done on the intellectual development of the youth.

The proposals on the possible involvement of the Komsomol committees and Komsomol organizations in the Youth Program of the Space Year can be sent to the address: Moscow, Novaya Ploshchad, 6/8, Department of Youth Education of the Komsomol Central Committee, Presidium of the All-Union Youth Aerospace Society Soyuz.

## RESOLUTION

### On Labor Employment for Youth

The Komsomol Central Committee Plenum notes that under the conditions of the nation's transition to a planned market economy, labor employment is

becoming a very important problem for the youth. This problem has become particularly urgent in the Central Asian Republics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, as well as in a number of regions of the Ukraine and Moldavia.

Proceeding from the program goals of the Komsomol, the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum instructs:

- The Komsomol Central Committee Buro and the USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol to work out and incorporate proposals on the legal support for the social defense of the youth in the draft of the Legislative Principles of the USSR and Union Republics on the Employment of the Public and in the draft of the overall plan for a State Program for the Training and Use of Management Cadres Under the New Management Conditions;
- The USSR people's deputies from the Komsomol are to assume particular supervision over protecting the rights and interests of the youth in the labor sphere;
- The Komsomol committees in every possible way are to develop their own economic activities and set up a network of small enterprises not only for carrying out their own economic tasks but also for creating new jobs for the youth.

### On the Komsomol and the Defense of the Fatherland

The Komsomol Central Committee supports the activities of the USSR President, the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet government aimed at lessening international tension and ensuring a secure peace and the security of all peoples.

At the same time, military confrontation has still not been overcome and the USSR Armed Forces remain the guarantor for a dependable security of the state while a readiness to defend the fatherland is the highest civil and moral duty of each Soviet person.

Considering all of this, the Komsomol Central Committee considers as one of the most important tasks of the Komsomol the developing in the youth of an historical awareness, patriotism, and an aware responsibility for the readiness and ability to defend their fatherland.

The Komsomol, in remaining loyal to its traditions, will in the future assist in strengthening national defense, it will carry out active military patriotic work among the youth and support youth movements and initiatives such as exploratory detachments, defense-patriotic and military-history clubs and associations, councils of reserve personnel and internationalist soldiers, the young army movement and others which do not run contrary to the USSR Constitution.

Proceeding from the principles of a reasonable sufficiency and from the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, the state under the law and the standards of international law, the Komsomol Central Committee is in favor of a scientifically sound military reform, a

further democratization of Army and Navy life as well as a revising of military training in institutions of learning.

We feel that under the conditions of the reorganization, cutback and development of the Armed Forces, a defender of the fatherland should also be securely socially defended by the state.

The Komsomol Central Committee urges all the nation's Komsomol members not to give in to political provocations aimed at preventing induction into the USSR Armed Forces, discrediting the servicemen and infringing the rights of the members of their families.

We consider as inadmissible any violations of Soviet legislation and decisions of the government regarding the participants of the Great Patriotic War and the persons considered equal to them and the internationalist soldiers, any delay in presenting them with battle decorations, any manifestation of indifference or neglecting the memory of the past or the persons who honorably carried out their duty to the motherland.

In recognizing the validity of criticism against the negative phenomena existing in the Armed Forces, we are against any attempts to distort their role and purpose, to drive a wedge between the Army and the people and blacken military history.

The shaping of public opinion and the treating of army subjects in the mass information media should be just, respectful in terms of the army and military service.

The Komsomol Central Committee appeals to the USSR President, the Supreme Soviet and the USSR government to consider our opinions and proposals in working out and adopting the corresponding draft laws and decisions.

#### APPEAL

##### Of the Komsomol Central Committee to the USSR Supreme Soviet

In the USSR Armed Forces, for various reasons, regular servicemen continue to die, including as a result of improper relations and conflicts on interethnic grounds.

Such phenomena are particularly widespread in the military construction units as well as the troops and subunits subordinate to the various ministries and departments.

The given problem, in our view, occurs due to poor preparation of the youth for army service and due to the old approaches to manning the Armed Forces which do not take into account the sociopolitical changes in the nation, as well as due to the absence of proper social and legal protection of the servicemen.

This causes serious harm to the authority of the USSR Armed Forces, it causes a rise in anti-Army attitudes and causes serious difficulties in calling up the youth for

active military service, particularly in the regions of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and the Baltic Republics.

The Komsomol Central Committee turns to the USSR Supreme Soviet with a proposal among the primary questions related to the activities of the USSR Armed Forces to review the following:

- On accelerating the adoption of a USSR Law on Defense;
- For introducing civilian alternative service, including within the Union republics in which the draftees reside;
- Abolishing the military construction units subordinate to the ministries and departments which are not part of the USSR Armed Forces;
- Establishing material compensation for the parents of servicemen killed in regular service;
- For shortening the period of service for seamen and petty officers of the Navy and the naval units of the Border Troops of the USSR KGB;
- Guaranteed granting of annual leave to regular servicemen;
- Raising the monthly pay for regular servicemen, extending to them the surpayments and coefficients for serving under difficult physico-geographic and climatic conditions;
- Guarantees of service in a specialty for young officers and warrant officers ["praporshchik"] after completing a military school and a rapid solution to the housing question and jobs for members of their families.

#### DECREE

##### On the Draft Resolution of the 21st Komsomol Congress on the Personnel of the Komsomol Central Committee

The Komsomol Bylaws adopted by the Congress propose a substantial change in the functions of the personnel of the central elective bodies and their formation on new principles.

In line with this, the Komsomol Central Committee decrees:

1. To reorganize the personnel of the Komsomol Central Committee. The Komsomol Central Committee Bureau is to take measures to find employment for those workers who will not be invited to work as part of the new personnel.
2. The first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee is to organize the personnel of the Komsomol Central Committee and submit this for approval to the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau.

**On the Draft Resolution for the Surgut Alternative Movement**

Having heard and discussed the draft resolution of the 21st Komsomol Congress prepared by the Discussion Center Surgut Alternative, the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum notes that the movement Surgut Alternative contributes to activating life within the Komsomol as well as to working out realistic assessments of the processes occurring in the Komsomol. A number of proposals by movement members has been used in preparing for the plenums of the Komsomol Central Committee, the documents of the 21st Komsomol Congress, the Komsomol Bylaws and program aims.

At the same time, a number of positions proclaimed by the movement Surgut Alternative do not correspond to the decisions of the 21st Komsomol Congress.

Proceeding from the above-stated, the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum decrees:

1. In supporting activities aimed at the further democratization of the Komsomol, the Komsomol Central Committee considers it necessary to instruct the commission involved in working out the procedure for granting Komsomol organizations the status of principal of federation to work out by the next plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee normative documents which would define the procedure for granting the status of all-Union formation or association.

2. After the adopting of the appropriate documents, to review at a plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee the question of the possibility of granting the movement Surgut Alternative the status of an all-Union formation or association.

**On the Draft Resolutions Sent Out for the Consideration of the Delegates of the 21st Komsomol Congress Concerning Relations of the Komsomol and CPSU and Party Youth Policy**

To instruct the Komsomol Central Committee Buro to generalize proposals from the delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress, the proposals received from the Komsomol members and Komsomol organizations and after approval with the members of the Komsomol Central Committee, to sent them out to the CPSU

Central Committee as well as use them as the basis of the position of Komsomol representatives at the 28th Party Congress.

**CORRECTION for the Text of the Komsomol Bylaws and Resolutions of a Bylaw Nature in the 21st Komsomol Congress**

A mistake was made in transcribing the verbatim record of the 21st Komsomol Congress in the text of the Komsomol Bylaws and the Resolutions of a Bylaw Nature of the 21st Komsomol Congress.

The last section of Paragraph 27 of the Komsomol Bylaws should read in the following wording:

"Upon the demand of one-quarter of the principals of federation, the election of the first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee and the chairman of the Komsomol Central Control Committee can be carried out by voting by representation. In this instance a candidate for whom a majority of the delegations of the principals of federation has voted for is considered elected."

The last section of the Resolution of the 21st Komsomol Congress "On the Procedure for Electing Members of the Komsomol Central Committee, the Buro and Secretaries of the Komsomol Central Committee," should read in the following manner: "Upon the demand of the representatives of one-quarter of the principals of federation, the elections of the members of the Buro and the secretaries of the Komsomol Central Committee can be carried out by voting by representation. In this instance, candidates are considered elected when a majority of the delegations from the principals of federation present at the plenum vote for them."

The last section of the point of the First Resolution of the 21st Komsomol Congress "On Functions and Powers of the Komsomol Central Committee, the Buro, Secretaries and Personnel of the Komsomol Central Committee" should read in the following wording: "For these questions the representatives of one-quarter of the principals of federation as members of the Komsomol Central Committee can demand the adopting of decisions by voting by representation. In this instance, a decision is considered adopted if a majority of the delegations of the principals of federation present at the plenum have voted for it."

**Armenian CP Buro Reviews 27 May Unrest**  
*90US1081A Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian*  
*2 Jun 90 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "In the Armenian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro examined the issue of the tragic incidents that occurred on May 27 1990 in Yerevan and the urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the Republic.

The Central Committee Buro assessed the tragic incidents which took place as a gross provocation directed at further destabilizing the situation in the Republic and at inciting anti-Armenian feelings, and at confronting the Armenian people with Soviet Army and internal troops subunits.

It was stressed that what had occurred discredits the Armenian people's aspiration for democratization and the establishment of a rule-of-law state. But this incident cannot undermine the traditional friendship of the Armenian people with the Russian people and the long-standing feelings of our people toward the Soviet Army.

It has been pointed out that what has occurred was the result of criminal irresponsibility of separate groups and individuals and their instigative activities that resulted in bloodshed. This was facilitated by the passive, indecisive, and at times unprincipled activities of Republic law enforcement organs in maintaining public order, stopping numerous cases of arms seizures and seizing them from various formations, including those of a clearly criminal nature.

The Central Committee Buro tasked law enforcement organs to take the needed measures to stop any illegal activities directed at destabilizing the situation in the Republic and that incite people toward the paths of anarchy and disorder and to protect citizens' constitutional rights.

We have been informed that the Armenian SSR Procurator's Office has brought criminal charges on cases of the incidents previously mentioned. The results of the investigation conducted by the Republic Procurator's Office to determine the guilty parties and to hold them strictly responsible will be made available to the public in a timely manner.

We have also been informed that the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers has created a special commission with the participation of representatives of society that is inquiring into the tragic incidents which occurred in Yerevan on May 27. The entire society will be informed about the results of this inquiry and the measures taken in accordance with them.

The Armenian SSR Council of Ministers is developing measures for the confiscation of stolen and illegally held weapons, ammunition, explosives, and motor vehicles from criminal formations and individuals.

We stress the need to continue work for the voluntary return of seized weapons and motor vehicles. Otherwise, steps will be taken to confiscate stolen and illegally acquired weapons, ammunition, and motor vehicles in accordance with legal law enforcement organs.

The Central Committee Buro has pointed out Yerevan Armenian CP Gorkom's and Yerevan Gorsovet Ispolkom's passiveness in work to strengthen public order in the city and to prevent violations of public order. They need to take needed steps to stabilize the socio-political and operational situation in the city that has a substantial influence on the situation in the entire Republic.

Yerevan Party Gorkom has been tasked to provide the proper political assessment to the tragic events and to analyze the state of combating crime and other antisocial manifestations and to keenly and fundamentally examine shortcomings in this work and develop steps to eliminate them. To raise the responsibility of communists of law enforcement organs for the unconditional accomplishment of their duties.

It has been pointed out that in the existing conditions, the Central Committee Buro, the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers Presidium, and the Republic Government have adopted efficient steps to prevent escalation of tensions. A meeting that took place in the Armenian CP Central Committee between the Central Committee first secretary and the leaders of informal associations and organizations permitted us to localize the conflict and to defuse the situation through negotiations. The task was assigned to prevent further exacerbation of the situation at the meeting.

The Central Committee Buro considers the primary tasks of Party and government organs, ministries and departments, and of the entire population to be stabilization of the situation in the Republic and insurance of collectiveness, organization, and discipline in each city and rayon and in each work place.

Newspaper and magazine editors, Armenian SSR Gos-teleradio, and Armenpress have been tasked to widely cover the activities of Party, government, and law enforcement agencies to strengthen law and order and rule of law and to regularly inform society about the steps being taken to maintain public order and to combat crime. To seek the establishment of a situation of condemnation and intolerance toward provocative activities of hooliganistic and criminal elements and attempts to incite anti-Armenian and anti-Russian moods.

While providing a fundamental assessment to what has occurred, the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro simultaneously condemned the attempts of certain central mass media organs to categorize the tragic incidents in Yerevan as acts of terrorism. The Armenian people have always strived and now strive to resolve their problems through peaceful constitutional methods. And it can have nothing in common with terrorism.

The Armenian CP Central Committee Buro has once again called upon the Republic's workers to maintain calm and restraint, to not submit to provocations, and to promote the return of peace and calm in our home.

### Procurators View 27 May Yerevan Incident

90US1081B Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian  
6 Jun 90 p 1

[Interview with USSR Deputy Procurator General V.I. Andreyev and Armenian SSR Procurator A.A. Gevorkyan, by PRAVDA Correspondent A. Sarkisyan, Yerevan: "How the Law Requires That"]

[Text] The investigation continues into the tragic incidents that according to precise information took 24 lives, among them one serviceman.

PRAVDA Correspondent A. Sarkisyan asked USSR Deputy Procurator General V.I. Andreyev and Armenian SSR Procurator A.A. Gevorkyan to comment on the course of the investigation.

[Gevorkyan] The Republic Procurator's Office has filed two criminal cases on the incident at the Yerevan Railroad Station and on the case of the armed clash between gangs and USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] VV [internal troops] subunits. Operational investigative groups have been established from among experienced agents who are being directed by investigators of very important matters under the Republic Procurator. The cases will be combined into one if facts appear during the course of the investigation that attest to a link between the two episodes. I cannot presume to say anything specific other than what your readers already know. These are the requirements of the investigation. However I can firmly state that we will act impartially in accordance with the letter of the law in order to bring all of the guilty parties to justice who are responsible for the tragedy that took place. Besides intensive investigatory work, we conducted an analysis of the case at an operational meeting with the participation of V.I. Andreyev, USSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs I.F. Shilov, and Republic KGB and MVD agents.

Only two cases are obvious. A group of armed citizens conducted an attack on a military sentry to seize a weapon.

During the day of that same day, independent armed groups blockaded entry and exit from Yerevan that served as grounds for an armed clash between them and internal forces subunits. Several versions exist about what took place. The investigation will show which of them is true. As you pointed out, while respecting the law on presumption of innocence, I must refrain from any assessments whatsoever all the more so from categorization of activities of some or other participants in incidents. I would like to request that you also do not attempt to prematurely assess this complex situation.

[Andreyev] I concur with the Republic Procurator. The fact is that someone has begun using the term "Armenian terrorists" and caused a reverse reaction in Armenia. I met and talked with quite a few people. They are correct: It is impossible to ascribe terrorist moods to the Armenian people. What occurred in Yerevan is a matter of the hands of individual groups whose activities are also being investigated by procurator office organs. We have still not established the attackers' goal and therefore we also cannot categorize their activities. Furthermore, I, a Russian man, am concerned about interrelations among the peoples of our country. Recall the moral loss we inflicted on ourselves having proclaimed the so-called "Uzbek Affair," when we should have talked about specific facts of bribery and corruption and not have played with the dignity of an entire people. It is also the same in this case. It is to no one's advantage if moods are incited against an entire people in the country all the more so if the people are not at fault.

[Sarkisyan] Tell me, what do you see as the way out of the situation that has developed? Armed formations are an objective fact of our lives. Appeals to voluntarily surrender weapons have not achieved success. How can this be?

[Gevorkyan] We can approach the solution to this problem in various ways. Confiscate the stolen weapons by force means to certainly result in new victims. The reality is such that we must take into account the numerous causes that promote the preservation of tension. Therefore, I think that the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in execution of the May 11 decision of the Republic Supreme Soviet adopted the proper resolution that recognized as necessary the formation of independent social formations to prevent violations of the law and to render assistance to law enforcement organs in this matter within the structure of the Defense Soviet under the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet. The Republic Council of Ministers is tasked to develop a provision to regulate the powers of these formations. Law enforcement agencies are obliged to carry out effective measures to eliminate, in the shortest possible time, groups that act outside of these formations. I think that it is impossible to delay and that we must use all possible methods for a bloodless, weighty solution to a very complex problem.

### Azerbaijan to Establish Post of President

#### Meeting of Supreme Soviet Presidium

90US0991A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
12 May 90 p 1

[Azerinform report: "At the Presidium of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet has reviewed the question of establishing the post of Azerbaijani President. Proceeding from the interests of ensuring the sovereignty of Azerbaijan, its security, territorial integrity, effectively carrying out political and

economic changes in the republic, strengthening the constitutional system, legality and law and order, protecting the rights, freedoms and security of the citizens, for harmonizing interethnic relations and for improving the interaction of the superior bodies of state power and administration in Azerbaijan, the Presidium of the Republic Supreme Soviet has considered it necessary to establish the post of President of Azerbaijan and raise this question for review by the Supreme Soviet.

In line with this, the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Supreme Soviet was recommended to provide for the corresponding provisions stemming from the establishing of the post of President of Azerbaijan in the draft Law "Governing Amendments and Additions to the Azerbaijan Constitution (Basic Law)."

### **Draft Law on Constitutional Amendments, Additions**

*90US0991B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
12 May 90 p 1*

[Draft of Amendments and Additions to the Azerbaijan Constitution (Basic Law) pursuant to the establishing of post of President of Azerbaijan]

[Text] Chapter 13<sup>1</sup>. The President of Azerbaijan.

Article 121<sup>1</sup>. The President of Azerbaijan is the head of the Azerbaijan state, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

Article 121<sup>2</sup>. A citizen of Azerbaijan not younger than 35 years of age and not over 65 years can be elected the President of Azerbaijan. The same person cannot be President of Azerbaijan for more than two terms running.

The President of Azerbaijan is elected by the citizens of Azerbaijan on the basis of universal, equal and direct electoral law with secret balloting for a term of 5 years. The number of candidates for the post of President of Azerbaijan is not limited. The elections of the President of Azerbaijan are considered valid if at least 50 percent of the voters has participated in them. A candidate is considered elected having received over one-half of the votes of the voters participating in the balloting.

The procedure for the electing of the President of Azerbaijan is determined by Azerbaijani law.

The President of Azerbaijan cannot be an Azerbaijani people's deputy and a deputy of the local Azerbaijani soviets.

A person who is the President of Azerbaijan can earn a stipend only for this post.

Article 121<sup>3</sup>. Upon assuming the post, the President of Azerbaijan takes an oath at a session of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet.

Article 121<sup>4</sup>. The President of Azerbaijan:

1) Acts as the guarantor for the observance of the rights and liberties of the Azerbaijani citizens, the Azerbaijan Constitution and the laws of Azerbaijan;

2) Ensures the protection of the state sovereignty of Azerbaijan, the security and territorial integrity of the republic;

3) Represents the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic inside the republic, as well as in relations with the USSR, the Union republics and in international relations;

4) Ensures the interaction of the superior bodies of state power and administration of Azerbaijan;

5) Submits to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet annual reports on the status of the republic and informs the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet on the most important questions of Azerbaijani domestic and foreign policy;

6) Submits for approval to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet candidates for the posts of chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, the chairman of the Azerbaijan People's Control Committee, the chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Court and the Chief State Arbiter of Azerbaijan and submits proposals to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet on the dismissal of the designated officials from their duties, with the exception of the chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Court;

7) With the approval of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet submits for appointment to the USSR General Procurator the candidate procurator of Azerbaijan and also raises before the USSR General Procurator the question of dismissing the Azerbaijan procurator from his position;

8) Raises the question before the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet of the retirement or the acceptance of the retirement of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers; with the agreement of the chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers he dismisses and appoints members of the Azerbaijan government with subsequent submission for approval by the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet;

9) Signs the laws of Azerbaijan; has the right no later than within a two-week period to return a law with his arguments to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet for a rediscussion and voting. If the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet by a majority of two-thirds of the votes confirms the decision previously adopted by it, the President of Azerbaijan signs the law;

10) Goes to the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet with proposals to halt the USSR laws adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet as well as other enactments of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR President, the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR ministries, state committees and departments in the event that these to beyond the limits of the powers of the USSR or violate the sovereign rights of Azerbaijan;



11) Has the right to halt the action of decrees and orders of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers;

12) Conducts talks and signs international treaties of Azerbaijan; receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives of foreign states accredited to him; appoints and recalls diplomatic representatives of Azerbaijan in foreign states and international organizations;

13) Awards orders and medals of Azerbaijan and awards honorific titles of Azerbaijan;

14) Resolves questions of the granting of citizenship of Azerbaijan, the withdrawal from it or the lifting of citizenship in Azerbaijan, as well as the granting of shelter; grants amnesty to persons condemned by Azerbaijan courts;

15) In the interests of protecting Azerbaijan and the security of its frontiers, he warns of the declaration of a state of emergency in individual localities and when necessary can introduce it with the immediate submission of the adopted decision for approval of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet. A decree of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet on the given question is adopted by a majority of at least two-thirds of the Azerbaijan People's Deputies.

In the instances indicated in the first part of the designated point, it is also possible to introduce provisional presidential rule.

A state of emergency as well as presidential rule introduced by the President of Azerbaijan is established by an Azerbaijan law.

Article 121<sup>5</sup>. Under the President of Azerbaijan there is a Presidential Council, the task of which is to work out measures to implement the main directions of Azerbaijan domestic and foreign policy and ensure the republic's security.

The members of the Presidential Council are appointed by the President of Azerbaijan. The chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers is also a member of the Azerbaijan Presidential Council automatically by position.

The chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet has the right to participate in sessions of the Azerbaijan Presidential Council.

Article 121<sup>6</sup>. The President of Azerbaijan on the basis of and pursuant to the Azerbaijan Constitution and the Azerbaijan laws promulgates ukases which are of obligatory force on all the republic territory.

Article 121<sup>7</sup>. The President of Azerbaijan possesses the right of immunity and can be removed only by the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet in the event of his violation of the Azerbaijan Constitution and the Azerbaijan laws. Such a decision is taken by at least two-thirds of the

votes of the total number of Azerbaijan People's Deputies upon the initiative of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet itself and considering the ruling of the Azerbaijan Constitutional Oversight Committee.

Article 121<sup>8</sup>. The President of Azerbaijan can hand over the performance of his duties provided in Points 11-12 of Article 121<sup>4</sup> to the chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet and to the chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, and the duties provided by Point 13 of Article 121<sup>4</sup> to the chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet.

Article 121<sup>9</sup>. If the President of Azerbaijan for one reason or another can no longer perform his duties, up to the election of a new President of Azerbaijan, his powers are passed on to the chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, and if this is impossible, to the chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers. Elections of a new President of Azerbaijan here should be held within a period of 3 months.

#### Latvia Replies to Gorbachev Decree

90UN2073D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
26 May 90 p 7

[Governmental message of the Presidium of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet "To M.S. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Kremlin, Moscow"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet has taken cognizance of the attitude of the USSR president toward the Declaration of Independence of the Latvian Republic, which he expressed in the ukase of 14 May 1990.

Bearing in mind that the USSR Constitution does not afford the USSR president the right to repeal acts adopted by the supreme soviets of the Union republics, the Presidium of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet finds that the ukase of the president does engender consequences of a legal nature.

Taking into consideration the tension in relations between the president and the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet, the Presidium believes that disagreements should be resolved through negotiations and awaits the consent of the president.

#### Rubiks on Future Role of Latvian Communist Party

90UN2073B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
26 May 90 p 5

[Report of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Press Center: "Visits of Foreign Guests"]

[Text] Political circles abroad are expressing great interest in the events taking place in the Baltic and particularly in Latvia. The visits of diplomats from

various countries to the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee also provide confirmation of this. In just the past two days such visits were made by Heinz Bauer, GDR consul general in Leningrad; John R. Purnell, United States consul in Leningrad, and Yaakko Naurinkoski, special-mission ambassador of Finland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A.P. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, met with each of them.

The issues of interest to these guests were similar in many respects. The main question was—what does the Latvian Communist Party see as its role following adoption in the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of the Declaration on Restoration of the Independent Latvian Republic? In placing special emphasis on the fact that Latvian communists recognize the right of nations to self-determination to the point of their detachment from the USSR, Rubiks noted that they objected to the "concept of secession" because the tremendous possibilities of a future renewed federation had not been explored, and under present conditions realization of secession could only lead to a political, economic, and social dead end. Presenting detailed argument for his thesis, Rubiks noted that from this fact proceeded the main task of the party today—to tirelessly elucidate the negative consequences which would result from putting into effect the intentions of political leaders of the people's-front orientation. Rubiks informed his guests of basic trends seen in the concept of action espoused by the Latvian Communist Party. The party proposes in particular, in the event hopes of full-fledged development of the republic as part of a unified federation are not justified, to raise the question of secession from the USSR, but only after public opinion is studied by means of a referendum.

**Latvian Free Trade Union Congress Held 25 May**  
90UN2073A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
26 May 90 p 5

[Article by G. Pommere, Latvian Telegraph Agency correspondent: "At the First Congress of Latvian Free Trade Unions"]

[Text] The First Congress of Latvian Free Trade Unions opened 25 May in Riga at the House of Political Education. The decision concerning new status for the congress was adopted by the vote of a majority of the delegates elected to the 13th Congress of Latvian Trade Unions.

A. Silins, chairman of the LRSPS [expansion unknown], addressed the congress. He stated in part that the former trade union structure in no way conformed to present conditions, economic relations, or the degree of democratization in society, and that in order to better represent and protect the professional interests of the working class (regardless of their political views, nationality, or religion), certain professional associations and guilds were already being created in the republic based on trade

unions. The speaker later stressed that formation of the independent Latvian trade unions should be based on the following principles:

- voluntary joining and leaving the trade unions by both individuals and collectives;
- equal rights and independence for all trade unions in determining the norms of internal activity and orientation of the trade union organizations;
- collective decisionmaking in the work of the trade union organs and their regular accountability in the primary organizations;
- tolerance of minority opinion, minority rights, and protection of the minority;
- unity and solidarity during the course of realization of the goals and missions of the trade unions.

With respect to the future structure of the central organ, A. Silinsh spoke in favor of a confederation and enumerated a series of functions it would have to accomplish.

The congress continued its work.

**Estonian Supreme Soviet 8th Session Report**  
90UN2150A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in  
Russian 30 May 90 p 1

[ETA report: "At the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] The eighth session of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet started at 1000 on 29 May. Some 85 delegates were present, with 20 absent. Before the start of the discussion of the agenda a number of deputies spoke (V. Yermolayev, V. Lebedev, V. Kuznetsov, A. Tarand). They dealt with matters pertaining to publicizing the work of the session in radio broadcasts in Russian, and work and everyday problems of deputies. V. Kuznetsov handed the leaders of the Supreme Soviet an appeal from the inhabitants of northeast Estonia. The speaker of the Supreme Soviet, U. Nugis, reported that it is planned to discuss deputies' work and everyday problems at the next session of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The deputies then started to discuss the agenda; there was a government question time when answers were given to questions and requests from deputies.

During question time, problems concerning many spheres of Estonia's life were dealt with. Deputy U. Uluots asked a question about the ratification of the Baltic treaty on economic cooperation. Since Foreign Minister L. Meri was abroad, a written answer was provided.

Deputy Minister for Construction A. Kana answered questions on problems concerning construction in northeast Estonia.

Finance Minister R. Miller responded to a request from Deputy A. Veetousme on the liquidation of the Sotsbank.

Deputy T. Saarman asked a question about the violation of provisions on the conclusion of contract agreements with farms and farmsteads. Minister of Agriculture V. Lind responded to the question. T. Mets raised the question of duration of ministry vacations (18 days). The deputy was answered by Minister for Social Issues A. Kuddo. Deputy Minister of Culture M. Ummelas told deputies about the course of preparations for the song and dance holiday. He also responded to a question about financing for Russian cultural autonomy.

G. Israelyan asked Chairman of the Estonian Republic government E. Savisaar whether or not it was true that food and gasoline is being sent everyday from Estonia into Lithuania, and who was doing so. E. Savisaar was not present at the Supreme Soviet session.

S. Petinov raised the question of when the government plans to lift sanctions against the United Council of Labor Collectives. Minister R. Vare replied that a decision on this would be reached after the investigation of the events of 15 May has been completed.

The Supreme Soviet received with approval the news that B. Yeltsin had been elected chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet. It was decided to send him a telegram.

It was then decided to change the procedure for dealing with remaining questions. The deputies started the voting for the post of deputy chairman of the Estonian Republic Supreme Court. P-U. Rakhi was elected deputy chairman of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Soviet elected delegates who will present to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet an appeal from our republic's Supreme Soviet. The delegation was to include A. Ruutel, M. Lauristin, E. Lippmaa, and M. Titma.

During the afternoon the deputies continued their work in the commissions.

The session will continue at 1000 on 30 May.

### **Estonian Supreme Soviet Session Continues**

*90UN2150B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 31 May 90 p 1*

[ETA report: "At the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Session"]

[Text] On 30 May the eighth session began, as usual, with a roll-call of deputies present. Some 81 people were in the hall, 24 were absent. Opening the session Supreme Soviet Chairman U. Nugis noted that the present session had failed to justify the hopes placed in it because for a number of reasons the commissions had not been working successfully. He expressed the hope that the next session would be more fruitful.

Several deputies asked to speak before moving on to the agenda. U. Uluots reported on his own request, to which he had received a written reply the day before. The question involved the Baltic economic treaty, in connection with which Uluots had expressed an interest in knowing whether or not the prime minister was empowered to sign that treaty and whether it would have to be ratified in the Supreme Soviet. U. Uluots said that in the document he had received there were almost no answers to his questions. S. Petinov raised the question of the "Eesti kodukatse" organization. The reason for this was the fact that on 26 May members of that organization had prevented N. Aksinin from entering the editorial offices of MOLODEZH ESTONII. V. Malkovskiy was interested in knowing what expenditures were involved in maintaining the "Eesti kodukaytse."

The deputies then turned to the discussion of item six on the agenda—the first reading of the draft law "On Regulating the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet." On behalf of the working group dealing with the draft regulations P. Kask reported that the work had been delayed and that it was still too early for the first reading. Following some discussion it was decided to postpone the matter.

And finally to the last item on the agenda—the participation of members of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet in the work of the Supreme Soviet and its standing commissions. Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman V. Andrejev presented the report. He analyzed member participation in the work of the Supreme Soviet, and also certain problems in organizing the work of the Supreme Soviet and its commissions. The report elicited numerous questions and statements. Those sharing their thoughts and ideas included Yu. Telgmaa, S. Petinov, A. Junti, S. Sovetnikov, T. Israelyan, A. Sirendi, V. Lebedev, A. Payu, K. Kokha, A. Zybin, and A. Ristkok.

No decision was adopted on this matter.

This concluded the items on the agenda.

During the afternoon a meeting of members of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the deputy groups took place in Kadriorga. The matter in hand was questions relating to deputies' work and everyday affairs and organizational problems, and also the Congress of Estonia and the meeting in Kokhtla-Yarve.

The next session of the Supreme Soviet will take place on 4 June.

### **New Moldavian Flag, Coat of Arms Detailed**

*90UN1918A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 13 May 90 p 4*

[Report by A.K. Moshanu, Moldavian SSR people's deputy: "On the Moldavian SSR's State Flag and State Coat of Arms: Report by A.K. Moshanu, Moldavian SSR

People's Deputy at the Fifth Session of the Moldavian SSR First Session, 12th Convocation, 27 April 1990"]

[Text] Highly esteemed chairman of the Supreme Soviet!

Highly esteemed deputies!

The very fact that the Moldavian SSR Draft Law "On Changing Articles 167 and 168 of the Moldavian SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)" has been submitted for discussion by the first session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation is of far greater importance than the matter of national symbolism. The initiative for bringing up this issue is due to the Moldavian people. They have become more active than ever before; they are making increasingly energetic efforts to resurrect their own history, which was basically distorted during the years of the bitter past; they are manifesting a lively interest in their own traditions, including the traditions of national symbolism. All this convincingly shows that the struggle by those Moldavians living to the east of the Prut River for freedom and independence, for political and economic sovereignty within the framework of a radically renewed federation has entered upon a qualitatively new phase.

At meetings with inhabitants of the cities and villages, as well as with representatives of various social groups, one hears the following question more and more often: When will the tricolor be adopted as the state flag, and when will a new coat of arms be approved? Moldavians have become very fond of the three-colored flag. It is a component of our spirituality. From the experience of their forefathers the people are able to determine what is the main thing, to evaluate everything that helps them to survive, to strengthen them spiritually and morally, and to prepare a worthy future for their own successors. It is specifically through this prism that we must view the matter of our symbolism.

The Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet formed a special commission, headed up by Ye.V. Sobor. It included 19 specialists—historians, ethnographers, lawyers, archive staff members, writers, artists, and public figures. The commission was assigned the task of studying this matter in order to convince itself that the dark-blue-yellow-and-red flag, as well as the coat of arms with the aurochs as its principal element, are based on historical, Moldavian traditions, and that the roots of this symbolism go deep into the olden times of our history.

In order to make sure that this issue was studied profoundly and in a multi-faceted manner, the commission formed three independent working groups consisting of historians, headed up by D.M. Dragnev, deputy director of the History Institute of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences; A.G. Moraru, deputy director of the Sociopolitical Studies Institute under the Moldavian CP Central Committee; and myself, as president of the Moldavian Historians' Society. In order to study the legal and philosophical aspects of the matter of national symbolism, two additional groups were created: political

scientists and legal experts. There were about 100 persons in all who were drawn into the commission's work.

The sessions of the commission were open, and representatives of the mass media were admitted to witness their work. The public had the opportunity to follow the ongoing discussions via the broadcasts of Moldavian television and radio. Also taking part in the sessions as invited guests were the leading officials and representatives of independent public organizations, including the People's Front of Moldavia, the "Unitatya-Yedinstvo" Inter-Ethnic Movement, the "Gagauz khakhy" People's Movement, and the Bolgar "Vozrozhdeniye" [Revival or Rebirth] Sociocultural Association.

Having studied the various materials, the commission came to the following conclusions, approved by the Presidium of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet and recommended for consideration at the present session.

Moldavian state symbolism arose with the formation of an independent Moldavian state in the mid-14th century. The symbols included a coat of arms for the principality and banners—the standards of the gospodars and military banners, i.e., pennants.

The traditional coat of arms of the Moldavian state, which has been preserved in gospodar prints from the second half of the 14th century, included the following elements: the head of an aurochs (the aurochs is a symbol of strength, fertility, and wealth), a star above the forehead of the aurochs; to the lower right of the aurochs's head is a sun (rose-colored); to the left is a half-moon turned to the left. These symbols were depicted on a heraldic shield and comprised a distinctive sign of the Moldavian Principality.

Moldavian banners originally had single-color, rectangular borders (we have not yet succeeded in ascertaining the specific color), with or without an edging, and with inscriptions and emblems of various colors. Depicted on the gospodar standards was the principality's coat of arms, while the military banners also showed the protecting-angels of the soldiers—usually St. George. Two flags have been preserved from the time of Stefan cel Mare's reign—with a red background and a gold (yellow) one having silver and green ornamentation. The flag of the gospodar Ieremia Movile (1601) consisted of a red border with a light-yellow edging; it had a red-and-yellow staff and a dark-blue cluster.

Accounts by foreign travelers and other historical sources, beginning from the 15th century and ending in the early 19th century, describe about 20 state and military banners with red or cherry, i.e., cerise, azure, and yellow color schemes, or—less frequently—white. The white color scheme was more characteristic of Muntenia. Most frequently, Moldavian banners had a red background—more rarely—light-blue, sometimes white, and—very rarely—yellow. Yellow and white, i.e., the colors of gold and silver, were utilized in composing coats of arms and in embroidering the faces of saints. Of these two colors, the most prevalent was a golden yellow.

Moldavian banners also depicted a coat of arms—the head of an aurochs and stylized depictions of the sun and moon at the ends, as well as a five-pointed small star between the horns of the aurochs. On a banner dating from 1807 the coat of arms was framed by oak leaves in the form of a crown. Embroidered on the other side of the banner was a portrait (usually of St. George) with golden colors and light blue and green details. The banner of Tudor Vladimiresku—the leader of the 1821 peasant uprising in Muntenia, which was participated in by Moldavians as well—combined red, yellow, and light-blue colors.

Consequently, according to historical data, prior to the beginning of the 19th century in Moldavia the background of the banner was predominantly single-colored, whereas the ornamentation was multi-colored. However, the red background was combined with yellow, sometimes with light-blue and dark-blue ornamentation—more rarely—with a silvery ornamentation.

During the years 1832-1859 the banner with a light-blue and red background (light-blue in the form of a cross) had a gold-and-silver ornamentation. This was the last official flag of the Moldavian Principality and was adopted in the period when the Organic Regulations were in effect.

In 1834, at the request of the gospodar Aleksandru Gika, the Ottoman Porte approved a firman concerning the use by Wallachian troops of a tricolor flag with horizontally placed stripes of various dimensions: the upper half of the flag was red, whereas the lower part was divided equally between yellow and light-blue.

The 1848 Revolution marked a new historical phase in the struggle for national and social liberation, as well as in the national self-awareness of the popular masses of the Danubian Principalities. Adoption of the tricolored flag was likewise an eloquent reflection of this period. In particular, in Muntenia during 1848 the tricolored banner with horizontal stripes and the inscription "Justice and Brotherhood," along with tricolored cockades and scarfs became symbols of revolution. Such symbols were also carried, worn, and propagandized by Moldavian revolutionaries.

For example, in a report made by a certain foreign diplomat in 1857 to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that along the road from Bakeu to Iassy he encountered Moldavians with tricolored national ribbons and waistbands. It must be emphasized that the tricolored flag was carried by participants in popular uprisings. The struggle for uniting the principalities was unleashed under this banner.

In 1859 the tricolored flag became the official banner of the United Principalities of Romania.

As to the territory between the Prut and Dnestr rivers, which was annexed in 1812 by tsarist Russia, it did not receive the right to have a flag, but, beginning in 1826, as a separate oblast and then as a guberniya, it had only a

coat of arms. Appearing on the guberniya's coat of arms, as approved in 1878, are azure-blue, yellow (golden), and red colors.

Inasmuch as, during the years 1856-1878, the southern part of Bessarabia (the uyezds [districts] of Bolgard, Kakhul, and Izmail) was a component of Moldavia, and then, from 1859 on—the United Principalities of Romania, the tricolor with vertical and evenly placed colors became the official flag of the Bessarabians in this region.

After the victory of the Bourgeois-Democratic Revolution of February 1917 in Russia, the situation changed radically, including that with regard to symbolism. A national-liberation movement of Moldavians living east of the Prut was unleashed under the tricolor banner. Beginning in April 1917, this banner was unfurled in Kishinev, in Bessarabian villages, and in the cities of Tiraspol, Odessa, Kiev, Sevastopol—in places where there were soldiers and Moldavian students. Flown over the building of Bessarabia's first parliament—the Sfatul Tseriy—which proclaimed the Moldavian People's Republic on 2 (15) December 1917, was a tricolored flag with vertically arranged stripes: light-blue, yellow, and red.

In their struggle for social liberation, the working people of Bessarabia also used the Red Banner of Revolution. It was under this banner that the soldiers of the Romanian Front also fought for the Soviet regime.

From 1924 to 1940 the flag of the Soviet Ukraine was the State Flag of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In February 1941 a session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Constitution of the Moldavian SSR, in accordance with which the State Flag of the Moldavian SSR was a red width of cloth with the depiction of a hammer and sickle and the gold letters "RSSM" in the upper-left portion. This was the Moldavian SSR's State Flag from 1941 through April 1952.

During this period, in accordance with a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 20 January 1947, the republic began a project to study and develop a new flag for the Moldavian SSR. The appropriate commission proposed a design for a tricolored flag (red, green, and yellow), but the official organs turned down this proposal. In April 1952 a session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a two-colored flag (red and green) for the Moldavian SSR. The article in the Moldavian SSR Constitution regarding the banner was approved in the following version: "The State Flag of the Moldavian SSR shall consist of a width of red and green colors with a depiction in the upper left-hand portion, at a distance equal to 1/5 of the width, of a gold hammer and sickle and, above them, a rather small, five-pointed star, framed by a gold edging." That is to say, what we are talking about is the introduction of a two-colored (red and green) flag by the administrative-command

method. The components of this flag were not established on the basis of the traditions of the Moldavian nation's banner.

During the period of perestroika the tricolored banner has begun to appear again in the cities and villages of Soviet Moldavia. The dark-blue color symbolizes the clear sky, peace, and a sovereign life without wars; the yellow color is associated with abundant harvests from the wheat and corn fields, ripening under the beneficial rays of the southern sun; the red color is the revolutionary symbol of a new society moving forward along the path of peace, democracy, and social progress.

The tricolored banner reflects the movement for national rebirth, a return to historical traditions, and a striving toward genuine national sovereignty.

Proceeding from the conclusions that:

- the tricolor has a significant, profound history in the land of Moldavia;
- the universality of the tricolor has manifested itself in Moldavian life and activity as a component of the Eastern Romanian ethnic bloc (as attested to by their clothing, rugs, fabrics, various miniatures, enamels, sphragistics, heraldics, etc.) and their preferences in chromatic color schemes;
- light-blue, yellow, and red colors have appeared simultaneously in the Moldavian flag and even during the early period (at first, less definitely, and then more expressively);
- the time-period of the maximum adherence to the tricolor coincides with the revolutionary epochs, when broad masses of the Moldavian people have joined the political struggle with unrestrainable force;
- at the present time the tricolor is identified with the sovereignty and national independence of the Moldavian state;
- the tricolored flag does not contradict the interests of non-Moldavian citizens residing in this republic. Bearing within itself elements of general revolutionary symbolism, it will reflect the unified interests of all the Moldavian SSR's citizens, regardless of their nationality.

The commission deems it necessary to prepare and introduce substantive amendments to the Moldavian SSR's Constitution with regard to the State Flag and State Coat of Arms of the Moldavian SSR.

In defining the tricolor, the following description shall be employed: "The State Flag of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic—the tricolor—shall be a rectangular width of cloth with three equal stripes, arranged vertically in the following sequence of colors, starting from the staff: azure-blue, yellow, and red. The Moldavian SSR's State Coat of Arms shall be depicted in the center of the yellow stripe. The ratio of the width of the coat of

arms to the length of the flag shall be 1:5. The ratio of the flag's width to its length shall be 1:2."

The commission considers that the Coat of Arms of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic should reflect in a harmonious combination the ancient symbolism with contemporary elements (the stylized head of an aurochs with a five-pointed star above its forehead, a rising sun, and a wreath of oak-leaves) the following traits of the Moldavian statehood, the democratic principles of a state system, equal rights, brotherhood, and friendship among all citizens of the Moldavian SSR, as well as the unique characteristics of its nature, economy, and culture.

In connection with this, the commission proposes to announce a contest for designs of the new Coat of Arms for the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, taking into account the Moldavian SSR's historical traditions and present-day level of development.

### **Tajik Decree To Ensure Sociopolitical Stability in Republic**

90US0958A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 May 90 p 1

[Text of legislation: "Law of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic: On Responsibility for Destabilizing the Sociopolitical Situation in the Republic"]

[Text] For the purposes of the republic's future sociopolitical stability, as well as in connection with the USSR laws "On increasing amenability for infringing on citizens' ethnic equality and for violent breach of the integrity of the territory of the USSR" and "On legal procedures during emergency situations," the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet sets forth:

1. To establish that the groundless refusal to render services in the sphere of trade, public nutrition, household, communal, medical, transport, or any other services to the population that are among the worker's job obligations on the grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation shall entail the imposition of measures of administrative amenability in the form of a fine in the amount of up to 100 rubles or corrective labor up to two months with the withholding of 20 per cent of pay or administrative arrest of up to 15 days.

The same acts committed repeatedly within a year after the imposition of the administrative penalty shall entail criminal amenability and shall be punished by corrective labor for a term of up to one year or by a fine of up to 500 rubles or by deprivation of the right to occupy specific posts or to carry on specific activities.

Individuals who have committed the offences covered in the first part of this article may also face disciplinary punishment.

2. To establish that individuals who instigate citizens who are dependent upon them materially, for employment, or in any other way to participate in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, or demonstrations shall bear administrative amenability in the form of a fine in the amount of between 1,000 and 2,000 rubles or administrative arrest for a term of up to 15 days.

3. To establish that the leaders of enterprises, institutions, organizations, educational institutions, public organizations, and other officials who provide sites, state or public property (means of communication, duplicating or other equipment, supplies, transport) for participants in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, or demonstrations, or who create conditions for the organization and conduct of such undertakings, bear disciplinary or administrative amenability in the form of the imposition of a fine of between 500 and 1,000 rubles.

4. The protocol on administrative offences envisaged in the first part of article 1 and articles 2 and 3 of the present law shall be composed by the duly authorized individual in the organ of internal affairs (the police) or by the ispolkom of the rayon, city, or city-rayon congresses of people's deputies.

5. Officials who have illegally refused to employ, lowered a salary, or dismissed workers or employees on the basis of ethnic or racial affiliation, or for lack of knowledge of the state language or the language of interethnic communication, shall bear criminal amenability in the form of corrective labor for a term of up to one year or dismissal from their post.

6. To envisage the dismissal of citizens at the initiative of the administration of enterprises, institutions, and organizations for participation in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations, regardless of their length of absence from work.

II. To introduce changes and additions to the following legislative acts of the Tajik SSR:

1. To introduce into the Tajik SSR code for administrative offences passed by the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet on 5 December 1985 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA TADZHIKSKOY SSR 1985, No. 24; 1986, No. 8, Art. 72; No. 12, Art. 101; No. 17, Art. 155; 1987, No. 5, Art. 73; No. 11, Arts. 163-164; No. 15, Arts. 206-207; No. 24, Art. 334; 1988, No. 3, Art. 25; No. 5, Art. 54; No. 11, Art. 161; No. 17, Art. 235; 1989, No. 3, Art. 27; No. 9, Art. 56; No. 13, Art. 80), the following changes and additions:

To add Articles 166<sup>1</sup>, 166<sup>2</sup>, 177<sup>1</sup>, 178<sup>2</sup>, 178<sup>3</sup>, and 178<sup>4</sup> of the following content:

**"Article 166<sup>1</sup>: Calls for pogroms and forcible eviction of citizens**

The preparation or possession for the purposes of dissemination of oral, manuscript, print, or audiovisual

materials containing calls for pogroms and forcible eviction of citizens, or a threat to public order and people's safety, or intended to create panic among the population,—shall entail the imposition of a fine in the amount of between 200 and 500 rubles, corrective labor for a term of up to two months with withholding to the state of up to 20 per cent of pay, or administrative arrest of up to ten days with the confiscation of the materials' means of preparation and distribution.

**Article 166<sup>2</sup>. The violation of specific requirements established during emergency situations**

The violation of requirements established in accordance with points 3, 4, 6, 10 and 12-16 of article 4, as well as the requirements envisaged by the first part of article 7 of the USSR law on legal procedure in an emergency situation,—shall entail the imposition of a fine in the amount of up to 1,000 rubles or arrest for a term of up to 15 days.

The spreading of provocative rumors, acts provoking the violation of law and order or igniting ethnic division, active opposition to the realization by citizens and officials of their legal rights and obligations, as well as malicious insubordination toward legal instructions or the demand of an associate of the organs of internal affairs, a serviceman, a voluntary patrolman [druzhinik], or other individual performing their assigned responsibilities or public duty to preserve public order or other similar acts destructive to the public order and the tranquility of citizens, or the violation of the laws of administrative control committed in localities where an emergency situation has been declared,—shall entail the imposition of a fine in the amount of up to 1,000 rubles or administrative arrest for a term of up to 15 days."

**"Article 177<sup>1</sup>. The creation of associations whose activities are prohibited and active participation in them**

Acts to create associations of citizens, including political parties, public organizations, and mass movements, whose activities are directed toward inciting interethnic and racial hostility, strife, or contempt, the application of force on an ethnic, racial, or religious basis, as well as active participation in their activities,—shall entail the imposition of a fine in the amount of up to 5,000 rubles or administrative arrest for a term of up to 15 days."

**"Article 178<sup>2</sup>. The creation of conditions for the conduct of unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations**

The provision by leaders of enterprises, institutions, organizations, educational institutions, public organizations, and other officials to participants in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, or other demonstrations of sites, state or public property (means of communication, duplicating or other equipment, supplies, transport) or the creation of other conditions for the organization and conduct of such undertakings—shall entail the imposition of a fine of between 500 and 1,000 rubles.



**Article 178<sup>3</sup>. Inciting participation in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations**

Inciting citizens who are dependent materially, for employment, or in any other way to participate in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations—shall entail the imposition of a fine in the amount of between 1,000 and 2,000 rubles or administrative arrest for a term of up to 15 days.

**Article 178<sup>4</sup>. Refusal to provide services for reasons of ethnic or racial affiliation**

The groundless refusal to provide services in the sphere of trade, public nutrition, household, communal, medical, transport, or other service to the population that are part of the worker's job obligations for reasons of ethnic or racial affiliation—shall entail the imposition of a fine in the amount of up to 100 rubles, corrective labor for a term of up to two months with withholding of 20 per cent of pay, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days."

In article 26:

to set forth the third part of article 26 in the following edition:

"Given the need to increase amenability for specific forms of administrative offences against the legislative acts of the Tajik SSR, a fine may be established for citizens of up to 50 rubles and for officials of up to 200 rubles, and for mercenary administrative offences of up to 200 rubles; against the legislative acts of the USSR for citizens of up to 100 rubles and for officials of up to 200 rubles, and for mercenary administrative offences and infringements of the law on the struggle against drunkenness a fine up to 300 rubles; against the legislative acts of the USSR and the Tajik SSR for violations related to incitements against the public order a fine of up to 1,000 rubles, for the creation and active participation of citizens in associations the activities of which are prohibited, a fine of up to 10,000 rubles";

to add a fourth part of the following content:

"Given the need to increase amenability for specific forms of administrative offences against the laws of the Tajik SSR higher amounts may be established for fines":

to consider the fourth part of this article as the fifth part.

Article 221, after the number "166" to add "166<sup>1</sup>, 166<sup>2</sup>," after "177" to add "177<sup>1</sup>," and after "178<sup>1</sup>" to add "178<sup>2</sup>, 178<sup>3</sup>, 178<sup>4</sup>."

To add to point 1 of article 222, after "166," "166<sup>2</sup>."

To set forth point 1 of article 259 in the following edition:

"the organs of internal affairs—after the commission of petty hooliganism, calls for pogroms and forcible eviction of citizens, the commission of offences envisaged by article 166<sup>2</sup> of the present Code, the creation of associations the activities of which are prohibited and active

participation in them, malicious insubordination to legal instruction or the demand of a worker of the militia, a voluntary patrolman, or a servicemen, the violation of organization procedure and the conduct of gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations, the creation of conditions for the conduct of unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations, the creation of conditions for the conduct of unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, demonstrations, instigation to participate in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations, the commission of illegal operations with hard foreign currency or payment documents, petty speculation, the ingestion of alcoholic beverages in public places or the appearance in public places in a drunken state offensive to human dignity and public morality, in instances when there is sufficient basis to assume that the individual is involved in prostitution, upon the violation of traffic regulations, hunting and fishing regulations, or the maintenance of fish reserves and other violations of the law on the protection and utilization of the animal world, as well as in other instances specifically envisaged by the legislative acts of the USSR and the Tajik SSR."

To add to the first part of article 292, after "166," "166<sup>1</sup>," to add after "177," "177<sup>1</sup>," and after "178<sup>1</sup>," to add "178<sup>2</sup>, 178<sup>3</sup>, 178<sup>4</sup>."

2. To introduce into the Tajik SSR Criminal Code, confirmed by the Tajik SSR law of 17 August 1961, the following changes and additions:

To supplement article 38 with point 31 of the following content:

"31) the commission of a crime on the grounds of ethnic or racial hostility or contempt."

To set forth article 67 in the following edition:

**"Article 67. Calls for the forcible overthrow or betrayal of the Soviet state and social structure or the forcible violation of the territorial integrity of the USSR, the Tajik SSR, or the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya autonomous oblast**

Public calls for the forcible overthrow or betrayal of the Soviet state or social structure or for the forcible violation of the territorial integrity of the USSR, the Tajik SSR, or the Gorno-Badakhshanskaya AO, which is reinforced by the USSR and the Tajik SSR constitutions, as well as the dissemination of materials of such content for this purpose—shall be punished by incarceration for a term of up to three years or by a fine of up to 10,000 rubles.

The same acts, committed repeatedly or by an organized group of individuals—shall be punished by incarceration for a term of up to seven years or by a fine of up to 25,000 rubles.

Acts envisaged by the first and second parts of the present article committed at the instruction of foreign



organizations or their representatives,—shall be punished by incarceration for a term of up to ten years with confiscation of property or without such."

To supplement article 104 with point "m" of the following content:

"m) committed on the grounds of ethnic or racial hostility or contempt."

To add articles 147<sup>1</sup>, 147<sup>2</sup>, 216<sup>2</sup>, and 220<sup>1</sup> of the following content:

**"Article 147<sup>1</sup>. Refusal to employ, lowering of salary, or dismissal of workers or employees on grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation**

The illegal refusal to employ, the lowering of pay, or the dismissal of workers or employees on the grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation or for lack of knowledge of the state language or the language of interethnic communication—shall be punished by corrective labor for a term of up to one year or by dismissal from one's post.

**Article 147<sup>2</sup>. Refusal to provide services on the grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation**

The groundless refusal to provide services in the sphere of trade, public nutrition, household, communal, medical, transport, or other services to the population that are part of the worker's job obligations on the grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation committed by an individual who in the previous year had already been subjected to measures of administrative punishment for similar actions,—shall be punished by corrective labor for a term of up to one year, by a fine of up to 500 rubles, or by deprivation of the right to hold a specific position or to be involved in specific activities."

**Article 216<sup>2</sup>. The leadership of a prohibited strike**

The leadership of a prohibited strike during an emergency situation, as well as hindering the work of an enterprise, institution, or organization—shall be punished by a fine of up to 10,000 rubles, by corrective labor for a term of up to two years, or by incarceration for a term of up to three years."

**"Article 220<sup>1</sup>. Calls for pogroms and the forcible eviction of citizens**

The preparation or possession for the purposes of dissemination, as well as the dissemination in oral, manuscript, printed, or audiovisual form, of materials containing calls for pogroms and the forcible eviction of citizens, as well as a threat to the public order and the safety of people, either sent out repeatedly during the year after the application of measures of administrative punishment or committed by a group of individuals or by an individual previously convicted, or involving minors in such actions,—shall be punished by incarceration for a term of between one and three years, by corrective labor for a term of up to two years, or by a fine of between 500

and 1,000 rubles with confiscation of the means for preparing and disseminating the materials."

To replace in the sanction of the second part of Article 170<sup>3</sup> the words "for the same term" with the words "for a term of up to two years."

3. To introduce into the Tajik SSR Labor Code, confirmed by the Tajik SSR law of 16 June 1972 (VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA TADZHIKSKOY SSR 1972, No. 12, Art. 90; 1973, No. 21, Art. 190; 1975, No. 11, Art. 103; 1976, No. 3, Art. 16; 1977, No. 7, Art. 43; 1978, No. 5, Art. 70; 1980, No. 5, Art. 36; 1981, No. 11, Art. 94; 1982, No. 17, Art. 188; 1984, No. 15, Art. 164; 1986, No. 12, Art. 101; 1987, No. 5, Art. 76; No. 9, Art. 129; No. 11, Art. 153; 1989, No. 8, Art. 117) the following changes and additions:

To set forth point 4 of article 36 in the following edition:

"4) absence from work (including absences from work of over three hours in the course of the working day) without mitigating circumstances or participation during working hours in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations regardless of length of absence from work."

To add article 108<sup>1</sup> of the following content:

**"Article 108<sup>1</sup>. Guarantees of employment for workers and employees and the prohibition of dismissing them on grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation**

It is prohibited to refuse employment to workers and employees, to lower their salary, or to dismiss them on grounds of ethnic or racial affiliation or for lack of knowledge of the state language or the language of interethnic communication."

In article 136:

to add a second part of the following content:

"Regardless of the application of the measures envisaged in the first part of disciplinary punishment, individuals participating during working hours in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations, as well as organizers of their conduct, can undergo a deprivation of bonuses and other privileges for a term of one year, a shift back in the line for housing, a curtailment of vacation by the number of days of absence connected with participation in unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations. For the creation of conditions for the conduct of unsanctioned gatherings, meetings, street marches, and demonstrations, the leaders of enterprises, institutions, organizations, educational institutions, public organizations, and other officials can be deprived of bonuses for a term of up to one year, demoted, or dismissed from their position";

to consider parts two and three as parts three and four, respectively.

4. To supplement the Tajik SSR Civil Code, confirmed by the Tajik SSR law of 28 December 1963, with Article 440<sup>1</sup> of the following content:

**"Article 440<sup>1</sup>. Amenability for inflicting harm due to reckless actions as a result of mass disorders.**

Harm inflicted on a citizen due to reckless actions as a result of mass disorders, shall be subject to compensation, apart from pensions and subsidies designated in accordance with current legislation, in the full amount up to the average monthly pay lost, and the expenses incurred due to harm to health (high-caloric diet, prosthesis, outside care, and so forth) shall be compensated in the same amount out of the republic budget.

In the event of death resulting from reckless actions due to mass disorders, individuals specified in the second part of Article 455 shall have the right to compensation for harm inflicted in accordance with the procedures defined by the third part of Article 455 of the present Code.

Harm to organizations or citizens resulting from damage, destruction, or embezzlement of property as a result of pogroms during mass disorders shall be compensated in the amount of the loss actually inflicted at the expense of the republic budget.

Compensation for harm (loss) shall be produced by the financial organs of the location where the harm (loss) was inflicted.

The fact of infliction of loss during mass disorders shall be substantiated by documents of the investigatory organs."

5. To introduce into the Criminal Procedure Code of the Tajik SSR and confirmed by the Tajik SSR law of 17 August 1961, the following changes and additions:

In the first part of article 121, replace "213-217" with "213-216<sup>1</sup>, 217."

In the second part of article 122, replace "212<sup>1</sup>, 218, 219" with "212<sup>1</sup>, 216<sup>2</sup>, 218, 219, 220<sup>1</sup>."

Signed

**Chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet K. Makhkamov**

24 April 1990 Dushanbe

**Proceedings of Kirovograd Plenum Reported**  
90UN1865A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in  
Ukrainian May 5 90 p 2

[Article by M. Volok: "He Began with an Analysis of Mistakes"]

[Text] As we informed you, in Kirovograd a regional [obkom] party plenum took place at which a new leader of the oblast party organization was elected. We are offering some details.

The rumor that the First Secretary of the Obkom [the regional committee of the party] M. Samilyk wrote a statement concerning his discharge from office has already made the rounds in the city, even a few days before the plenum. And now there is a plenum taking place.

This act was quite unexpected at the time, though the need for its occurrence had become apparent long ago. The initiators of an appeal to the regional communists, which our newspaper wrote about, and people at crowded, winter meetings demanded such an act be taken. And during a discussion of an informative letter to the regional party, some communists demanded that a summons be made for an extraordinary plenum; that members of the bureau make a report during this plenum, and that a group of members be dismissed, including in this number, the first secretary as well.

To tell the truth, after remaining eight years in the oblast, M. Samilyk made a noticeable contribution to its economic and social development. But at a certain stage, his efforts stopped yielding the expected returns; one felt there were mistakes in his choice of cadres. The desire to take everything on one's own shoulders resulted in inactivity, and at times the irresponsibility of individual leaders. One noticed the regional leadership had severed itself from the original party organization.

And during the plenum, though it was said that today's dismissal of the "first [secretary]" was not caused by pressure exerted by popular meetings or by demands of informal organizations, that Mykola Hnatovych is leaving his post of his own accord, leaving behind a good record (there on the market, which is a hundred meters from the regional party building, the prices for food products are the lowest in the republic, and in stores there is something to buy)—though all this was said, it was felt: everything was not so clear. Perhaps, not only the state of his health forced him to take a decisive step.

There he is on the tribune, and I feel how difficult it is for him to begin speaking. And people assembled in the hall understand him.

He won the assembly over with his humanity, simplicity. And this is why the beginning of the plenum took a completely unexpected turn. Speaking good-natured words, other speakers sometimes had recourse to glorification.

An enlarged session of the bureau and the active members of the city and regional party organizations proposed five candidates for the position of "first [secretary]"; this event took place the day before the plenum. The regional bureau's propositions were passed for review to the plenum. The candidates were the second secretary of the regional party, Ye. Marmazov; the

chairman of the Oblast Council of the People's Deputies, V. Zheliba; the first secretary of the Kirovograd district committee, A. Kondratenko; the first secretary of the Kirovograd city party, H. Kostromin; the secretary of the regional party, V. Myasnyankin. V. Zheliba and H. Kostromin removed their candidacies.

After a secret vote, Ye. Marmazov won. Who is this, today's leader of the oblast communists? He was born in 1938, a Russian; he completed the Donetske Polytechnical Institute in 1965. He began working as an electrician [elektroslyusar], later became a foreman, an engineer, a leader of a shift, an assistant to the head engineer of the mines. He was a party, a komsomol worker. For more than ten years he worked as an instructor in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In three years in Kirovograd, he succeeded in earning considerable respect. He is business-like.

His speech was in the same class as the first one; he began it by noting the mistakes, which the regional bureau of the party recently had allowed. He proclaimed that ties must be made with the intelligentsia; that party cadres from the ranks of doctors, scholars, cultural workers must be selected; that immediate work must begin to resolve severe social problems. He also said that one should not interfere directly in agricultural activity, but rather influence the state of affairs through political methods used of communists, who are working in councils and in agricultural organizations. No, you cannot name him a technocrat, which is what some people see him as. That he loves discipline, responsibility, values professionalism—is this perhaps a defect?

The secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and member of the Politburo, I. Hrintsova's speech was not a traditional one, in the sense of "decreeing new tasks". But after many questions from the floor of the hall, the speech instead turned into an interesting conversation among communists about the current political and economic situation in the republic and the nation, about the paths to be taken for deciding the most important social-agricultural problems.

The participants of the plenum unanimously condemned the acts of extremist elements, who on April 22 in Kiev scoffed at the memory of V. I. Lenin as well as the state symbols.

### **Obkom Chief On Political Opposition**

90UN1954A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in  
Ukrainian May 13 90 p 3

[Interview with V. V. Sekretaryuk, the first secretary of the Lvov Obkom, by O. Telenchi, in Lvov: "A Real Dialogue The Authority of Common Sense... The Political Opposition and Various Paths to a Goal"]

[Text] This question is at the center of the oblast Communists' attention and all the voters' attention, who are attentively, with grief, following the newly elected organs of the people's authority's first steps and the Party

Committees' actions. This question has become decisive also in the dialogue between the First Secretary of the Lvov Obkom Party, V. V. Sekretaryuk and a correspondent from RADYANSKA UKRAYINA.

[Correspondent] Vyacheslav Vasylovych, you have involuntarily become an "odious" figure. Arguments have heated up among people in Lvov: who is he, Vyacheslav Sekretaryuk—a "child" of stagnation or rebuilding? Some have accepted your return to party work with high hopes for effective leadership and for constructive plans. Others view this as an attempt at restoring a phenomena from the period of stagnation, as a symptom of the developing dialogue between the Party Committee and the Democratic Bloc...

[Sekretaryuk] When the active members of the Party proposed me as a candidate, I answered, that I shall not fight for this post, but that I shall also not reject it. Three years ago I left party work with a heavy heart, leaving the post of first secretary of the local party, and I did not have any desire to walk again on an already trodden path. I am against such an attitude towards cadres, one which assumes they avoid the complicated problems of personal life, while they work under the constant dictate: give, give, give. I returned to party work not in order to renew the old order of things. I would never want it to be renewed again. Until recently I had an interesting job—working as a director of an educational-research institute. I am already 52 years old; thus I do not have and cannot have any careerist goals. To speak truthfully, the election results surprised me: 85 percent of the participants of the plenum voted for me, though for the last three years I, a candidate among the members of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, was not invited to the obkom Party's plenum a single time.

[Correspondent] Speaking to the oblast Communists, you always emphasize that it is necessary to return to a politics of common sense, because the authority of the Party organization depends on this. Explain in more detail, what you mean by this concept?

[Sekretaryuk] Quite often I hear this among the Communists: "Their councils, both oblast and local—are enacting frightening resolutions. What will happen next?" And I reply: these are not their councils, but our councils, which have gained the trust of the people; hence, let's be realists. One must take into account the actual arrangement of political powers and work with those deputies, whom we have to work with. The reality is this: Communists, who were elected, altogether make up 52 percent of the local councils; that is to say, the Party won. This is going by the figures, but in actuality? In actuality the Party's authority in Lvov Oblast, to put it lightly, is not high. And when we soberly evaluate the state of affairs, when we speak to people openly and truthfully, when we give ourselves realistic tasks, then and only then will we succeed in changing the face of social politics.

There are not only errors in our past experience. We knew and know how to work in such non-standard, back-breaking economic conditions, in which the best managers from the West would break their necks.

[Correspondent] However, the Party Obkom's appeal to the government in regard to improving the oblast's level of supplies was accepted by the body of deputies as an anti-constitutional intrusion on the councils' prerogatives. So how can one operate with the new structures of authority without simply replacing them, as was once the case? For now the voters do not see any real cooperation with the new councils. Each of the sides has stated its readiness to make certain compromises for the sake of the people's welfare; however, the stone wall, which arose first of all between the two Vyacheslavs—Vyacheslav Sekretaryuk and the chief of the oblast council, Vyacheslav Chornovil, lead one to unpleasant thoughts...

[Sekretaryuk] You mentioned the constitutional law of the new organs of the people's authority. Our opponents say that this constitution will not do. So there is already no platform for unity. If we are going to take such an approach, no type of constitution will help us move along. Some of the deputies and activists of the Democratic Bloc want the party organs to not interfere at all in the social-economic sphere, and they forget in this case that creating a new mechanism for administering the economy is impossible without a knowledge of how it used to work. There are not only people who shuffle papers working in the Party apparatus, but highly qualified specialists as well. We will find a common language with the councils on all issues, if we interest ourselves with the most significant matter: will the people be better or worse off as a result of our decisions? At a session of the oblast council unsubstantiated statements resounded about the economic blockade of the oblast, about the fact that we no longer need to turn to the diaspora for help. This is an unrealistic evaluation of the situation; it is caused by a game played by political powers. Unfortunately, each new generation of leaders tries to convince the masses of the fact that there will be no changes for the better in the near future, because the former leaders worked poorly and left behind a difficult inheritance. And so the newly elected leaders have stated just the same thing. And, aside from the political game, the deputies also made thoughtful evaluations and propositions. In fact, supplying the oblast is difficult, and this sharpens the social and political tension. That is why we turned to the government, and such concern is completely in order under the conditions created by the still active command-administrative system; after all, we have just begun developing market relations. One can by means of voting rename the 21st session as the first session of the first democratic convocation, which was what was done. To improve the people's life by means of voting cannot be managed; for this hard work is needed.

[Correspondent] During the oblast council session there was one extraordinary situation, which is worth giving an unambiguous evaluation. It was a surprise to me that

deputy Stepan Khmara, a so-called "dissident" with considerable prestige, defended deputy Oleksandr Pylypchuk, the secretary of the Party obkom. And though Pylypchuk did not become the director of the Planning-Budget Committee, he nonetheless received a considerable number of votes.

[Sekretaryuk] Well now, this is already an invitation to cooperate. The deputies cannot but understand: to get power is much easier than to hold onto it. I think, in time we will find a common language with the newly elected council's leaders, even if at the same time we would remain political opponents. I and Vyacheslav Chornovil cannot but be political rivals. This is the reality. As one of the leaders of UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Union] he heads the political power which opposes the KPRS [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. And I am impressed by the fact that Vyacheslav Chornovil, who has had a bitter life (V. Chornovil, a journalist by profession, was interned for fifteen years in places where he was deprived of freedom.—Author), during his entire life did not betray, but stood for his convictions. And many of our so-called Communists, who are now giving back their party cards, lived well in the command-administrative system. I can tell you a lot—about who lived how and how a career was made for someone. These people were paid by the state and the Party with very good salaries, especially, for their convictions. But they do not have them... Thus with such worthy competitors, like Vyacheslav Chornovil, one can conduct a discussion, a dialogue.

[Correspondent] Doesn't something like this seem illogical to you. You do not reject the pluralistic aspect of people's thinking and desire; you have talked about this at the obkom Party plenum; however, the party tribune resounded with calls to move away from so-called "factionalists". What do you think about the birth in Lvov of the Party club "Democratic Alternative"?

[Sekretaryuk] The political powers that make up the Democratic Bloc also attained a victory in Lvov Oblast—these are strong, organized, disciplined structures, whose activity has been founded on the principals of centralism. But the "Democratic Alternative" proposes to us to create a parliamentary party, to conduct discussions, conversations. In Lvov this parliamentary party or faction in a better moment would exist perhaps a month. In order that the political equilibrium should not be shaken, the strong Communist Party should interact mutually with the strong Democratic Bloc. Both political powers will correct one another, making one united front, not forgetting at the same time that all this is being done for the people's welfare. That is how I see our future.

[Correspondent] We, the voters, are very alarmed by the fact that once again in the leaders' political lexicon there has appeared a painfully familiar concept—"compromise", which was very popular in the period of struggle against those so-called thinkers of a different view. And now gossip has been already spread here that

you defended a dissertation in Moscow in two weeks. They say also that you are still in debt, and they hint that it seems during meetings with the party organizers of the city, you know a bit about many of today's political actors. One could ignore such rumors, and agree that they are also at the center of everyone's attention, who today with alarm observes the opposition between the two Vyacheslavs—that is, you, on the third story; and Vyacheslav on the second floor, that is, Chornovil. So far only a common residence unites you.

[Sekretaryuk] You know, when I heard from one of the deputies the expression they are "locking horns", I felt such "lightness" in my soul at such familiar words. In its time the Party used labels generously; now UKhS and Rukh are brilliantly copying the worst aspects of this practice. To say searches for a compromise are a form of political struggle can be explained. But in the normal life of a person—this is not normal. It seems to me, that some of the leaders of the councils are guiding themselves by feelings of historical vengeance: "We did time—you'll do time; we, having degrees, worked as janitors and shepherders, now you'll work likewise". On the principals of such a relation there will not be any sense of understanding in society. I do not want to teach anyone; I am simply expressing my thoughts. I think, that the political and social-economic situation will develop in the oblast in such a way that our deputies will forget how to "lock horns", because there will come a time to work with a sweating brow in order to solve the region's social problems. The days I have been working at this post are numbered; hence, do not wait until you can dot your i's. And finally accept my reproach: where were you, the newspaper journalists, when they were throwing stones at me?..

#### Instead of a Conclusion

While signing the text of the conversation, V. Sekretaryuk added: "The time will come to pass, and you will be interviewing both Vyacheslavs together. This—is a reality."

Well, let the authority of common sense become confirmed soon. People are already tired of the explanations being given at meetings about relations. And so much work lies ahead.

#### Restructuring of Ukrainian Customs Service

90UN1902A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in  
Ukrainian 12 May 90 p 3

[Interview with V.K. Boyarov, chairman of the main administrative state customs service, by a RATAU correspondent: "New Aspects of Customs Service"]

[Text] In accordance to the re-organization of the customs service in the state, in our republic, a Ukrainian administrative state customs service of the USSR was formed.

Commenting on this fact, the chairman of the Main Administrative state customs service, who is a member of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, V. K. Boyarov, specifically noted:

In the course of rebuilding [perebudova] the role of the customs system is also changing. As the number of foreign ties grows constantly and intensely, so does the number of workers in our pay. If only four years ago there were 2,500 people on the payroll, then now there are more than 8,000; and in three years this figure will double. Naturally, it has already become simply impossible to effectively direct all the divisions from Moscow.

It is completely understandable that since there is one market for goods on the territory of the USSR, with closely interwoven national-economic ties among the national republics, there should be one customs service operating, as is the case in the majority of the developed nations of the world. In addition to this, in connection with the republics of the Soviet Union increasing participation in foreign economic activities, these republics' acquirement of laws for independent activity on the foreign market gives rise to the need to enlarge their role in customs services. In addition to having been formed in Ukraine, the republic level, state customs services of the USSR have also been formed in Belorussia and Georgia. This promises a solid, favorable economic situation for the republics. In particular, an import tax is being established, a considerable portion of which will come to the republic's disposal. It appears that there is even a possibility for applying local taxes.

In answer to the question of why there are so many demands made nowadays of the customs service and such long lines of people at its locations, V. K. Boyarov said:

We have had a sharp increase of foreign trade returns; the flow of people has increased who want to stay in foreign countries. But we have here a customs service mechanism that regulates this flow of trade and people at a slow, outmoded pace. Because of this situation there are lines and the people are dissatisfied. What is to be done? We must improve the customs service of the country. The Council of Ministers of the USSR passed a resolution addressed to this very issue in April of this year, which concerns the complete re-organization of the customs service of the country. Interestingly, the first such document was signed by Lenin in connection with the organization of the customs service of the RSFSR. Since that time there has been little done in this branch. Just now the question of improving the customs service is reflected in a series of new laws accepted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

According to the director of the Ukrainian state customs service, A. H. Pylypenko, the newly introduced laws will first of all help improve the quality of work by the republic customs service. A precise system of informing the Ukrainian government is being formed, which concerns the movement of freight across its boundary; as a

result of having established this system, one can accept operative decisions regarding the republic's participation in these operations. It is also important that a genuine possibility has been obtained to fundamentally expand the material base of the republic customs service. But in the next five to seven years of time spent in setting up customs points on the boundaries of Ukraine with neighboring countries, there will be spent over 300 million rubles [karbovanets]. New locations will open and their technical equipment and service will improve.

And the main thing, emphasized the head of the administration, is the new system has been formed at the right time, because at the beginning of next year Ukraine is becoming economically self-supportive, which, naturally, will lead to a further growth of its number of foreign ties. Therefore—we shall have our share of worries.

### **Ivashko Ukrainian Party Congress Speech**

90UN2283A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
20 Jun 90 pp 2-4

[Speech by Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary V. A. Ivashko, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo, at 28th Congress of Ukrainian Communist Party: "The Sociopolitical Situation and Principal Directions of Ukrainian Communist Party Activity at the present stage. Report by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] Comrades! The 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party has been convoked prior to completion of term of the Central Committee elected at the preceding congress and to a certain degree constitutes a special [chrezvychnyy] congress. Holding the congress early reflects concern on the part of Communists and the worker masses with the situation in the party and in this country and with the increasingly complex sociopolitical situation.

Five years ago the party commenced a radical restructuring [perestroyka] of our society. The course of policy formulated at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the 27th Party Congress, and the 19th All-Union Party Conference was given broad popular support. Practical realities, however, have proven to be much more complex and conflictive than had been presumed. Hopes that we would succeed in turning things around in a short time failed to materialize.

Our congress is tasked with thoroughly analyzing the sociopolitical situation, positive and negative trends, to evaluate in a frank and principled manner what has been accomplished, and to formulate a well-reasoned policy for the future. The Ukrainian Communist Party should come to the 28th CPSU Congress with a clearly-formulated, collectively hammered-out position on all issues of major importance.

We must sum up the discussion within the Ukrainian Communist Party of draft proposals for a CPSU Central

Committee Platform for the congress and new Party Rules [Ustav partii]. We shall be considering and adopting Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party, as well as documents which would make evident our understanding of the autonomy of the Ukrainian Communist Party within the CPSU and would define its rights and obligations. And, finally, the congress is to elect the Ukrainian Communist Party's governing bodies.

### **I. The Situation in Society and the Party**

Comrades! Rapid, profound changes are presently taking place in all domains of societal affairs. A political reform is intensively in progress. The first genuinely democratic elections of USSR people's deputies and elections to republic and local soviets constituted a turning point in the establishment of genuine democratic rule by the people. New agencies of authority have been established at all levels. Specific steps are being taken along the road of radical economic reform. Dynamic reforms are gathering momentum in the spiritual and intellectual affairs of society.

We are encountering more and more new problems, however, at practically every step along the path of renewal. Conflicts and contradictions which at some time in the past had been driven deep below the surface are bursting to the surface of societal affairs. Living conditions have become much more difficult, people are losing faith in the future, and it is difficult to explain to them why goods shortages, inflation, etc have increased. One is also depressed by the environmental situation, which reached a critical point following the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. Ethnic and religious intolerance are being artificially fueled. Increase in crime is causing general concern.

One must also be exceptionally alert in analyzing changes in people's moods and attitudes, in the public consciousness, in the disposition of political forces and development of events, as well as in foreseeing difficulties which can retard or even reverse the process of democratization. Without this it is impossible to formulate and implement a scientifically-validated policy which meets both the requirements of the present moment as well as strategic goals and the root interests of the people.

One must always keep the main thing clearly in mind. And the main thing is to ensure that more and more people, united by an understanding of the need for radical changes, become actively involved in the processes of perestroyka.

But it is also obvious that there exist in society other tendencies, possessing their own roots and their own causes. Impeding elements include conservatism, psychological lack of readiness and willingness for profound reforms, and the widespread occurrence of certain social illusions and utopian notions, in particular attitudes of total dependence on others and downward-leveling egalitarianism.

On the other hand leftism is manifesting itself in an extremely threatening manner, showing no desire to consider realistic possibilities and pushing for an irresponsible forced pace of social processes at all costs, and even for blind destruction.

Against this background importunate attempts are being made to belittle the institutions of authority, and structures of government are portrayed as totally bureaucratized by the mere fact of their existence.

The rapid changes in society are being correspondingly reflected in people's subjective social well-being and are affecting their root, vital interests, which in turn is causing accelerated politicization of social consciousness. Difference in views and approaches toward solving pressing problems is becoming clearly evident, a rapid process of political demarcation is taking place, and various initiative groupings, organizations, and movements are forming. In spite of the ambiguity of this process, it is entirely logical.

Unfortunately, however, we are presently far from that situation, which is entirely natural for a democratic society, whereby each citizen values and defends democracy, for we began perestroika lacking political knowledgability and with a minimal legal foundation.

But elements have appeared in the political arena which are claiming leadership but which do not acknowledge any moral standards. They define the principle of pluralism as a call for raging of base passions, and they view glasnost as an opportunity to cast mud on everything and everybody. Obviously this hinders the establishment of civilized forms of political life. The overwhelming majority of new political entities as a rule declare their devotion to democracy, progress and perestroika. Things are frequently different in practice, however.

We are noting today the process of transformation of many "informal" organizations into parties. They are advancing various goals: from moderate general democratic aims to outright antisocialist, anti-Soviet objectives.

The Ukrainian Republican Party [URP], which has declared communist ideology and practices to be, and I quote: "essentially antihuman [antichelovecheskoy] and perverted [protivoyestestvennoy]," represents an outspokenly antisocialist force. The Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), which takes a distinct, clearly-marked anticommunist position, closely adjoins the URP in an ideological sense.

It is difficult at the present time to make a final determination regarding other parties and political groupings which are declaring themselves parties, for experience indicates that frequently their practical actions are in contradiction to their proclaimed declarations and platforms.

Comrades, let us call a spade a spade. We have entered a period of open political struggle, which is taking on an

increasingly acute character. For this reason formulation of modern tactics and strategy of activity for the Ukrainian Communist Party in conditions of multiple parties is an exceptionally important task of this congress.

We are faced with the problem of seeking allies and cooperating with all those who acknowledge the realities of life and place the interests of the people and the future of the Ukraine at the central focus of policy. And we are open to dialogue with all those who construct their programs on the values of socialism and who have an interest in implementing a policy of perestroika. Such cooperation could become a unique, modern embodiment of the Bolshevik "left bloc" tactics, the principles of which were formulated by V. I. Lenin. But obviously a constructive dialogue is possible only at such a time as our political opponents are willing to "play by the rules" and take part in the normal democratic process. At present, however, some of them are displaying an exceptional lack of patience and are rejecting the very thought of a reasonable compromise. A number of situations which repeatedly arose at the session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet also convince one of this.

Unfortunately initial practical steps taken by certain Soviet of People's Deputies leaders in some oblasts and cities in this republic have compelled the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers to come forth with a Declaration and to include in it a warning against violations of the USSR Constitution, the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, and the rights of citizens.

As one analyzes the current political scene, one must also mention certain new phenomena in the worker movement and confrontation on the part of various so-called "independent" worker organizations. These processes became particularly intensified during last year's miner strikes. By their actions they were making a resolute declaration of dissatisfaction with living and working conditions and of the need to speed up perestroika. The causal factors were revealed and a political assessment of these events was made at Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenums.

The main conclusion for us is that we simply cannot stand by idle in such social conflicts but must gain considerably more thorough knowledge and must resolutely defend the legitimate interests of the working people.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, its Politburo and Secretariat endeavored to construct their activities in the period under review, particularly following the September (1989) Central Committee Plenum, with awareness of this urgent demand of the times. Today the Central Committee is doing everything in full and plain view of the party masses. Never before has there been such broad openness in Central Committee activities, right down to direct broadcast of Central Committee plenum proceedings.



The Central Committee was seeking to overcome the command style of leadership, more clearly to delineate functions with governmental and economic agencies, to interfere as little as possible in the activities of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, ministries and agencies, to avoid acting in their place, and to avoid redundancy. Primary attention was devoted to democratization of intraparty affairs and the creation of conditions for development of party member initiative. In particular, dissemination of the "A Specific Socially Significant Task Assigned to Each Primary Party Organization" initiative was directed toward this.

Party cadres have undergone substantial renewal and replacement. During the period under review all first secretaries and 80 percent of secretaries of oblast committees and the Kiev City Committee, and approximately 60 percent of first secretaries of party city committees and rayon committees were replaced for various reasons. These officials were elected in a democratic manner, taking into account the opinion of party members and the community.

The Central Committee opposed attempts to split the party from within under the cloak of debate and to create parallel structures. The emergence of different platforms within the party is a natural occurrence. We have no desire for unthinking, mechanical unanimity. But differences of opinion among party members on matters of tactics by no means constitute an excuse for harsh confrontation. The resolution of the March (1990) Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum entitled "For Strengthening Unity of Party Ranks" should be viewed precisely from this position.

We must acknowledge, however, that the present activities of the Ukrainian Communist Party are still far from being in keeping in all aspects with the specific features of the political moment and the tasks of renewal of society. The Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat must admit to a number of shortcomings and errors. Now, from the high ground of acquired experience, we see as the main reason for this the fact that we did not always grasp the full depth of the changes demanded by perestroika.

One should also bear in mind the fact that the dynamic nature of the political situation dictated its own content and tempo to all our work. We were compelled to react in most instances to current events and phenomena and to deal more with issues of tactics than strategy. We did not always succeed in assessing the political situation in a prompt, timely and correct manner, which led to aggravation of the situation in a number of oblasts, including the dismissal of first secretaries of party oblast committees. Rarely did there occur frank, firm assessments of manifestations of poor responsibility on the part of Communist officials of republic agencies. Decisions would be arrived at in a hasty manner, as a consequence of which they would frequently prove to be little effective.

The Central Committee failed to establish solid working relationships with local party organizations and committees, with the body of party activists, and failed to overcome such phenomena as decline in party discipline, right up to refusal to obey the Party Rules and distrust of party directive agencies by the party masses. The prestige of party organizations is declining, and there is increasing voluntary resignation from party membership. In the first five months of this year more than 28,000 persons turned in their party cards. And although this is less than 1 percent of total party membership, at no time in the history of our party have we experienced such a large exodus of members. The art of political struggle in conditions of a de facto multiparty system was being mastered very slowly. During the election campaign, for example, Communists frequently competed with one another, and as a result our political opponents were elected to the Soviets.

Consequently, comrades, the situation in the party and in society as a whole is complex and tense. This is due both to the complexity of the tasks which must be accomplished and the serious mistakes made by the CPSU Central Committee and national government in the course of perestroika.

Many mistakes have also been made by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic government. They consist first and foremost in the fact that we have not always approached decisions by the central authorities in a critical manner, have failed to predict their potential social consequences, and have failed to display the requisite determination, courage if you will, in defending the republic's interests and in solving pressing problems. Precisely this was clearly manifested in the situation involving the Chernobyl tragedy, when republic leaders were unable to withstand the dictate of the ministries, and all measures pertaining to providing the public with radiation safety and with informing the public were totally determined at the central level, by a national governmental commission.

This applies to the state of affairs in the social and economic domains. But unfortunately our influence on overall party affairs as well is not at all in keeping with the position of the Ukrainian Communist Party within the CPSU.

There is no more important task today, comrades, than to keep the political process stable during this difficult stage of transition to a democratic state governed by rule of law, to overcome crisis phenomena, to prevent disruption of civil tranquility and, finally, to move forward along the road toward practical solution of all our problems.

Today there is an abundance of those who would foist upon us various "scenarios" of development of events. But in order to be a serious politician, that is, to take into consideration the specific features of our historical development, the state of the economy, and the disposition of political forces, one must reach the incontestable



conclusion that we have our own road to follow, which is grounded on the people's socialist choice.

Proceeding from this fact, the Communist Party quite logically assumed political responsibility for development of society and for its future. Historical realities are such that at the present time there is no other organized force capable of performing a consolidating role, of maintaining a balance of interests, of supporting national consensus, and of securing societal advance. The Ukrainian Communist Party, which today has a membership of 3,241,000, which is restructuring itself and radically refurbishing the methods and forms of its activities, must do this and will be able to do it.

Comrades! In presenting this report to the congress, the Central Committee seeks not only to render an account of its performance but also to express opinions regarding ways to accomplish renewal of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and on the principal directions of party policy, which would bring our society out of crisis as quickly as possible. We are counting on the Congress delegates to assess the performance of the Central Committee in a firm and demanding manner, to provide supplementary analysis, and to propose their own solutions to our pressing problems.

## **II. Renewal of the Ukrainian Communist Party—A Determining Precondition For Strengthening Its Influence on the Course of Perestroika**

Comrades! Our congress must reply to the question: what must be done to accomplish renewal of the Ukrainian Communist Party? Millions of people expect this of us, people who are not indifferent to the fate of the party and the prospects of all our future life.

A high degree of political and civic activeness on the part of Communists and party-unaffiliated was demonstrated by the pre-congress discussion and debate, which encompassed a very broad spectrum of issues, resulting in a heated, keenly-committed clash of opinions, judgments and positions. These were active and fruitful efforts, resulting in numerous suggestions, comments and additions to the program documents of the CPSU and the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Appearance of alternative platforms in the party became a typical feature of this year's discussion and debate. We consider this to be a natural and logical phenomenon and see in it an attempt to systematize opinions and views which do not in all respects coincide with the position of the party majority.

Also indisputable is the fact that a number of planks in the Democratic and Marxist platforms are of a constructive nature and are reflected in the new draft versions of the CPSU Central Committee Platform and Program Principles of the Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

One can also note positive elements in the "Democratic Platform in the Ukrainian Communist Party": denunciation of organized factions, a striving toward consolidation, and unification of efforts. We hope that the supporters of this platform have come to the congress with like aspirations.

We must learn to hear one another out, to bring our positions into agreement, to work together seeking ways to accomplish party renewal as rapidly as possible. In particular, a get-together in May at the Central Committee with supporters of the "Democratic Platform in the Ukrainian Communist Party" helped bring views closer together. At the same time all this does not signify political omnivorousness and compromises on fundamental issues. And one must clearly see that on the whole the program represented by the Democratic Platform departs from the Leninist concept of a vanguard party and from the ideological and organizational principles of the CPSU. The "Marxist Platform in the CPSU" underlines Leninism.

The party must defend itself against factionalism and preserve itself as a unified political organism. And counteraction against schismatics and capitulationists should not be called persecution of dissidents, as there have been attempts to do in some party organizations following publication of the Open Letter from the CPSU Central Committee to This Country's Communists and the resolution of the March (1990) Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum entitled "For Strengthening Unity of Party Ranks."

I must say that recently the single-minded and biased criticism of our party's entire historical past has been assuming an increasingly broader scale and sweeping nature. There are those who declare the road the party has traveled to be erroneous and all its activities to be an endless chain of mistakes and crimes. But no matter how much our opponents on the right and left may try, they will never succeed in refuting the fact that the Leninist Party was the sole party that possessed the courage to take up and carry on its shoulders the entire burden of responsibility for the fate of this country at critical points in history.

I would like to remind those who today accuse the Communists of every mortal sin that it is precisely thanks to this highly-organized party, which is conscious of its duty to the people, that our country was able to make it through unprecedented ordeals, while preserving its political independence and territorial integrity.

This also applies in full measure to the Ukrainian Communist Party. Created in 1918, it has traveled a great and heroic journey together with the Ukrainian people. We should particularly stress the fact that Bolshevism was not something alien on our soil, something carried in from without, as our less than conscientious and prejudice-filled critics are attempting to prove. Back during the years of civil war it became in this republic, to

use the Leninist expression, "a unique national movement." This republic's Communists led the struggle of their people against oppression and exploitation. They affirmed the ideas of socialism, patriotism, and internationalism, friendship and brotherhood of working people of all nationalities and ethnic groups. This is the truth of history, and nobody can take it away from us; nobody can erase this fact.

Certainly there have also been bitter, tragic pages in our history. We condemn the crimes of the Stalinist regime and the deformations of subsequent years. But it would be a departure from the historical truth to place the responsibility for this onto the entire party, onto all generations of Communists, for the party itself and its ranking officials sustained the greatest losses from the repressions. The Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) was virtually shattered for putting up resistance to Stalin's cult of personality and to everything connected with it. By 1936 party ranks had been more than cut in half.

I shall also cite the following sad figures. At the Ukrainian Communist Party's 14th Congress in 1938 an assessment of the Central Committee's work accomplished was not presented, since only two of its 102 members were still among the living. The audit commission submitted no report whatsoever, for none of the commission members had survived.

We must remind those who today would force upon us a total historical guilt complex that it was precisely the party of Communists which led our people's heroic struggle against fascism. And nobody has the right to forget that 8 out of 10 prewar members of the Ukrainian Communist Party perished in this struggle.

It is precisely our party which united the people to the task of rebuilding the republic's economy, which had been totally destroyed by the war.

And finally, at the present time the overwhelming majority, 85 percent to be precise, of our party's members joined the party subsequent to 1954. And although the course of policy aimed at overcoming the consequences of the cult of personality, a policy initiated by the 20th CPSU Congress, failed to experience adequate development, the new generation of Communists did not allow our society to backslide to a dictatorship of a Stalinist type. This policy took on an irreversible nature during the period of perestroika.

The present generation of Communists, resolutely condemning and dissociating itself from the crimes against the people perpetrated under the Stalin regime as well as from the deformations of subsequent years, is absolutely against indicting the entire party for this. It confirms its devotion to the finest party traditions, the most important of which lies in an indissoluble bond with the people and selfless service to the people's interests. This is that foundation on which the entire edifice of a renewed Ukrainian Communist Party should rise.

What kind of a party do we want it to be?

First, and this was once again incontrovertibly confirmed by the pre-congress discussion and debate: the absolute majority of Communists are convinced that the party should maintain its fidelity to the socialist choice and the communist ideal, to creative Marxism-Leninism. Loss of clearly-defined points of ideological reference would create a genuine threat to the party's very existence. Lenin's warning that organization without ideological underpinnings is an absurdity is just as valid and relevant today as ever.

Second, in conditions of more than one party and differentiation of political views and interests, the question of the party's social base takes on particular significance. Today we should clearly declare that working people—the worker class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia—constitute this base for our party. And we must much more fully and resolutely express and defend their interests in party policy and our practical activities. A broad and dependable social base is practically the most important precondition for our party's viability and ability to exert political influence, and for replenishing party ranks with healthy, fresh elements, capable of ensuring a continuous and uninterrupted process of renewal.

We particularly value those who are joining the party today—at such a difficult and conflictive time. This represents the best evidence of people's awareness of their choice, their desire to stand to the defense of the socialist ideal.

Thirdly, in conditions of the existence of multiple parties and political diversity of views, the party's political, ideological, and organizing functions should become filled with new content. Considerably more attention should be devoted to scientific analysis and forecasting of sociopolitical processes. Without this the party will be unable to withstand attempts to remove it from the political arena, to detach it from the socioeconomic domain, to deny it egress to the practical workings of society.

We view as an important element the formulation of policy and its implementation via Communists in representative governmental bodies, through utilization of the right of legislative initiative. But this presupposes revision of mutual relations between party committees and Soviets and a genuine and meaningful demarcation of functions. Party agencies should not directly intervene in administrative and economic management affairs. As for party groups in the soviets, through which the party takes part in solving these problems, Lenin's guidelines remain valid: adherence to the framework of the Program, intraparty discipline, and diversity of tactical devices, forms and methods of activity.

The party should combine activeness in parliamentary affairs with work directly in workforces, in neighborhoods, and in mass democratic organizations, with improving their mutual relations with other parties. This

problem is complex and not unambiguous; it contains many aspects for which there is no past precedent. It is no easy matter, comrades, to have the ability to find allies and to recognize adversaries. But this must be learned without delay, on the run, so to speak. We must stay ahead of things.

In considering ways to accomplish party renewal, the participants in the pre-congress discussion and debate attached paramount importance to democratization of intraparty affairs, seeing this as a reliable means of assuring genuine power to the party masses. At the same time it was stressed that the party should not lose its capability for organized unity of actions. And this presumes that not bureaucratic but truly democratic centralism should constitute the basis of its structure and activities. Practical realities demand revival of its Leninist essence and that it be brought into conformity with the new realities. These include first and foremost the will of the majority, freedom of opinion at the stage of discussion, and unity of actions after decisions are made. It includes an elective principle in selecting all agencies and bodies and their periodic accountability reporting to the party membership. It includes a collegial principle in work activities. And, finally, it includes a guarantee of party comradeship, equality, conscious and unified party discipline for all Communists.

The process of democratization is aimed at ensuring that each Communist has a genuine possibility and opportunity to influence the formulation and implementation of party policy and to influence the forming and activities of party bodies and agencies at all levels.

And, finally, the structure of the Ukrainian Communist Party should be placed on its foundation—the primary organizations. These presently number 72,500. But the significance of these elements lies not only in their number but primarily in their proximity to the people, to their interests and concerns, to real, concrete matters.

As we know, a significant enhancement of the role of the primary party organizations is prescribed by the draft new CPSU Rules. It would at the very least be naive, however, to count on statutory standards being implemented automatically, by themselves. The broad rights and authorities of the local-level elements could remain unutilized if all party committees, from rayon committee to Central Committee, do not organize their work activities proceeding from the interests of the primary organizations and the rank-and-file Communists.

It would be advisable to give primary organizations the right to draft their own variations of enactments pertaining to fundamental issues of party affairs and to submit them for the consideration of party rayon committees, city committees, oblast committees, and the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and to enable them to delegate their own representatives to take part in plenums at all levels.

We feel that our congress should come out in explicit terms against attempts to eliminate party organizations

in production, in governmental establishments, in the Armed Forces, and in law enforcement agencies.

Reanalysis of relations between party organizations on the one hand and management, workforce councils, worker committees, trade unions and Komsomol organizations on the other is a different matter altogether. These mutual relations should without question be built on a foundation of dialogue, partnership, cooperation, and mutual assistance.

While attaching priority significance to primary party organizations in production, at the same time we should enhance the role of territorial party elements. One is also persuaded of this by the recent election campaign, the center of gravity of which in most instances shifted precisely to where people live.

Enhancement of the role of the primary party organizations compels one to take a new look at the role of party committees. In our view the main tasks of the party committees at the present stage consist in providing information to party organizations, coordinating their actions, and ensuring a high degree of organization. Main attention should be focused on formulating socio-economic programs and methods of implementing them, on studying public opinion, political moods and attitudes, on analysis and forecasting of sociopolitical processes, on formulating decisions, and on organization and verification of their implementation.

The entire character of party cadre work is also radically changing. This by no means signifies that it is being entirely removed from the domain of party influence. We are talking about eliminating excessive centralization, manifestations of subjectivism, an attitude of exclusive right to privileged information, and other unattractive attributes which have frequently accompanied the deciding of cadre matters. Practical steps have already been taken in this direction. Personal qualities, professionalism, and the ability to solve new problems and to accomplish new tasks are becoming the main criterion in assessing workers and an incentive to stimulate their professional growth.

We are proceeding from the position that in conditions of accelerated democratization of societal affairs there is from an objective standpoint no longer a need for an unwieldy nomenklatura of party committees or the need to maintain direct control over everybody and everything.

Education of party-member cadres who would be able in conditions of choice and competition to head up important areas of Soviet and economic management work, to achieve genuine movement forward in these areas and to implement party policy here is a promising or, stated more accurately, the only correct policy at the present time. In other words, an atmosphere should be created in which each Communist, and each party-unaffiliated individual as well, who possesses the requisite attributes and training, could be nominated or could suggest his nomination for an executive position. And this means

that the party must organize training and refresher training of its cadres working in all branches and sectors of the economy and, particularly, cadres from among the workers. To accomplish this it is essential more extensively to utilize the experience and know-how of the world's advanced countries, sending our specialists there for training, including practical on-the-job experience.

We must approach forming of all party structures in a new way. Unquestionably they must be improved. But one should proceed thereby from actual interests, not giving in to the pressure of the mass political rally. For example, it would make sense for the matter of consolidating or eliminating certain party city and rayon committees to be settled proceeding from the specific situation, focusing on the need to cooperate with Soviets of People's Deputies at the corresponding level.

The forming of councils of secretaries of primary organizations and other structures which are generally called horizontal structures has become quite widespread today. They are unquestionably needed as work forms. But perhaps they should not be viewed as an alternative to collegial elected bodies.

The matter of the party administrative apparatus merits separate discussion. It has long since become popular to blame all our ills on the party administrators. Today there are many who are earning popularity with their sweeping and, to put it mildly, improper criticism of "apparatchiks."

I can say with absolute certainty that many new comrades have now entered the party administrative edifice, that diligent, conscientious individuals, the professional and political level of whom arouses no question whatsoever, are working here. Unquestionably the times demand further improvement in the work performance of the party administrative apparatus and a continuous influx of fresh manpower. We need an administrative edifice which would work entirely in support of an elected body, would be subordinate to that body, and would handle its theoretical-analytical, sociological, forecasting, and consultative support services.

We consider it advisable for a portion of executive officials of party committees at all levels to be selected from members of an elected body. An elected body could in addition invite leading specialists, highly-qualified consultants, to work in a party committee on a competitive basis, including holding more than one position at the same time. It would also make sense to establish new structures: press centers, subdivisions to deal with public organization affairs, sociological research, and political analysis.

As we know, the question of financial and management affairs in the Ukrainian Communist Party has recently become a rather acute issue.

The Ukrainian Communist Party, its party committees and establishments have in their possession fixed assets representing a total value of 497 million rubles. The

activities of 697 party committees and approximately 800 party establishments—political education houses, universities of Marxism-Leninism, two higher party schools, the Institute for History of the Party under the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and two branches of the V. I. Lenin Museum—are financed from the budget of the Ukrainian Communist Party. More than 11,000 at-large party workers in 9,000 primary party organizations are being supported.

The cost of maintaining republic party bodies, agencies, and their establishments has always been financed solely by their own resources. Revenues over expenditures would be contributed to the CPSU budget for financing general party needs.

In order to reduce party spending, construction of 47 facilities representing an aggregate estimate cost of 83 million rubles has been removed from the component plans of the 12th Five-Year Plan. Construction of new administrative office buildings has been suspended, with the exception of those cases where old facilities are in a dangerously dilapidated state. Freed-up allocations for contracted construction projects have been transferred to local soviets for construction for the most part of social-use facilities. In addition, in the last two and a half years 23 buildings of party agencies have been transferred over gratis to utilization for social needs.

Since publication of the draft new CPSU Rules, suggestions and proposals have been coming in from party committees, primary organizations, and individual party members to reduce membership dues. Of course this issue cannot be considered in isolation from the state and condition of the party budget. The budget is funded from two sources: first of all, from membership dues (75 percent) and, secondly, from contributions from profits generated by party publishing houses (25 percent). But at the present time we are essentially deprived of this second source of revenue, if one considers the manner and procedure of profit taxation as proposed by the draft USSR Law on Taxation of State, Leased, Cooperative, Public and Other Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations. For this reason we feel that the amount of membership dues specified by the CPSU Rules should be adopted taking into account persisting suggestions to reduce the maximum size of dues (3 percent). It would make sense to establish a maximum figure of 2 percent of an amount up to 500 rubles, and 2.5 percent above this amount.

If we consider the fact that 50 percent of party dues will be retained by the primary organizations, this is that limit which should not be exceeded. Otherwise the party will lose its financial base, and in many oblasts party city and rayon committees would have to be eliminated.

Many primary party organizations will also be unable to maintain at-large workers. Clearly this cannot be allowed. We should not forget that already right now 16 oblast party organizations are receiving subsidies. New expenditures also await us in connection with the need to

set up party newspapers and to finance scholarly research for the party's needs.

On the whole we consider valid the demand party members have made that the budgets of the Ukrainian Communist Party and oblast party organizations be openly discussed and approved at plenums of the Central Committee and party oblast committees. We are firmly convinced that the party's fixed assets should be indivisible. Everything that has been created by many generations of Communists should serve the party. And of course matters pertaining to reducing expenditures, intensifying economy measures, and especially the search for new production sources of profit for party operational needs are assuming paramount importance. We must establish our own party economic structure. This is the only viable solution today.

And, finally, one more fundamental issue. The new sociopolitical situation calls for increasing the autonomy of the Ukrainian Communist Party. We should stress that this is needed not in order to satisfy any ambitions. The main thing is for the Ukrainian Communist Party to be able, without looking toward the central authority, to take upon itself responsibility for solving problems and accomplishing tasks of the republic's political, socioeconomic, spiritual and intellectual development, to determine priorities, and to select forms of implementation of general party decisions. All this is dictated by assertion of the political sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR.

This is one of the reasons why the question of the Rules of the Ukrainian Communist Party is being submitted for your consideration. In the course of discussion in primary party organizations, at party conferences and Central Committee plenums, opinions have differed regarding whether they should be adopted. But the political situation in this country and in the party which has developed recently compels us to return to this question at the congress.

#### **Establishing New Approaches in Ideological Work and Making Ideological Work More Aggressive**

Comrades! The present state of party ideological work is perhaps giving rise to the greatest amount of criticism. We are well aware that what is demanded first and foremost today of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee is absolute clarity and firm integrity of policy in matters of party ideological affairs. It is therefore essential that we analyze as deeply as possible the causes of crisis phenomena in this domain and reach a clear determination in regard to ways to surmount them.

It is undisputed fact that many of our present difficulties proceed first and foremost from failure adequately to appreciate the importance of creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory, from dogmatization and oversimplification in treatment and interpretation of its fundamental points. Marx's teaching on trends in historical development and on replacement of one societal system by another was so simplified that it gradually brought people to the thought that one can simply

observe things, for the flow of history will in any case carry us to a bright future. This is one of the causes of political infantilism, of the psychology of ideological dependence, which gradually permeated the entire party from top to bottom. This was also fostered by the notion, cultivated during the times of cult of personality and still not entirely eradicated to this day, that there is somebody to think for all of us—both Communists and non-Communists—that there is somebody to formulate policy and to provide guidelines. Social thought ultimately entered a decline on the soil of canonization of theoretical postulates.

Centralism of theoretical thinking, so to speak, was logically added to the excessively centralized structure of the party. Just a few decades back the very concept—to have theorists in the republic who would be bold enough independently to elaborate problems of tactics and strategy of the Ukrainian Communist Party—would have sounded as a note of dissonance.

On the other hand we are harvesting the fruits of our ideological introversion. The creative thought of ideological workers and of practically all Communists as well did not directly clash with manifestations of anticommunism, while the latter in the meantime was honing its methods of struggle for people's minds. Even today many of our cadres hold the notion that fighting our political adversaries is a purely administrative matter. That is a serious error.

Everything pertaining to hostile ideas and political struggle is our business. But no ideological services, commissions, centers, etc will be able to solve this problem if each and every Communist does not feel personally involved and responsible for affirmation of his party's ideology. In addition, even now we are somehow ashamed to admit what the entire world sees today: in recent years the Soviet Union has been hit with an unprecedented wave of coordinated anticommunist propaganda. Its organizers, exploiting the processes of democratization and glasnost in this country, seeking to profit on difficulties and mistakes, and liberally enhancing little-known and well-known facts with their own fanciful conjectures and sometimes even outright lies, set as their objective to compromise the very idea of communism at all costs and to sweep Communists from the arena of history.

We must also note serious errors of omission in ideological work by the Politburo and CPSU Central Committee secretaries. In any case, the fact remains: the party met this furious onslaught of anticommunist propaganda in a state of ideological demobilization. Abandonment of the very term "ideological struggle" as well as confused and inconsistent positions such as "the press should play the role of opposition" or "the mass media reflects only that which exists in life" evoked confusion among our ideological cadres.

Thus almost nothing was done to counter endeavors to force into the mass consciousness the absurd and essentially lying claim that the communist idea is practically the diametrical opposite of freedom and democracy. And many are indeed beginning to forget that socialist concepts arose and became established as a road toward the liberation of mankind and that capitalism was forced to become more humanitarian and farsighted not from within itself but under the influence both of our ideas and our example.

Today one can state that anticommunism as an ideological-political current has become transformed into an absolutely real phenomenon in this republic's internal political affairs as well. Nor can one ignore the fact that liberal-bourgeois views even today occupy a certain place in the public consciousness. A typical indication of such views is an apologia of the capitalist path of development. The advocates of social-democratic models of societal development, for whom even the very terms "Leninism" and "communism" are unacceptable, are seeking opportunities to achieve ideological and organizational consolidation.

Such views, superimposed on the difficulties of economic and social development, engender an extremely dangerous phenomenon—a not always recognized bytovoy antikommunizm [anticommunism engendered by the frustrations of daily life]. They are also counting on this as well. The logic here is simple: until the masses come to their senses and gain genuine political experience, one can entertain the hope of seizing power and settling accounts with the CPSU. But one can easily imagine what kind of "democratization" could subsequently come from this.

One's attention is drawn by the attempt by anticommunists to exploit the process of national and ethnic rebirth and revival, to give them as much national-chauvinist coloration as possible, and once again to turn them against CPSU policy.

Recently there have been attempts to exploit the complex religious situation in this republic. Already difficult relations between the Greek Catholic Church, Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church are being artificially aggravated. Conflicts between Russian Orthodox and Greek Catholics are in some places escalating into outright confrontation. Ethnoreligious groups are consolidating, which is leading them to a state of introversion, isolation, and is setting them off against one another.

We have repeatedly stated our position on this issue. Communists seek to achieve a consensus between religious believers and non-believers, between the adherents of different denominations, and to eliminate confrontation between people. Realization of freedom of conscience, observance of present laws, and creation of an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation is the only possible path to follow in this matter. In our opinion establishment and consolidation of such

approaches will be promoted by a law on freedom of conscience and on religious organizations, a draft of which is presently in the works, as they say.

Thus we see clear manifestations of acute political struggle in practically all domains of our societal affairs. In these conditions the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has sought to analyze the ideological situation, to forecast and influence the development of events.

We have endeavored considerably more extensively to enlist the services of social scientists, party activists, and party practical workers in formulating and preparing party documents of fundamental significance. In particular, problems pertaining to the political and economic sovereignty of this republic, improvement of interethnic relations, development of the languages of nationalities and ethnic groups, and party organizational development were worked on with their participation. Collaboration with scientists and scholars made it possible to prepare draft Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party and to incorporate into it a number of new points of theory.

In order to boost the scientific level of all our work, we feel that it is essential to establish an Institute for Political Research, based on the Institute of History of the Party under the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

Detailed theoretical research papers which innovatively develop the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the contemporary era and the essence of the processes of perestroika and renewal of the socialist system are extremely needed today. Research papers on the theoretical legacy of V. I. Lenin and its de-Stalinization have today become particularly important. We must proceed toward the true Lenin, not an icon of Lenin, through scientific analysis of his work and theoretical legacy, and enrichment of this legacy with new conclusions in light of present conditions and the experience of our socialist society and world civilization. Lenin—the thinker, the politician, the man—today needs vigorous protection both against banal, artificial honors and against cynical slander. It is our party duty to defend Lenin and Leninism.

Proceeding from the fact that the so-called "blank spots" in our history have today become the most common target of all kinds of political advantage-seeking, a number of scholars have been enlisted to study and research them. Dozens of detailed papers on this subject have recently appeared. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has made a political assessment of a number of tragic pages in our history and made the decision to publish archival materials dealing with the years 1932 and 1933. This was not an easy decision; these are not pages of history of which one can be proud. But this is also the only possible way to carry out the party's historical responsibility for its past: honest analysis and an uncompromising assessment of what is past,

and utilization of kernels of historical experience from all things, even from tragedy, so that such things may never be repeated.

We are in favor of continuing such analysis. We see it as one of the ways to accomplish spiritual renewal and cleansing of the party. The decision recently adopted by the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee to rescind a number of decrees by the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) from the end of the 1940's and beginning of the 1950's on matters pertaining to development of Ukrainian literature, art, and historical science, also pursues this goal.

Many critical comments are also leveled at the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee pertaining to its position regarding various initiative-formed politicized associations, Rukh in particular. Nevertheless one cannot fully accept all the criticism voiced in this regard. There are those who feel that inadequate attention has been devoted to Rukh, that no attempts have been made to arrive at mutual understanding and to find ways to interact with it. Others, on the contrary, are dissatisfied with the fact that we have treated Rukh too solicitously instead of applying resolute confrontational measures. Still others accuse the Central Committee of inconsistency ("they were fighting it, and then suddenly they recognized it") and of a disinclination and inability to predict the subsequent course of events.

While by no means dismissing the criticism, I would nevertheless like to dot a few i's. Yes, there occurred both contacts and attempts at mutual understanding; there also occurred ideological struggle, confrontational counteraction, and mistakes were also made.

Unquestionably some tactical miscalculations occurred, certain lack of coordination in the actions by certain party organizations, and loss of a sense of measure on the part of certain party members—both in "debunking" Rukh and in making advances to Rukh. Nevertheless one must acknowledge that the basic assessments and prognoses on the future prospects for evolution of Rukh were in most cases correct.

Here are just a few items. Our assessments indicated concern over the lack of clarity of the political position of the initiators of Rukh and the ideological "omnivorousness" contained in its program documents. Attention was drawn to the fact that this could lead to consolidation, under the guise of Rukh, of various extremist, antisocialist factions, which ultimately would take over control. And subsequent facts have confirmed that this indeed was the case.

We might also recall the righteous indignation with which the organizers of Rukh denied the very possibility of its transformation into a political party, an alternative to the CPSU. No longer does this seem so strange to anybody. The only debate is over the question of how many such parties Rukh will engender. In the recent

elections Rukh became de facto the basis of a bloc opposing the Ukrainian Communist Party. These are the political realities.

We are convinced that the policy of constructive dialogue simultaneously with criticism and political analysis of real actions was correct. Precisely this policy should be followed by the Ukrainian Communist Party in the future as well in relations with all political parties.

But at this point we must again stress one firm position. "Consolidation in general" cannot occur without a clearly-defined goal. Reasonable compromises are possible in the interests of the common cause. But when they call upon us in the name of unity to give up our political principles, to give up the socialist choice, to yield our position outright—this is not consolidation but something else. Precisely for this reason we view consolidation in a dialectical unity with political demarcation.

During the period under review specific sociological studies were conducted, the results of some of which made it possible promptly to adjust Central Committee actions. Although we have not yet achieved the requisite scale and results in this area. We must conduct continuous sociological monitoring of public opinion, people's moods, attitudes, and aspirations. Here too academic sociological research is not enough. For this reason an information-sociological center has begun to be established in the Central Committee, which is to engage in studying public opinion and formulating appropriate recommendations for party committees.

Of course the most thorough theoretical studies, the most substantial and most responsive sociological "intentions" will not produce tangible results in practical ideological work if their conclusions are not perceived in a timely manner by the party and assimilated by party cadres.

I feel that the matter of linkage between theory and practice and the question of the scientific level of daily political indoctrination work has never been so critical for us, so vitally important as right now, for the main task for us today is the struggle for the masses. For this reason matters pertaining to political education of party members and prompt provision of the latest party-political information to party organizations are becoming extremely crucial.

A great deal of discussion and debate is currently in progress on the forms and methods of political instruction, the structure of seminars, study groups, etc. In principle it is a good thing that people are thinking and engaging in inquiry. The only cause of concern is the question of whether a simple but indisputable truth: today all of us must study and learn—will not drown in the flood of words, critical comments and radical-nihilistic suggestions and proposals. Some practical measures for achieving this have already been formulated. The decision has been made to consolidate the universities of Marxism-Leninism and courses of instruction for training and upgrading party, soviet, and ideological



workers. Qualitatively new party educational institutions—institutes of sociopolitical knowledge—are being created on the foundation of these structures.

The very approach to organization of political instruction of Communists and the forming of a dialectical-materialist ideological outlook should be fundamentally altered, linked with the process of reforming the party and with the political changes in society.

A great deal has been said about the positive and negative role of our mass media. Without any doubt whatsoever they have exerted unparalleled influence on awakening of social thought, development of democracy and glasnost, and criticism of shortcomings. But there is also dissatisfaction on the part of many Communists with our newspapers and magazines, TV and radio broadcasts. One should not reduce this to crude rejection of criticism, although this also occurs. We must look deeper.

Today, when the CPSU is going through difficult times, Communists are entitled to expect much more talented and impassioned statements by our party journalists in defense of the party, the communist idea, and the socialist system. But there have been very few of these.

But this is not the only point. Communists sense a clear prejudice in many articles, even those which in general are truthful, a certain political subtext, which feeds that very bytovoy antikommunizm, and evokes natural dissatisfaction on the part of party members and many people who write to the Central Committee. An analysis performed by our sociologists indicates that, for example, on the pages of the majority of oblast and even a number of republic party newspapers, in recent months the terms "Communist," "party committee," and "party worker" have been used in a negative context five to six times as often as in a positive sense. I repeat: we are talking here about the party press. It is hard to believe that the party member editors fail to notice this.

We need incisive, frank, honest criticism: we shall reject neither such criticism nor the genuine truth about life. But we can no longer accept a nihilistic-destructive tone and humiliation of the party, the country, and our people.

Practical realities also require organization of a party press—the creation of newspapers which constitute organs solely of party committees. We need a genuinely party press, a vigorous assistant and dependable support for party committees in the political struggle, in the struggle for the masses.

One should also draw attention to the need for a profound reanalysis and restructuring of the interaction of party organizations with their publications. Here too it is not enough to issue appeals to give up the command style and to show mutual tolerance. We must consistently implement a policy of integration of newspaper staffs with party committee staffs. Only when journalists feel that they are coauthors of the policy being implemented

by a party committee and that they are direct participants in the formulation and implementation of this policy will they be able to collaborate with the party committee in a genuinely creative manner. The journalist in turn must have confidence that if he stands up for the truth, the party will always support him.

The importance of the level of development of culture, science and enlightenment for the forming and shaping of the public consciousness has been particularly clearly manifested during the years of perestroika. Today one can hear more and more frequently harsh and categorical statements about total decline and degradation of this domain and casting of blame on the party and Soviet State for this situation. Without playing into the hands of the political opportunists, who would like to make some capital here as well, but also with an understanding attitude toward a habit which is typical of contemporary public opinion, of readily shifting from one extreme position to the opposite, let us nevertheless endeavor to analyze just what is taking place here.

It is my conviction that we have no grounds to dismiss everything accomplished during the years of Soviet rule, to dismiss that enormous scientific, educational and cultural potential amassed by the people, and the selfless, dedicated labor of people, both Communists and party-unaffiliated, working in cultural and educational establishments and furthering science and the arts. Everything they have done constitutes our national wealth. And nevertheless we must understand why precisely these people, who bear this difficult burden on their own shoulders, today are willing rather to dismiss everything they themselves have accomplished rather than to speak up about their achievements. They probably feel particularly acutely the fact that society underappreciates not only them personally but the spiritual and intellectual domain in general. We are talking not only about that notorious residual principle of allocating resources, funds, and personnel. This is rather a consequence.

It seems to me that of all our great and small mistakes which in one way or another affected the people's spiritual and intellectual life and culture, we must today grasp the most important one: the party was unable to perceive at the level of all its components, and therefore was also unable to convince the entire people of this, that culture in the broad sense of the term is an internal spring of progress, and in the final analysis it determines the place of each people in overall human civilization.

A people which fails to assimilate the latest scientific and cultural advances is doomed to fall behind in technology, in standard of living—in all things. It is a most important task of all party organizations to make people aware of this truth. If we accomplish this, it will be much easier to accomplish everything else. Communists should act proceeding from this in the soviets and republic bodies in determining government policy pertaining to development of the public education system and science, and in implementing those rather extensive plans which formed



the basis of the cultural development program recently formulated at the initiative of the Central Committee.

I should like to mention at least in passing the problems of work by party organizations in these areas, for we are dealing here with a fairly large segment of the intelligentsia, the influence of which in forming public opinion can scarcely be overestimated.

First of all—pertaining to education. We must acknowledge that perhaps no other sector has sustained such losses from constant reforms. Elimination of the corresponding departments in the party committees complicated the situation to an even greater extent. It is no secret that today our political opponents, seeking to snatch the future away from the party and to bring an end to socialism, have channeled their forces into this sector, under the flag of depoliticization of the educational process.

Obviously new approaches are needed in organization of all of public education. We view as the essential substance of these approaches finally turning society face to face with the schools, forming and shaping a well-conceived concept of the national school. Supported by Communists and party organizations, we must do everything in our power to return to the younger generation the ideals of humanism and a feeling of patriotism and pride in their homeland, in their people.

In working with Communists and party organizations of cultural and educational establishments and unions of creative artists, we must resolutely refrain from interference in the creative process. We must deepen constructive dialogue and cooperation with those active in the cultural domain, and we must mobilize the efforts of Communists working in the arts to create in every collective a moral-psychological atmosphere which organically combines freedom of creativity with awareness of one's great responsibility for the ideological and political results of creative activity. This is particularly important in an age of emergence of so-called mass culture, which indulges low-standard tastes and which destroys moral underpinnings.

Such a specific area of ideological work as nationalities policy, which is of particular current relevance to the party in present-day conditions, must be discussed separately. It is of vital importance in our republic, in which members of more than 100 different ethnic groups reside.

The decisions of the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the platform it adopted, entitled "Party Nationalities Policy in Present-Day Conditions," present guidelines for resolving urgent issues. They are reflected in the draft Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party. At the initiative of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, an aggregate of measures is being carried out to broaden the domain of functioning of the Ukrainian language and to

create favorable conditions for study and unrestricted utilization of the languages of other nationalities and ethnic groups.

As we know, the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet passed a Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR. But different, even opposite approaches came to light at the very outset of its implementation. On the one hand some are claiming that the law is being incorporated at too slow a pace, while on the other hand there is increasing dissatisfaction over excessive haste in this matter. Emotions should yield to painstaking, sober-minded deliberation. Whipping up passions around this law can lead not only to its undermining but also to confrontation between different linguistic groups.

Of course it is premature to claim radical changes in this republic's linguistic affairs. We should note, however, that 367 schools and 3,000 children's preschool facilities at which Ukrainian is the language of instruction, including 35 schools in oblast administrative seats, have been opened or reopened in the last two years. The number of schools and class sections with thorough study of the Ukrainian language, literature, history, folklore, and art has almost tripled. We must ensure that in the near future schools, individual class sections and groups where Ukrainian and other ethnic languages are the language of instruction are available in every urban microdistrict.

New Ukrainian language and literature textbooks and methods manuals have been published, as well as appropriate corresponding film and audio materials. The interests of people of different ethnic groups are also being considered. In localities in which there is a compact population concentration of a specific ethnic group, almost 200 schools are in operation with Moldavian, Hungarian, and Polish as the language of instruction. Thousands of citizens now have the opportunity to study their native language.

To accomplish this, steps are being taken to meet the growing requirements in teachers, requisite instructional aids and textbooks. Books, newspapers, and magazines are presently being published in Bulgarian, Hungarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, Polish, Moldavian, and German. In Donetsk, Transcarpathian, Zaporozhye, Crimean, Odessa, and Chernovtsy oblasts there is radio and TV broadcasting in the languages of ethnic groups. Training of ethnic cadres for schools, higher educational institutions, cultural establishments, and the mass media is being organized.

The establishment of ethnic cultural societies in this republic has become a sign of the times. They play an important role in preservation and development of the language and culture of ethnic groups and in raising the level of interethnic communication. The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and party committees in the localities have from the very establishment of these societies been working in close contact with them and have been giving them various assistance.

We should continue strengthening contacts with fellow countrymen outside the republic. Recently the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has established close, meaningful contacts with party committees, governmental and public organizations in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other republics. It is also important to seek to ensure in the future that not only public organizations but government institutions as well show concern for citizens of Ukrainian nationality residing in the union republics. We must offer our fellow countrymen, and they number in the millions, continuous help in preserving their native language, culture, and ethnic traditions, and we must concern ourselves with ensuring that their aspirations and interests are more fully met.

#### **IV. A Sovereign Ukrainian Socialist State Governed by Rule of Law**

Comrades! As is stressed in the draft Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party, affirmation of the political sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR constitutes the point of departure of our present policy in the area of national-state organizational development. Full political, economic, social, spiritual and intellectual development of the Ukraine, preservation and further flourishing of culture and language, and affirmation of the national worth and uniqueness of the Ukrainian people and all ethnic groups residing in this republic are impossible without this.

We define political sovereignty of the Ukraine as sovereignty by the people of the Ukraine on its territory, supremacy, autonomy, complete and indivisible authority, the right independently to determine matters of this republic's political, economic, and cultural affairs, to determine the forms and structure of agencies of governmental authority and administration, precedence of republic laws, discontinuance of effect of Union laws which go beyond the powers and authorities of the Union, territorial integrity of the republic, and establishment of the Ukraine as a genuine party to international relations.

All these and other points should be formally articulated in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, a draft of which was submitted for discussion by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. We hope that our supreme legislative body will support the position of this republic's Communists on this issue, a position stated in the well-known resolution of the March (of this year) Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum.

It is our position that there is an urgent need to draw up and formally adopt a new Agreement of Union [Soyuznyy dogovor]. It should clearly state those powers, authorities, and domains of governmental administration which the Ukraine voluntarily transfers over to the central government.

Of course we must proceed from practical realities as we move along the road toward a sovereign Ukrainian

nationhood. Any hasty decisions without solid forecasts, thorough analysis of consideration of political situations, both within the USSR, in Europe and in the world, would constitute nothing less than a political adventure.

It is important to emphasize that we link assertion of the political sovereignty of the Ukraine with improvement of its national-governmental system and a guarantee of the political rights of all ethnic groups residing in this republic. This would include the formation, when necessary, of ethnic, administrative-territorial, and even autonomous structures in places where various ethnic groups reside in a compact pattern, at their desire.

In particular, the question of the status of the Crimea is presently being actively discussed. This is a complex issue. However, in view of the geographic location, historical traditions, demographic and socioeconomic realities, one could consider the possibility of establishing within the Ukrainian SSR a Crimean ASSR as a multiethnic autonomous entity. Although, of course, the peoples of the Crimea have the final word in this matter.

Establishment of a Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Nationalities Affairs is of great importance for administering nationalities processes in this republic. The Communists who work in this committee must be aware of the great importance of their assigned task.

Comrades! Assertion of political sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR should also be realized in its increasing involvement in international affairs. In recent years this republic has presented a number of important international initiatives ratified by the UN. There has been greater participation by the Ukrainian SSR in multilateral international and bilateral intergovernmental agreements. In our view, however, development of international activities by the Ukrainian SSR does not yet conform to its political, economic, intellectual, and cultural potential.

Increasing efforts directed toward strengthening peace and international security should unquestionably continue in the future as the main thrust of Ukrainian SSR foreign policy. We attach great importance to the development of mutually beneficial relations, on a basis of equality, with neighboring countries and other countries of Europe, to inclusion of the Ukraine in the European process, as well as to expansion and establishment of cooperation with all countries in the world which are ready and willing to do so. Favorable opportunities are being created today for dialogue and broad cooperation with emigres from the Ukraine and their descendants in foreign countries on a long-term basis.

In the course of renewal of Soviet Federation, we support putting specific content into a republic's constitutional right to enter into relations with foreign states, to enter into treaties with them, and to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives.

It is important to continue cooperation between the Ukrainian Communist Party, Communist worker and

socialist parties, to establish contacts and relations with social democratic and national democratic parties and mass democratic organizations of foreign countries, and to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding between peoples.

Comrades! Today, when the matter of improving our society has become so critical, one of our most important tasks is the establishment of a state governed by rule of law. We proceed from the position that only the sovereign will of the people of the Ukraine, which it implements through the Soviets of People's Deputies, can be the sole legitimate source of power in this republic.

We support establishment of sovereignty of the Soviets on our territory. A certain foundation for this is provided by the USSR Law on the General Principles of Local Self-Government and Local Economic Management in the USSR. This is patently insufficient, however. An appropriate legislative foundation is necessary in order to achieve genuine rule by the people. All republic legislation dealing with local soviets needs general updating and renewal.

We should proceed without delay with drafting a new Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR, which should formally articulate political sovereignty of the Ukraine. It makes sense to focus in this endeavor on the new structural concept of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a free Union of sovereign socialist states. The entire aggregate of constitutional rights and freedoms should be brought into conformity with the international pacts on human rights which have been ratified by the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. Substantial changes should also be made in the republic's current laws. We have a number of constructive suggestions in this regard, and we feel that the newly-elected Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee should submit them as a legislative initiative.

Experience indicates that it is no easy matter to create reliable, well-substantiated laws. But it is even more difficult to implement them in conditions of lack of a proper level of legal knowledgeability and sophistication. Nevertheless this must be done. Everybody must be clearly cognizant of the fact that it is impossible to accomplish the tasks presently facing this republic without eradicating deformations in mass awareness of the law and without the establishment of deep respect for the Law, for genuine democracy is incompatible with arbitrary rule and anarchy. We cannot allow the freedoms and rights of one segment of society to be achieved at the expense of another. And there is no future for a society which fails to recognize this.

Today people are reacting with alarm and indignation to outbursts of violence and savagery, which have become a serious destabilizing factor. Unfortunately party and governmental agencies have slackened their attention toward these matters. This republic's law enforcement agencies have also proven to be less than effective. In some places they have shown their inability to combat

crime in the new conditions and have displayed sluggishness and sometimes incompetence as well.

Serious steps must be taken to correct this situation. The interests of society and of each and every citizen demand that our law enforcement agencies act in a resolute manner, competently and confidently, in full conformity with the law. Communists working in law enforcement must persistently implement party policy of adherence to principles of rule of law and observance of standards of constitutional law.

Matters connected with ensuring this country's reliable national defense grounded on principles of reasonable sufficiency and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces demand daily attention. Each and every one of us understands that only a unified military is capable of defending this country and the Soviet system against any and all encroachments. Great harm is being done by those who are attempting to disunite our military on a territorial and ethnic basis and who are attempting to sow seeds of distrust toward the military.

We should not reject out of hand search and inquiry efforts pertaining to organizing the military on a professional basis.

The question of Internal Security Forces [Vnutrenniye voyska] is a particularly acute and urgent issue. We share the public's view that Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs personnel and Internal Security Forces personnel should not be sent to other regions of the country without the consent of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Party organizations should seek to improve the military-patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of young people and their preparation for military service. We cannot help but be concerned by the fact that pacifistic, antimilitary attitudes have recently been spreading among our youth and that instances of evasion of conscription into the military have been occurring with increasing frequency. This must be resolutely combated, using all resources and means to influence the forming of a strong sense of responsibility for defending the homeland in future military personnel.

Our Armed Forces are bound by strong ties to the people and share all the concerns of society. It is the duty of party organizations to continue in the future helping strengthen ties between workforces, schools, unions of creative artists, and public organizations on the one hand and military units on the other, in particular with those which are returning from the countries of Eastern Europe. We must help them by means of specific actions in carrying out their assigned tasks, in creating adequate conditions for military personnel and their families, and we must make every effort to counter attempts to belittle the honor and dignity of the Soviet serviceman.

### V. Putting Man at the Center of Ukrainian Communist Party Socioeconomic Policy

Comrades! Perestroyka is opening up new possibilities for accomplishing a decisive turning of the economy toward man. With dismantling of the system of rule by administrative fiat [komandno-byurokraticheskaya sistema], those factors which paralyze party political initiative in achieving humanist goals are being eliminated.

Recently our political opponents have been importunately recommending that we refrain from any and all interference in economic affairs, in formulating and carrying out social programs. We categorically oppose this, for only that party which formulates and implements strong social policy can count on the support of the people. For this reason the economy has been and should continue to be a concern of the Ukrainian Communist Party. We are confident that the congress will support our position on this matter.

During the period under review the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has worked persistently on matters pertaining to further development of the economy and adoption of economic reform. We have succeeded in achieving the growth rate for industrial output and consumer goods manufacture prescribed by the five-year plan. Labor productivity has been increased, and materials intensiveness of production has been reduced. This year the Ukraine was one of the few republics in the USSR which succeeded in preventing a decrease in overall industrial output volume.

Unfortunately, however, some negative trends appeared in this republic's economy and even become intensified in the course of perestroyka. The average annual national income growth rate dropped to 3 percent, as compared with 3.4 percent for each of the two preceding five-year plans. Industrial output has grown by less than 1 percent since the beginning of this year, with a targeted annual 3.6 percent growth. The state of affairs has worsened sharply in the basic industries: coal, metallurgical, in a number of sub-branches of the machine building industry, and in the building materials industry.

Real income growth has failed to reach plan targets. The housing problem has worsened. Although much more housing was built than during the first four years of the preceding five-year plan, the waiting list for housing has grown by almost 400,000 families. The consumer market situation has considerably worsened. The level of medical care for our people fails to meet today's needs. The problem of improving living conditions and social protection of women, veterans, large and low-income families, persons living alone, the elderly, and orphaned children remains exceptionally acute.

Thus no matter where we look, we see problems everywhere. And each of them—from the shortage of goods to deficiency of humanity—is today taking on a political

character. There are many reasons for this. Their roots lie in deficiencies both of the union and republic leadership.

First of all, the very model of economic reform constructed at the central governmental level has objectively led to disharmony in economic relations.

Essentially a "vacuum" has formed in direction of the economy. The union-level agencies, however, which formed the mechanism of economic management, remained in the shadows. The entire force of criticism for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the economy, and correspondingly in the social domain as well, is directed at republic party, economic, and Soviet agencies.

Incidentally, capabilities on the part of the Central Committee and republic party committees to affect processes in the economy under these conditions were very limited. But nevertheless we are compelled to take the brunt of this attack, for we have been unable to stand up to arbitrary ministerial rule on the territory of the Ukraine. And that is the truth.

Secondly, converting enterprises over to self-financing in conditions of a ministerial system has proven destructive to the economy. This is unquestionably a serious miscalculation in implementation of perestroyka. Ministerial dictate and planning regulated from above has encouraged enterprises to increase profits not through efficiency and quality of performance but by raising prices. And this ultimately led to ignoring the interests of the consumer, to uncontrolled growth of monetary payments, and to breach of contractual relations.

But even under these circumstances we could have done much more. Take such an important item in the decisions of the 27th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party as providing the market with an abundant supply of consumer goods. It has been pointed out time and again that group A enterprises have not taken adequate part in accomplishing this task. Some of them have not updated their product list for decades. Can it be considered a normal situation where many of our giants of heavy industry in the manufacture of goods have not taken the trouble to rise above the level of the industrial arts of the 1950's, offering only kitchen knives, curtain rods, buckets, etc?

Enterprises of the defense complex should also be making a greater contribution toward increasing production of consumer goods. But due to the lack of a government conversion program, the majority of these enterprises commenced this process without adequate preparation.

And yet all these enterprises are located on the territory of a republic. Can it really be that our government and local soviet agencies lack adequate manpower and authority to organize this important undertaking? What is lacking is initiative, boldness, and the ability to work in the new manner.

We should emphasize that, while giving priority to the manufacture of consumer goods and development of the social domain, the Ukrainian Communist Party should under no circumstances ignore the technical retooling of production, for this is our future. I should note that at the present time almost one fourth of fixed productive assets of this republic has been in use from 10 to 20 years.

Resolving all these problems requires that we carry out specific, decisive measures to increase the effectiveness of capital investment. I must state frankly that up to the present time there have been no fundamental changes here. This is due to a considerable degree to the fact that after enterprises and ministries were empowered to draw up plans independently, the number and extent of uncompleted projects not only failed to decrease but on the contrary grew substantially, reaching a figure of approximately 19 billion rubles at the beginning of this year, that is, 88 percent of our annual capital investment volume. The time it takes to build state-financed production facilities is now almost twice the standard length of time.

In view of this fact the Ukrainian Communist Party will seek to ensure that state funds are spent primarily on building social-purpose facilities. Industrial construction should be financed by enterprises' own funds and with bank credit. We feel that this approach will also make it possible to make the housing problem less acute, since solving this problem requires a sharp increase, by at least double, in the volume of housing construction. Of course in order to accomplish this it is necessary to reconfigure the construction industry within a short period of time and to take a substantial step forward in development of the building materials industry. Within two to three years we must bring to an end the shortage of bricks, cement, finishing materials, etc. We have everything needed to accomplish this in our republic: a raw materials base, a developed machine building industry, and considerable potential on the part of contractor organizations. All that is needed is a proper attitude and a strong sense of responsibility on the part of all Communists who are directly involved in these matters in the government, in other republic agencies, and in local soviets.

It would make sense for the new Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee to organize the drafting of a new, effective capital investment policy and to submit appropriate proposals in the form of a legislative initiative to be considered by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet.

I would also like to emphasize that a new capital investment policy, the republic budget, and economic development plans should be environmentally substantiated. Socioeconomic principles should dominate in formulating economic development criteria. We must prescribe the extensive employment of environmentally-sound technologies which ensure highly-efficient

utilization of raw materials and energy resources. Proceeding from this, our environmental policy should be focused on comprehensive protection of the environment, restoration of our forests and soil fertility, and their effective protection. Particular attention must be focused on revival and recovery of the Dnieper and the small rivers of the Ukraine, the Sea of Azov, recreational zones in the Crimea, on the northwestern coast of the Black Sea, in the Carpathians, etc.

We must complete as soon as possible drafting of and submission for public review and discussion of a republic program of environmental protection and efficient utilization of natural resources during the next five-year plan and beyond. Obviously its implementation will require considerable funds, advanced technologies, and the forming of modern ecological awareness, as well as appropriate legislative enactments.

Comrades! In the period under review we have also not succeeded in accomplishing a radical turnaround to the situation in our rural areas or in diminishing the seriousness of the food problem. Of course it would be incorrect to list nothing but shortcomings, for last year the grain harvest exceeded one ton per capita. There was also increased production of sugar, sunflower oil, meat, and milk. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes generated approximately 10 billion rubles in profit—2.5 million more than in the previous year.

All this is clearly insufficient in order to solve the food problem, however. Nontraditional approaches and radical changes in our agrarian policy are needed.

Heated debate is going on over agrarian policy. There are those who are gaining political capital with angry diatribes about the terrible plight of the peasantry, while making no constructive suggestions. Certain "agrarian experts," while not inquiring, incidentally, to determine the opinion of the agricultural workers themselves, are demanding that kolkhozes be disbanded immediately and that we shift to small-scale peasant farming.

Where does the solution actually lie?

The March (of this year) Central Committee Plenum approved the basic points of a new agrarian policy of the Ukrainian Communist Party. It essentially consists in accomplishing revival of the Ukrainian village and our peasantry, for we can expect to be able to supply the market with foodstuffs only by creating normal conditions in which the peasant can live and work.

The Ukrainian Communist Party will insist that government agricultural programs truly provide priority attention and allocate the necessary funds and resources to strengthen the material and technical foundation of the agroindustrial complex, and especially for accomplishing social restructuring of the village. And this requires considerable funds.

As practical experience has shown, channeling capital investment solely into the production domain without

adequate subsidies for social undertakings fails to produce the anticipated effect. It is a sad fact, but only 2 percent of villages in this republic have been provided adequate and comprehensive facilities. Approximately one half of rural communities have no schools whatsoever, while almost 60 percent lack postal and telegraph/telephone offices, consumer services and preschool facilities, and 70 percent lack public bath facilities. Only 7 percent of villages have gas lines, and only 15 percent have water lines. More than 1,100 rural communities must truck in water.

Each year almost 80 villages "die," and more than 200,000 young people migrate to the city. At the same time the number of housing units built per thousand population is smaller than in urban localities by a factor of 1.7. Last year 75 million rubles of credit was extended just to urban gardeners, while a total of only 65 million rubles was extended to agricultural workers as a group for construction of housing. And market allocations for building materials for rural localities are being systematically reduced to the benefit of contractor organizations.

Also unfair is the fact that construction of cultural, consumer services and social-designation facilities in rural localities is virtually being shifted to the responsibility of kolkhozes and sovkhoses. And although today one out of every ten urban workers and employees has his permanent residence in a rural locality, the industrial enterprises which employ them are not allocating a single kopeck for rural social needs. And they give practically no construction assistance whatsoever to the peasants.

It is therefore essential that the Council of Ministers and local soviets provide for meeting the basic requirements of the village in the state and local budgets and in regional socioeconomic development plans. Enterprises in this republic produce 2.8 million tons annually, for example, just of steel pipe suitable for gas and water lines. Only 90,000 tons of this pipe is allocated to the village, although minimum rural requirements run 300,000 tons. There are also other possibilities, particularly for increasing production of brick, crushed stone, and other construction materials for priority supply to the village. And these possibilities must be aggressively utilized in every oblast and in every rayon. Considerable reserve potential is offered by the new capital investment policy and by refraining from long-term construction of industrial installations.

Clearly the situation in the village can be radically improved only through joint efforts by our entire people, and it is obvious that we must turn the republic's entire economy and industrial potential in a practical manner toward our rural needs. I am convinced that this position will be supported by our congress, by all Communists and working people in the Ukraine.

The delegates are well aware that at the present time the village is literally strangling from lack of equipment, particularly harvesting equipment, as well as modern

equipment for mechanization of livestock operations. This is why it would be advisable for both republic and local agencies to step up efforts to establish associations, joint-stock societies and other structural entities of machine builders, agricultural workers, and scientists for the purpose of designing and manufacturing the equipment our farm areas need.

It is no less important to secure an economic and social balance within the agrarian sector proper, as well as equivalent-value exchange between city and village.

Priorities in agrarian policy should include priority development of the processing industry and agricultural product storage facilities. Food resources can be increased by a minimum of 20-30 percent just by reducing the enormous losses, by prompt, timely and high-quality processing and conveyance to the consumer of everything that is right now being produced. And this is precisely the volume of agricultural product by which the food market falls short.

Capital spending for technical retooling of above-listed branches has been increased by 40 percent in the current five-year plan. But a fundamentally new approach is required here as well. We feel that Gosplan, Gosagroprom, and the Southern Department of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin, working jointly with the appropriate oblast agencies, must draw up in short order a program for establishment of a powerful food-industrial complex in this republic, measures pertaining to its implementation in the next five-year plan, with these measures submitted for consideration by the Council of Ministers.

Present realities, comrades, are that large-scale highly-mechanized farming operations, that is, kolkhozes and sovkhoses, are now and will continue to remain in the near future the basic form of organization of agricultural production in this republic. But in order fully to realize their actual potential, they must radically reorganize their operations. First and foremost I am talking about improving production relations, aggressive adoption of modern scientific advances and the latest technologies. But this will be possible only when farms have genuine economic autonomy.

At the same time it is necessary to establish across the board all conditions required for development of diversified methods of farm operation and management and forms of ownership: individual and group lease, contract, peasant farms and independent farmer operations, production cooperatives, integrated entities, etc. It is important to provide equal government support and protection and equal economic opportunities to the new and traditional forms of farming operation. I emphasize, however, that the peasants themselves should determine the appropriateness of employment of a given form, proceeding from their own economic interest. It is obvious that the situation in agriculture will progress to a better extent if it is the peasant who has the greatest material incentive and if the peasant can in fact enjoy the

fruits of his labor, that is, becomes the genuine master on the land, who is given a vested interest and full equality of rights.

This is not enough, however, for revival of the peasantry. Everything possible must be done to raise the intellectual-spiritual-cultural level in the village. One almost never hears today the sound of girls singing on a village street in the evening, amateur artistic activities are in decline in many rayons, folk crafts are being forgotten, and national traditions are being lost. It is essential to strengthen the facilities of rural cultural-educational and sports establishments, to devote considerably greater attention to the rural intelligentsia, and to provide equal living conditions in the village for cultural workers, educators, medical workers, and other categories of specialist personnel.

It is the task of the entire party to revive the village and to return respect and honor to the farmer. And a special role here should be played by rural rayon party committees. Each and every Communist, each and every citizen should be profoundly aware of the fact that root agrarian issues can be resolved only in a close alliance between the peasantry and the worker class.

I am convinced that our congress will confirm once again that the Ukrainian Communist Party will continue in the future to be a reliable spokesman for and defender of the interests of the peasantry—bearer of the spiritual health of the nation, of folk wisdom and of the work ethic.

Comrades! Accomplishment of all tasks pertaining to raising people's living standards requires a substantial increase in national income within a fairly short period of time. But to accomplish this it is necessary first of all to create conditions which will foster intensive increase in production volume and prevent redistribution of national income by means of unequivalent-value exchange, and which will firmly link an individual's level of prosperity with the end results of his labor.

We also need republic economic sovereignty in order to accomplish these tasks. Economic sovereignty will open up for the people of the Ukraine the possibility of enjoying the fruits of their labor in full measure.

We must acknowledge that at the present time our economic relations with the central government and the other republics continue to be highly complex and many times not mutually advantageous. Take the coal industry, for example, socioeconomic conflicts had been building up and becoming more aggravated in this industry for years. Chronic failure of union ministries to meet capital investment targets and rapid aging of mine facilities worsened the already difficult working conditions for the miners and the state of utilities, municipal and consumer services in mining towns and communities.

The central government's short-sighted policy was also clearly manifested in development of the nuclear power industry on the territory of this republic. Billions of

rubles and enormous material resources were wasted on the Chigirin, Crimean, and other nuclear power plants. The tragic consequences of the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant lie as a heavy burden on our economy.

For this reason specific actions directed toward fundamental renewal and renovation of economic relations between the Ukraine on the one hand and the USSR and the union republics on the other must constitute one of the principal directions taken in the activities of the newly-elected members of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee.

Declarations alone, however, even quite correct declarations, are not enough, for the point here is to move from dictate and monopolistic practices to partnership on a mutually beneficial contractual basis, to totally new economic relations. For this reason a great deal of preparatory work is needed, formulation of an overall economic concept which takes into account the specific features of this republic. Unfortunately our government is lagging behind here as well.

A question arises: is there not a contradiction between economic sovereignty and a policy of integration which, as we know, is inherent in modern civilization? In actuality there are no contradictions here at all. Integration is a result of a previously-implemented profound division of labor, the result of creating in a country or region its own unique potential. And this in turn is possible only on a foundation of economic autonomy and extended differentiation.

For this reason the road to integration is seen as lying through the formation of a new division of labor, which meets criteria of efficiency of utilization of everything we currently possess. Passage through a phase of development which precisely sovereignty will encourage will ensure the creation of solid preconditions for the republic economy to enter into the union economy as well as the world economy grounded on principles of mutually beneficial integration.

Of course sovereignty, with all its attractiveness, cannot of itself guarantee that the economy will prosper or even become healthy. This must be stated frankly, since many people today entertain the illusion that economic autonomy can become a panacea for all ills. Growth in volume and increase in efficiency of production, primarily through an efficient structure of the economy, renovation and retooling, and extensive adoption of the latest technologies and hardware, was in the past and continues to be the main factor in the development of any society.

Today power engineering and the metallurgical industry, mining and chemicals, heavy machine building, etc comprise more than two thirds of our economy, the structure of which was formed historically as the foundation for our country's heavy industry. The daily lives of tens of millions of persons and the fate of entire regions are linked to these industries. Obviously it is



simply impossible to alter such a structure in short order. This is why the Ukrainian Communist Party advocates gradual, thoroughly-substantiated reconfiguration of individual enterprises and branches in the interests of the people.

An exceptionally important role in this process is played by science and the practical application of scientific advances. For this reason Communists in government must actively foster the adoption of an economic mechanism for speeding up scientific and technological advance.

A new concept of development of science proper is needed. While preserving all valuable elements achieved in previous decades, we must intensify attention by the state toward development of basic research and resolving the problems of providing society with information. The scientific worker must be placed in the center, and conditions must be created for the development and support of talents. It is also important that the Academy of Sciences more rapidly restructure its operations on the principles of self-government and autonomy, independence in the conduct of research, formulation of strategy and tactics of scientific activity, and determination of matters pertaining to its organizational structure.

The role of external economic activity becomes considerably greater in conditions of economic sovereignty. The time has also come to think about an agency to coordinate these activities within the republic in a skilled and able manner. Particularly since negative trends have appeared in this domain as enterprises and organizations have stepped up efforts to connect to the external market, and our export potential is frequently simply squandered.

Comrades! The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee has categorically stated its opposition to hasty, ill-conceived transition to market relations of business operation and management and advocates a reasoned, well-substantiated approach in this matter. Of considerable importance here are choice, thoughtful consideration, precise adjustment of specific actions, as well as internal logic and consistency of actions. During the years of perestroika all of us have become convinced that haste and incompetence lead to ruinous consequences.

We should not forget that a turn by the economy toward the market should be carried out taking into consideration the entire aggregate of existing societal and production relations. Otherwise the crisis phenomena in the economy not only will not be overcome but may even intensify.

Of course one should not expect a social idyll in conditions of a market economy. Everyone will have to learn, as they say, to make money, in order to implement broad social programs. This is no easy task, and it is a new task for Communists.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee feels that a market transition must begin with forming the organizational-production and monetary-financial preconditions for market relations. There arises here first of all the question of the necessity of establishing progressive production structures such as concerns [kontserny], associations [assotsiatsii], corporations [aktsionernyye obshchestva], etc, for it will be very difficult to enter individually into the new conditions of operation and management, and it will be beyond the capabilities of some enterprises. Evidently such structures will be created on the foundation of existing technological, territorial, or commercial ties and unite a varying number of enterprises. Thorough calculations are essential in each specific instance. But the main thing is to ensure that these associations [obyyedineniya] are entirely focused on demand, on the needs of the consumer.

We should already today start thinking about who will be exercising government regulation of the economy in this area in conditions of a market economy, both at the republic and local levels, and how this regulation will be carried out.

A second important precondition for transitioning to a market-oriented economy is improvement in the economy's financial health. Last year the budget deficit was covered, the printing of additional currency was reduced by one third, and the number of enterprises operating at a loss was cut by one fourth. This failed to stabilize the situation, however; inflationary processes are intensifying. This requires formulation and implementation of an extensive system of anti-inflation measures, both of a long-term nature and measures which must be implemented right today. Practical realities demand that republic economic agencies move more actively toward the establishment of a market for securities—stocks and bonds—and utilization of nontraditional profit sources. We must also give thought to the structure of the banking system and seriously address the matter of enhancing the role of credit and interest policy.

We should stress once again that in conditions of transition to a market-oriented economy, formulation of proposals on creating a mechanism of social protection for the individual and all strata of society should become one of the principal issues of the activities of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

Approximately 13 million pensioners and disabled persons currently reside in the Ukraine. 258,000 of these are disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War and persons of equivalent classification. Not all of their problems are resolved even with adoption of the Law on Pensions, although the total amount of pension payments will run almost 20 billion rubles annually in this republic.

We must make special mention of the need for a substantial improvement in medical care. We feel that the way to achieve this lies in restructuring of the operations of medical care facilities, extensive adoption of elements of medical insurance, advanced methods of prevention,



diagnosis, and treatment, utilizing modern medical equipment and technology and effective medicines.

In our opinion the mechanism of social protection of the individual should prescribe not only government financing but also funding by enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, trade union bodies, and other societal organizations.

The fact is, comrades, that we are faced by a considerable element of the unknown along the road toward market relations and a mixed economy. But one thing is certain: we must keep the situation under political oversight. Improvement of social-production relations, the proposed structural changes, and demonopolization of production will not simply proceed on their own in the course of market self-regulation, in the direction which we want them to take.

In critical situations, such as the one which has developed in this country, whereby supply and demand are out of balance and the economic growth rate is declining, it is also essential to use governmental authority more effectively. This is done very skillfully and aptly by that same Western World, to the experience of which it has become so popular these days to make reference. But republic economic sovereignty also makes it possible fully to apply the institutions of government authority in the interests of the individual.

Comrade delegates! Summarizing what has been stated, we must emphasize once again that the period under review was exceptionally difficult and sometimes dramatic as well for the present membership of the Central Committee and for the entire Ukrainian Communist Party. Not all of us proved to be prepared for the conflictive, unpredictable development of events and for prompt, timely, and comprehensive analysis of the new political realities of perestroika. Practical actions frequently lagged behind the needs of the time. This of course applies first and foremost to the members of the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. All of us deserve criticism. And criticism rang out at party meetings and conferences and in the mass media. In preparing this Accountability Report, we proceeded from the position that it is precisely you congress delegates who will make a well-substantiated and maximally objective appraisal of the performance of each individual—from Politburo member to every member of the Central Committee.

Comrades! We are standing at the threshold of the 28th CPSU Congress, which is to determine the party's future at a critical stage of societal development. Discussion is winding up on the proposed draft versions of the CPSU Platform entitled "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism," and on the CPSU Rules. On the whole these documents are given a positive appraisal, as providing a key to the resolution of acute socioeconomic and political problems, and determining the points of reference for subsequent renewal of society and the party.

At the same time many critical comments and suggestions are being made. In the opinion of those who took part in the discussion, we must beef up the historical-theoretical section of the Platform and define the substance of democratic, humanitarian socialism. Many comrades feel that we should deepen analysis of the processes taking place in society and more clearly define a program of actions by the party for the immediate future. Items pertaining to our party's social base, the principles of its structure, and the party's relationship toward other political currents need additional refinement.

Communists are in favor of all reasonable suggestions being utilized in the CPSU Program Document, including the points of alternative drafts, and the Democratic and Marxist Platforms.

The opinion is stated that it is essential to stress in the CPSU Rules the importance of the linkage between democratization of party affairs and strengthening of party discipline, and formulation of a mechanism for ensuring the ideological and organizational unity of party ranks.

In the course of discussion the draft Program Principles of Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party were on the whole given a positive appraisal. This draft has been substantially refined on the basis of comments and is being submitted for your consideration.

And, finally, I would like to address a fundamental issue. In considering all these documents, the republic's party organizations were virtually unanimous on one thing: we cannot allow the party to split. Defend the ideological and organizational unity of Communists: the Ukrainian Communist Party gives these instructions to the delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Comrades! Our congress is to elect a new Central Committee. Allow me to share some observations in this regard.

We feel that it is essential to reject the position-held principle in electing a Central Committee. Experience shows the erroneousness of this principle. At the 27th Congress almost all ministers and chairmen of state committees, as well as many second-level officials were elected to the Central Committee. Is this not one reason why the Central Committee, as a political body, proved to be insufficiently demanding and sometimes lenient toward those who for years had failed to do a fully adequate job in their assigned sector?

In our opinion it is the right thing to do to ensure representation of workers and peasants in the Central Committee. We feel that there should also be representatives of the worker class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia in the Central Committee Politburo. It is important to consider the ethnic composition of the Ukrainian Communist Party in forming the Central Committee.

Of course we should elect to the Central Committee Communists who are capable of thinking innovatively,

of acting in a vigorous manner in difficult conditions, and of demonstrating faithfulness to our ideals by their personal example.

The new Central Committee should constitute a genuine command headquarters of the Ukrainian Communist Party in conditions of its new status, in a multi-party environment. And this is much more difficult than things were in the past.

Comrades! By electing us as delegates to the congress, this republic's Communists have entrusted to us the future of the Ukrainian Communist Party, the fate of perestroyka in the republic. They have faith that we shall be able to consolidate party forces, to defend party unity, and to move forward the processes of renewal. And we shall be worthy of this great trust.

**SOYUZ Reviews Armenian-Azeri Conflict**

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Nos 18 and 19, May 90

[Article by Marat Abdullayev and Vasilii Kononenko:  
"Sacrifice on the Altar of Tragic Confusion"]

[No 18, May 90, pp 12-13]

[Text] Crisis. This word which recently was "foreign" to us can be heard more and more frequently across the expanses of our nation from the mouths of large and small authorities and giving rise to perplexity, a feeling of fear and social apathy. But it assumes an evil cast when the issue arises of the crisis in interethnic relations. Many of us or more accurately all of us who think see in the area of interethnic conflicts, hostility and clashes a disaster similar to the biblical Apocalypse. Its glow was clearly imprinted in our minds quite recently when in the Transcaucasus a bloody drama unfolded and seemingly a little bit later and it, like a medieval plague, had begun to affect near and distant peoples.

Of course, 3 years ago when the crisis had just begun to emerge in the relations between the Azeri and Armenian peoples, no one could have guessed what it would ultimately emerge as and with what a tragedy it would end. Alas, not many are capable to guess the future and hence all that occurred now belongs to history and no one is capable of altering this. However, this property of history of being unchanged has an indisputable plus in that all that it has set down can be analyzed and investigated in detail and helps us draw closer to the truth and gain lessons from what happened for the future. So let us try to do this and by a journalist investigation analyze the recent events; disclose the sources and turning points in the escalating of the unprecedented interethnic hostility in the Transcaucasus, and to shed light on the forces for which history sooner or later will present major accounts for immoral, criminal activity or, on the contrary, for idleness.

From the very outset we were confronted inevitably with the question of just how natural was such a tragic outcome of the Transcaucasus crisis? Can one agree that the drama was predetermined from the very start, when the pointer on the political barometer in the region just budged? A difficult question. Difficult primarily because we all have become witnesses of a not very ordinary development of one phenomenon into another.

Yes, psychologists, philosophers, political scientists and historians must still have their word in defining a completely new concept for us: "national self-awareness." We are not now ready to say what this is, what are the roots of national self-awareness, of what it is formed and how it differs, for instance, from nationalism. We touch on this concept only because undoubtedly precisely the increase in national self-awareness was the precursor of what happened in Armenia and Azerbaijan. We are convinced that neither the shadow economy nor the corruption which caused the ubiquitous indignation of

the people were the determining or root causes in the rise and development of the Transcaucasus crisis, although it would be flippant to ignore them completely. But this is a matter of a separate discussion.

Let us immediately stipulate that we in no way intend to uniformly define national self-awareness as a sort of detonator in the subsequent powerful destruction, since all of us have numerous examples of the beneficial influence of this feeling which should certainly be natural for each person. Moreover, nowhere up to now except in the Transcaucasus (Fergana and Dushanbe do not count since the events there were based on social and economic problems) have we as yet encountered the monstrous degeneration of national self-awareness into a nationalistic aggression.

Here we might be disputed and one might wonder whether there were the processes of the growth of national self-awareness in the Caucasus? Possibly everything would be much simpler with some in their nationalistic zeal throwing down the glove and others picking it up? Clearly this was not the case. A rise in national self-awareness has raged across the entire nation and one has merely to take the heightened question of the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans or look at the motley palette of people's fronts and movements of national minorities in virtually all the republics and regions of the nation.... Of course, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan could be taken out of the general context of the processes occurring in the nation since April 1985. From this viewpoint it is completely absurd to assert that the Transcaucasus crisis was started by one side. Here there are neither first nor second. We feel that one would be convinced of this by the very chronicle of the Transcaucasus events and particularly its start. Let us take a closer look.

1986. The 27th CPSU Congress was approaching. The social push toward democracy which for so long had dozed under the wrath of Stalinism and the Khrushchev and Brezhnev times assumed enormous scope for those moments. But at the crest of it in Armenia and in the NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], there appeared an alarming tilt related to the question of the reannexation of the "ancient Armenian lands." Even then there was a core group, a "control center" for achieving the idea of recovering the Nakhichevan ASSR and the NKAO by Armenia. This included scientific workers such as I. Maradyan, S. Ayvazyan, A. Ter-Mkrtychyan and the writer S. Khanzadyan and others. The correspondent of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA for Armenia Z. Balayan also played a major role in organizing the group.

Under the flag of the need to restore historical justice, the roots of which are linked by many to the dividing up of the territories of the Transcaucasus Republics in the 1920s, representatives of the intelligentsia initiated energetic activities in the NKAO for the mass collecting of signatures among the local inhabitants for an "appeal" to the powers for the withdrawal of Nagornyy Karabakh

from Azerbaijan. More and more frequently Moscow was visited by various delegations from the inhabitants of Armenia and the NKAO. In the Soviet and foreign press there was a growing number of articles on this question and soon thereafter the "Karabakh Question" as they say "matured."

In Azerbaijan a similar process was also present. In the scientific works and newspaper articles of certain Azeri scientists and in a number of works by republic writers sharp debates arose over the problems of the formation of the ethnos, the culture of the Azerbaijani nation, and its historical relations with neighboring peoples. New independent associations appeared. A special role began to be played by the historical-literary Chenlibel Association which was formed in April 1987 in Baku and the leadership of this included M. Gatami, a co-worker at the Museum of Azerbaijani Literature of the Republic Academy of Sciences; B. Shakhverdiyev, an educational worker from the Pioneer Palace; N. Panakhov, a worker from the Plant imeni Leytenant Shmidt, as well as representatives of the intelligentsia, the worker and student youth of the republic cities and rayons.

How were the informal groups able to win the minds of the masses. In the given case, an example could be the mentioned Chenlibel Association. Its leaders did not stuff the people with promises of a "bright future." They raised on their shield simple-to-understand and simultaneously the most urgent questions related to the fight against the corrupt bureaucrats and administrators of all levels; for preserving the natural resources for future generations and in particular the oil reserves; for the monolithness of the nation based on Islam and so forth.

As we can see, the ideology of Chenlibel appeared simple and it, incidentally, in being adopted in one form or another by scores and hundreds of informal organizations throughout the nation, in the current difficult stage of our development has been strong-acting. Its strength is that the problems which have built up over the decades for the various peoples have now been employed for rejecting the failings of the past and have strongly fostered the growth of national self-awareness. This growth has occurred simultaneously in both Transcaucasus republics. And what can be done if in one it was expressed in the need to resolve the "Karabakh Question" and in the other touched an equally painful nerve related to the ethnos and the unity of the nation. Who could be blamed for this? No one. This was being thought about by the same intelligentsia both in Armenia and Azerbaijan! They should have realized that a chain reaction of reciprocal claims would be a path to nowhere! Unfortunately, there was not such understanding. And the chain reaction began.

In October and November 1987 in Yerevan, Muradyan and his associates had already moved on to organizing demonstrations by natives from Nagornyy Karabakh. In a majority of the NKAO rayons meetings were held of the labor collectives and conferences of the party and

economic aktiv and here resolutions were adopted on the reunification of Nagornyy Karabakh with Armenia, money was collected as well as signatures for an appeal to the superior powers. Meetings and demonstrations in this spirit soon assumed a regular nature.

In turn, in Azerbaijan, particularly among the representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, the students and the youth, the determination grew to fight back in the event of an attempt to take the NKAO away from Azerbaijan. The crisis deepened after 20 February 1988, when a session of the Oblast Soviet of the NKAO adopted a decision to return the autonomous oblast to Armenia. There followed a long sequence of mutual attacks, threats, meetings, strikes involving various independent associations, committees and national movements.

Actually, it probably makes no sense to inform a reader of the infinite swirl of protests which gradually hardened the hearts of people. Clearly this did not lead to anything good. For a mass action held on 19 February in Baku by the student youth against the "unjust territorial claims of the Armenian nationalists" on 22 February set off a large crowd of inhabitants from Agdamskiy and other nearby rayons toward Stepanakert and armed with sticks and iron rods. The military subunits and forces of the MVD halted the basic portion of the crowd. But individual groups of young people succeeded in infiltrating the territory of Askeranskiy Rayon in the NKAO, and here there was a clash with the Armenian population and as a result of which some 19 persons were wounded on both sides and 2 Azeris were killed. Thus, the first blood was shed. And then the first refugees appeared.

After the clashes close to the settlement of Askeran, in Agdamskiy and Lachinskiy Rayons and in the city of Kirovabad in Azerbaijan, on 27 February 1988, the tragedy occurred in Sumgait.

Soon the clashes on an interethnic basis between the Armenians and the Azeris assumed an ominous constancy. After the next clash in Araratskiy Rayon of Armenia, from mid-May 1988, a third wave began in the resettlement of Azeris from Armenia and this with renewed force complicated the situation in the Transcaucasus. As a result, a state of emergency was introduced in Agdamskiy Rayon and Stepanakert. But the flow of refugees from both sides did not halt. As a whole in 1988, over 140,000 persons moved into Azerbaijan from Armenia while more than 90,000 persons of Armenian nationality left Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani refugees were represented chiefly by rural inhabitants from 17 rayons of Armenia.

The complete impunity for the bands led by the representatives of the Karabakh Committee contributed to the spread of panic among the Azeri population and led to their mass flight into the woods close to the frontier with Azerbaijan. Along the way they were subjected to attacks and beatings and many persons were maimed and received frostbite. Involved in the expulsion were

representatives of the local authorities and internal affairs and this gave these actions the character of state policy. It is precisely these refugees who presently represent the most unstable and explosive group.

Soon thereafter in Baku there began the marches by groups of Azeri refugees who demanded that the party and soviet bodies in the republic resolve their housing problems by the violent expulsion of Armenians from the city and threats and attacks on the Armenians followed.

In the summer of 1989, the People's Front of Azerbaijan (NFA) was created and this immediately began the mass involvement of the public in its activities. Actually, for this it did not need to make a special effort since by this time the republic authorities had repeatedly demonstrated their weakness and inability to check the storm of passions. This must be said now with bitterness as who knows how things would have turned out in the Transcaucasus if at the very outset the authorities had taken radical measures to improve the political climate in the republics or at least not create obstacles between themselves and the informal groups, had they sought a dialogue and tried in concert to solve the arising problems... Probably everything would have gone differently. Alas, in the same Azerbaijan to resolve the question of registering the NFA, it was necessary to bring things to the critical point, to the first claps before the lightening and after which the paralysis of official structures could be felt more and more clearly.

As is known, nature does not tolerate a vacuum. There was nothing surprising in the fact that the loss of confidence by the authorities led to the rise of a vacuum which was filled by structures of a completely different sort.

No matter how one might not wish to admit this, the reality was that at some stage both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the national aspirations of the fronts retreated to the background. And this was not only figuratively but also in the literal sense of this word when, so to speak, the flower of the nation, its conscience were decisively moved back and the levers of leadership over the national movements was taken up by the leftist radicals naturally with their own arsenal of methods and means.

For the sake of justice, it must be said that initially the NFA tried to avoid extremism. But gradually two branches appeared in the movement: the "leftist" (radicals) and the "center" (moderates). In August-September 1989, a "defense committee" was formed for "defending the interests of the front" and this was headed by Ali-zade Mamed Isaogly.

The transformation of this committee is also indicative of the degeneration of the NFA itself. While initially the main goal of the "defense committee" was to provide aid to the law enforcement bodies in instilling and maintaining order in the republic, subsequently it assumed

the questions of registering fighters and weapons, coordinating and organizing communications, protecting the NFA leaders, ticketing and so forth. Its activities were subordinate to achieving the immediate goal of the NFA, that is, seizing power, including by armed means.

Similar processes could also be observed in Armenia. On 4-6 November, in Yerevan the Karabakh Committee organized the constituent congress of the Armenian General National Movement (AOD) and this also included the Union of Armenian Students, the Charity Society as well as a number of cultural and ecological associations. And here an amazing lack of principle of the republic leadership became apparent. In contrast to the Azerbaijani authorities which merely distanced themselves from the informal groups, the Armenian Supreme Soviet hurried to recognize the AOD and made no effort to find a constructive channel for collaborating with it. In essence, the leaders of the movement were given the green light for creating an extensive network of rayon, settlement and rural structures as well as primary AOD organizations in the labor collectives. At present, it could be said that their aim was the same as for the leaders of the NFA and that was to form an alternative power in the republic.

Yes, the flags on the facades of the transformed front of course were the former ones promising the defense of the national interests of the native peoples. Other, true banners were unsafe to hand up. No matter how national aspirations dizzied the people, many were capable rather soberly of distinguishing the difference between the struggle for national interests and a political struggle for power. For this reason, the next step of the leftist was to push the most desperate portion of the refugees into physical reprisal against the "foreigners," the barbarous pogroms and murders and the armed clashes of the different sides. This was an explainable and natural step. In the person of the masses (no matter how monstrous this may sound) they needed a co-participant who, having dipped his hands in blood, would go to any barricade without particularly trying to figure out why. Of course, it was not possible to involve everyone in this. Proof of this is the examples where Azeris, including members of the NFA, hid Armenian families from the pogrom members. But they were unable to change the course of events.

[No 19 May 90, pp 12-13]

[Text] In December 1989, the Armenian Supreme Soviet adopted a decision which rejected the well-known decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the NKAO. In response there came an appropriate ruling of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet to prevent the withdrawal of the autonomous oblast and after this the resolving of the "Karabakh Question" was again stalemated. In politics there is the rule that in crisis situations one must endeavor in every possible way to maintain a dialogue and not allow a lull. This rule was not observed in terms of the NKAO problem. The process began of switching the affiliation

of the Armenian enterprises, institutions and organizations. On 6 December at a session of the National Council of the NKAO, they announced the halting of the powers of the Special Administration Committee and the reverting of all power to this council.

A response to this demarche followed quickly. On 24 December, real hostilities commenced between both sides with the use of an enormous amount of firearms and heavy equipment, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns and helicopters which had been captured from the troop units, the military commissariats, the ROVD [rayon internal affairs department] and other organizations.

What happened then is known to all. On 19 January 1990, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet promulgated an Ukase introducing a state of emergency in Baku. In accord with this, troops from the USSR MVD and the Ministry of Defense were sent in now to extinguish the flames of national discord.

We have now reached the most painful moment in the chronicle of the events described in the Transcaucasus. About that day in these republics, and not only there, one hears about the "punitive detachments," the "bloody perestroika" and so forth. We do not know how the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on introducing a state of emergency was adopted. For this reason, let us endeavor to model the logic of reasoning and the motives which guided the Presidium members, in again relying on the facts and an analysis of the situation in the Transcaucasus. (We do not accept the notion that our investigation was based on greater factual material than was available to the most informed persons in the nation. We have also learned that the summaries of the USSR KGB, the MVD and the Ministry of Defense fully reflected the drama and intensity of events in the Transcaucasus and it would be at least naive of us to accuse these bodies of primitive work or unprofessionalism.)

But this, as they say, is gloomy prose. But what did the lawmakers see in this situation? Just one thing, the dress rehearsal before the overthrow of constitutional power, primarily in Azerbaijan. During those anxious days, unfortunately, only the escalation of violence with unpredictable consequences was the denominator of all the summaries and messages to the Center.

In Azerbaijan the NFA leaders openly set out to strengthen their position as a permanent power. And the emphasis was on force. On 13 January at a demonstration attended by some 80,000 people in Baku, E. Mamedov announced the determination to resolve the Karabakh Question by force of arms and if the state apparatus would not participate in this, then the Defense Committee would declare the independence of Azerbaijan and turn top Iran and Turkey for aid. Another NFA leader, I. Panakhov, stated that "if punitive troops appear, we will disarm them and take over their weapons...."

The NFA leaders, and above all Nazim Rakhimov, visited the Iranian Consul General in Baku and received moral support for an armed struggle against the authorities as well as money. Thus, on 12 January they requested from the Iranian Consul General assistance in the "National Liberation Movement of the Azeris" and this in principle was promised to them.

The state frontier in the Nakhichevan area had been opened for an extended time. Each year, it was crossed by tens of thousands of people from the Azerbaijan and Iranian side and weapons were being smuggled.

There are many such facts and they clearly show that on 20 January the NFA leaders were planning to proclaim "their power" by putting the session of the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet under siege by excited crowds. Just what sort of power they envisaged can be clearly seen from the above-quoted statements of the NFA leaders.

During the dramatic days of the pogroms in Baku and after them, the call for help and for protection against the real danger of physical annihilation shattered nerves and evoked pain throughout our nation. We will now not speak about the tragedy which befell the Armenians removed from Baku, the Azeri refugees and the hundreds of thousands of refugees of other nationalities, including Russians and Ukrainians. This is a separate question for reflecting on the responsibility of those who "played" the trump of accumulated political problems and who toys with national feelings, without wondering and without being concerned with the consequences of such a dangerous game. We are accustomed to the fact that the Center should be responsible for everything. But during those January days, the Center became a lightning rod which was struck by bolts of indignation: "Why have troops not been sent for instilling order?" we heard everywhere. "Why have troops been introduced into Baku where there are no pogroms yet?" came the shouts beyond the Caucasus Range.

There scarcely exists any painless and simple formulas for curing the social malaise similar to an inflamed boil on national grounds. We feel that in such cases a surgeon is indispensable. Unfortunately, recently more and more frequently it is the troops who have had to perform the role of such a surgeon.

Thus, about the actions of the Army and the USSR MVD subunits. The state of emergency declared by the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in our view, was necessary in the first 10 days of January. By this time the great disaster in the Transcaucasus was clearly visible. But...

If one speaks to the larger issues, then the escalating of the Transcaucasus crisis also illuminated the confusion in the higher echelons of power. The former mechanism of decision-taking had begun to slip as a consequence of the moving of power from the party bodies into the state elective ones which, in turn, could not yet effectively

manage this power. To a larger degree we are inclined to explain the tragic indecisiveness of the Center by something else.

Certainly, the Center also has persons at work who would support the hope that reason will win out and who, like all of us, were swayed by the "troop syndrome" after Tbilisi. Nevertheless, the pogroms of the Armenians on 13 January in Baku became the Rubicon in the process of weighing the measures to prevent a civil war in the Transcaucasus. Soon thereafter, troop subunits began to be organized and moved up to the frontiers of Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, it is one thing to travel across a topographic map with a ruler, holding a stopwatch in your hand and reality is quite something else. On the approaches to the centers of the interethnic clashes, the troops were stopped. And what sense does it make to declare a state of emergency if on the spot there are no forces capable of supervising its observation? The troop units in Baku were paralyzed by the NFA fighters, by the barricades, trucks and crowds of overexcited persons. It made no sense to send the arriving soldiers into Nakhichevan, to the frontier with Armenia, without having assumed control over the situation in Baku from whence the "oxygen" was being supplied for the widening fire in the Transcaucasus. For this reason, on 19 January, there followed the order of the minister of defense to relieve the military camps and have the troops which had arrived from other regions break into Baku. Let us see how this looked from two contradictory examples.

Below follows an excerpt from an interview given by an actor at the Azerbaijani Dramatic Theater Ramiz Melikhov and which was broadcast by Radio Liberty on 27 January 1990: "The troops broke into Baku from four sides and fired on people using modern weapons. They crushed people with tanks. On 20 January, the punitive detachments killed people in different rayons of the city all day long." Where the truth is and where the lie is remains on the conscience of the interviewee.

Below follows an excerpt from the response of the troop unit commander in Baku and which was written shortly after the events:

"The leaving of the armored group from the camp had to be carried out not through the checkpoint but rather by ramming the fence in a place where there was no crowd of people. Here it was possible to avoid victims among the population surrounding the buildings. The soldiers began to tear down the barricades and were in a hurry. It was precisely then that mass fire began by fighters against the personnel and the military camp.

"The soldiers began returning the fire only after their first comrades had fallen, including Pvts Konartsev, Rusanov and Sobolev, Sr Sgt Pyatakov and others. During the first minutes after the sortie of the troops, some 11 servicemen and the wife of an officer were killed."

We have no intention to idealize the behavior of the military. Eye witnesses, our colleagues, have described that in certain instances it would have been possible to resort to precautionary measures as was done, for example, close to Dzhalilabad, where military maneuvers were conducted around the city and only after this did the troops enter the city without casualties. The order could have been carried out differently. But we cannot deny the obvious that when the zealous fighters shower the soldiers with fire and completely innocent young fellows are killed, admonishments become useless. The frantic zeal of the fighters is explainable as they, like the NFA leaders responsible for many crimes, had no other solution except to "go for broke."

...We do not feel that if the state of emergency had not been introduced in Baku and in a number of the rayons of Azerbaijan and Armenia with all the elements inherent to it that the situation would have straightened out by itself. Moreover, we are confident that the next victims after the "foreigners" would have been the representatives of their own people, the party and soviet workers, all of those who in one way or another represented the structures of constitutional power. It is no accident that during one of the parades during the most tense days, gallows were put up precisely in front of the building of the Azerbaijani CP Central Committee. Although they did not "go to work" at that time, this gloomy symbol says a great deal.

Of course, we could have followed a very simple path if in our research we had adhered to the standard version that the events in the Transcaucasus in essence were merely an attempt at a state coup and such a goal was set from the very outset, although it was necessary to reach this goal by intricate convolutions. No, everything developed quite differently and, in our view, each next stage of these events merely arose spontaneously from the previous stage. It is a different question that virtually no one at all prevented those who were trying to use the lack of will and the paralysis of the authorities for their own benefit. Thus, the idea of a national rebirth gradually grew into a completely different phenomenon. There was the tragic confusion of enormous masses who had lost their guidelines in the frantic zeal. The scale of sacrifice on this doleful altar became unprecedented. The price of a human life dropped below that limit beyond which begins the struggle of nature. Who, for example, could remain indifferent during those same January days in receiving the news that in the course of the Armenian pogroms in Baku a rabid crowd in the literal sense of the word tore a person to pieces and threw his remains into a garbage container? For instance, troops were introduced into Baku because in the world there are no states which could calmly contemplate their own destruction.

At present, it is possible to argue without end as to whether or not the limit has been reached beyond which the conflict could be halted only with the help of tanks. Are we returning or are we not to those times when disturbances on the periphery were suppressed by force? The answer comes automatically. The opportunity to

dispute was provided to use precisely by this lull, this pause in the still unweakening crisis. Let us dispute if there is some benefit from this. But would it not be better considering the lessons learned, the tragedies and the irrecoverable losses to use the time granted to us for something else, for a constructive search for ways to resolve the problems of the Transcaucasus? And this should be by democratic, civilized means.

At present, a new legal power is being formed in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Of course, time will be needed for it to manifest itself fully. But should we rely solely on this, on time as some sort of traditional medicine against all illnesses? Certainly all the components of the Transcaucasus crisis are with us today. The leaders of the AOD and NFA, although having changed partially (some have gone underground, others are being investigated or have fled like, for example, Panakhov, who, judging from everything, has taken refuge in one of the neighboring countries to the south), are still "calling the tune." And the formations of fighters have not disappeared without a trace and they have enough hidden weapons. Considering all of this, it seems to us that both Transcaucasian republics have not been in any hurry to draw lessons from the recent past. If this is the case, then this is sad news for all of us.

#### Estonian Opinion Poll On Independence, Soviet Rule

90UN1867A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 8 May 90 p 2

[Article by Kh. Khansen: "I Was Born Here..."]

[Text] ...I know the past of this land, and its present, the aspirations of the indigenous population are close to me. This phrase has become a common ground for many articles. What lies behind it?

Living in the land of another ethnic group helps a person understand the people among whom he lives. The situation in our republic today is such that the factors which keeps us from deepening our understanding of local problems outweigh those that facilitate mutual understanding between us. Let us try to examine how the outlook of the non-indigenous population of the republic varies as a function of the amount of time they have lived in Estonia. If we can do this, in the future we may be able to predict the occurrence of tension or its abatement. In November and December of last year the Society For Preservation of Antiquities conducted a survey (924 respondents) on the problems of political independence [for Estonia]. The sources of today's attitudes are rooted in the past, without knowledge of which we cannot understand the present correctly. This is the reason the questionnaire contained questions relating to attitudes toward events of previous years.

The first question was: To what extent did the inhabitants of Estonia participate in the establishment of Soviet power in Estonia in 1940?

The answers were distributed as follows.

	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	Lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	Born in Estonia	
Don't know	57	46	43	12
Soviet power established by the working people	10	13	9	11
Roles of local inhabitants and USSR troops were equal	13	20	23	2
Ethnic Estonians played little role	20	20	26	86

The answers of those born in Estonia were closer to those of the indigenous inhabitants, but not to a significant extent. A characteristic feature is the high percentage answering "I don't know." It is not that these people have not been told about past events, but that they do not know whom and what to believe. The information is too contradictory. This is confirmed by the answers to the second question: How beneficial was Soviet power for the development of Estonia and its people?

	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	born in Estonia	
Can't say	33	31	21	5
Productive influence	15	8	6	—
Some things improved, others got worse, good and bad balanced out	32	40	41	3
Some things improved, but generally things got worse	17	18	21	35
Nothing but deterioration	3	4	10	57

The fact that a large portion of the non-indigenous population cannot assess the influence of Soviet power is due, evidently to the dubious but active propaganda of the Intermovement trend. The less people are familiar with the local conditions, the easier it is for them to give advice about how to restructure interethnic relationships, what rights to give one or another ethnic community.

Let us begin with the main historical question—on attitude to Stalinism. Should Stalinism be acknowledged as a reign of terror, a crime against humanity, a crime without a statute of limitations?



	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	born in Estonia	
No there's no sense in that	15	10	10	1
It's hard to say	18	20	32	8
Yes, absolutely	67	70	58	91

The lack of agreement between the indigenous and the non-indigenous populations is obvious here. This can be explained by the fact that the majority of those born in Estonia belong to a generation of people whose parents came to the republic after the war, and had absorbed their parents attitude toward life under conditions of Stalinism, the former political ideals and orientations. Attitudes toward means and methods for increasing the well-being of the population are relevant here. What must be done to achieve that?

	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	Lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	Born in Estonia	
Increase the CPSU's authority	33	44	21	21
Preserve the USSR in its current form	39	51	37	3
Achieve equal level of development for all republics	55	61	45	13
Ensure a leading role for the Russian people	15	19	19	1
Make Estonia independent	30	31	37	84

Disagreements about means is obvious. One unexpected result was the rather great support for the idea of political independence among non-Estonians (33 percent). How active such support is can be seen in answers to the question: What is your attitude toward Estonia seceding from the USSR?

	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	Lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	Born in Estonia	
Against it; will do everything possible to prevent it	7	7	9	1
Not in favor, but will not try to prevent it	25	28	28	1
I don't care	7	10	6	1

I'm in favor of it, but will not work for it actively	44	48	43	45
Will do everything possible to make it happen	16	7	15	52

The Estonians have their supporters in all the groups surveyed. It is noteworthy that the attitudes of those born in Estonia and those who came to the republic recently are approximately the same.

What ways are proposed to ensure Estonia's future? Which way do you prefer?

	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	Lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	Born in Estonia	
I am completely satisfied with the current status	12	5	5	1
More freedom within the USSR	39	51	36	5
Treaty of alliance with RSFSR and other republics	26	22	25	8
State analogous to Hungary	2	2	7	4
State analogous to Finland	21	20	27	83

Here the Estonians can count on the support of almost a quarter of the non-Estonians. But one cannot ignore the mood and desires of the remaining three quarters, the plurality of whom [sic.] favor a treaty of alliance within the framework of a renewed federation. For the Estonians what is important is the idea of political independence as a guarantee of their survival as a nation. Today, three quarters of the Estonians assess the future prospects of their nation as favorable and 22 percent are unsure about their future. The opinion of non-Estonians on future prospects of the indigenous nation are predominantly optimistic: 88 percent of them do not see any danger for Estonians.

The survey also revealed high interest of the non-indigenous residents of Estonia in the problems of Russia and the Russians. More than half of them are very interested in this. This tendency is important as a sign of ethnic identification, fed evidently by the extensive nationalist movement among Estonians and also by the processes of ethnic self-consciousness, which are weeping the country.

And the last question the survey asked: Who lives well in Estonia?

	Non-Estonians			Estonians
	Lived in Estonia up to 10 yrs	11 years or more	Born in Estonia	
My life is more unsatisfactory, than satisfactory	29	23	28	59
I am generally satisfied	48	58	61	38
Completely satisfied	23	18	11	3

This survey shows that having lived a long time in the republic does not ensure rapprochement with the indigenous population. The aspirations of the two groups are too different. But both groups are bothered by lack of understanding, and fear the imposition of other groups' ideas. Both sides manifest more or less concealed fear, a certain feeling of their own superiority, aspirations for power, mistrust, secret grudges and hurt. There is truth in the saying that the oppressor cannot be freer than the oppressed. True friendship and affection can arise only among those who are equal and independent.

The hope remains that all of us—Estonians, Russians, Belorussians—all those who live in Estonia will become independent. To achieve this we must not merely hope, but also act.

#### Council of Nationalities Criticized

90P50041A

[Editorial Report] Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA in Russian on 22 June 1990 carries on page 1 a 700-word article titled "Let's Look After Each Other," by Zamira Egamberdyeva. She discusses the recent events in Osh and makes the following comment:

"The president of our republic I.A. Karimov, with the goal of averting future flare-ups of bloody events, twice directed telegrams to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. However, an answer was late. I want to talk about something that provokes indignation. How can it be that the blood of so many people is flowing but the chairman of the USSR Council of Nationalities Supreme Soviet keeps silent? After all, who in such events should come to the people, should extend to them a helping hand, if not the Council of Nationalities and R.N. Nishanov, its chairman? I do not understand. Perhaps I am mistaken. Or perhaps the Council of Nationalities was created for appearances? What are its missions? Who will answer this question? Who will prevent similar bloody events?"

#### Uzbek Crimean Resettlement Program Begins

90P50041B Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 20 Jun 90 p 1

[Text] The Soviet government's state program for the resettlement of individuals of Crimean Tatar nationality in the Crimea has begun.

In Kashkadarya and Samarkand oblasts, working groups for assisting the resettlement of Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland have been created. Workers of party and soviet organs, editors of oblast papers, and leaders of the Crimean-Tatar movement participated. People wishing to move to the Crimea are requested to complete forms. Questions about family composition, age, and professions are included in them. The information on the forms will be transferred to the union government and local organs in the Crimea for preparation of housing, working sites, schools, and kindergartens for the arrival of a significant number of immigrants.

The program of transferring Crimean Tatars to their historical homeland is intended to last until 1996.

### Shortcomings in Periodical Availability, Quality Outlined

90US1058A Moscow OGOONEK in Russian  
No 19, 5-12 May 90 pp 6-7

[Article by Lev Gudkov: "The Seal of Serfdom"]

[Text] In January I and many tens or hundreds of thousands of citizens of Moscow did not receive a single issue of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. Many magazines are late. In Latvia and the Transcaucasus, many newspapers have reduced their publishing. There is no paper, they say; or there are problems with the printing plants. Responsible officials from Goskompechat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade] and Minsvyazi [Ministry of Communications] once again argue that the public itself is to blame—they read too much, subscribe too much and buy too much (Just as they eat too much, wash too much and bake too much). Anyway, they probably don't even read them; they probably buy books just out of herd instinct and fashionable imitation (of whom?) and use them to decorate the interior of their apartments. No matter how wretched these statements are, they are regularly repeated—Not long ago, for example, the newspaper PRAVDA bombarded us with them. The reader should take them just like the habitual demagoguery of the leadership (The success of the struggle to remove ceilings for subscription has strongly reinforced it in this "delusion."); they are beyond hope...

### IN THE LAND OF AGITATORS AND PROPAGANDISTS

In February 1989, public opinion polls showed that 90 percent of the nation's population believed that the changed operations of the press and TV were the sole positive results of perestroika. But by summer this rating had fallen somewhat—the effect of dissatisfaction with tendentious portrayal of international conflicts and the miners' strike, the activity of new social organizations and movements, the one-sided criticism of Stalin and Soviet history, and so on. A second survey a year later confirmed this characteristic of the press—the reading public is becoming more radical and critical than the press and especially television, which is subject to the heaviest pressure from the apparat, especially since the arrival of the new leadership with its experience in surveillance of publishing houses and periodical literature. The public demands much more analysis and depth, boldness and freedom of speech from the press than the information authorities of state security allow today. Therefore the readers have become much more selective.

However, the press itself, as before, is being ruled with an iron hand. There is no paper. Especially not for new publishers with ideas and programs different from the official ones. The Inter-regional Group of Deputies is unable to publish its own newspaper (Where is there a democratic country in which the opposition has no voice?). APRELYU is not printed anywhere. And there

is no paper for scientific or literary cooperatives. Or there are no printing presses...

But for whom is there paper, and printing presses? Just how does the former Goskomizdat distribute paper resources? Let us take a look at the references. For the sake of brevity, let's take only the magazines.

The most paper of all—49.5 percent of the entire volume going to magazine publication in the country—goes to publication of socio-political and socio-economic magazines. The overwhelming majority of them are agitation-propagandist products, which inundate all the kiosks from Moscow to the very ends of the country, with their unsaleable surpluses, and also the publications of various agencies and ministries. All one has to do is glance at the showcase of any Soyuzpechat stall, and one sees PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA [Problems of Peace and Socialism], PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN [Party Life], VYSTAVKA DOSTIZHENIY SSSR [Exhibition of the Achievements of the USSR], EKONOMICHESKOE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV [Economic Cooperation of the CEMA Nations], ZNAMENOSETS [Standard Bearer]... What makes up the dead, unread supply of periodicals in libraries, written off according to instructions, in two years? Propagandistic and departmental publications—"APK: Ekonomika i Upravlenie" [The Agro-Industrial Complex: Economics and Management], "Dostizheniya nauki i tekhniki APK" [Agro-Industrial Complex Achievements in Science and Technology], "Agroprom Ukrainy" [The Ukraine's Agriculture Industry], "Ekonomika Sovetskoy Ukrainy" [The Economy of the Soviet Ukraine], "Ekonomika selskokhozyaystvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatiy" [The Economics of Agricultural and Processing Enterprises], "Ekonomika stroitelstva" [Construction Economics], "Kadry partii" [Party Cadres], "Materialno-tekhnicheskoe snabzhenie" [Material-Technical Supply], "Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie" [Socialist Competition], "Sotsialisticheskii Trud" [Socialist Labor], "Slovo lekтора" [Lecturer's Word], "Raboche-krestyanskiy korrespondent" [The Workers' and Peasants' Correspondent], "Rasprostranenie pechati" [Press Distribution], "Bytovoe obsluzhivanie" [Everyday Services], "Voennoye znaniya" [Military Knowledge] (the civil defense organ), and hundreds of others. Three-hundred-ninety-nine socio-political magazines are published in the country and 400 bulletins of the same genre, and 76 agitator's notebooks. To these one must add another 389 magazines from industrial ministries (not counting the multitude of publications of basically scientific-technical information, the usefulness of which one need not doubt).

Publishing all the literary-artistic magazines, even considering the sharp increase in circulation, requires almost one-third less paper than the socio-political magazines—18.5 percent. But that is in terms of volume; in terms of the number of titles they are significantly less: 135 magazines in all, published strictly according to administrative-territorial Soyuzpechat hierarchy—

several in the capitals and one each for oblast and republic organizations. It goes without saying that not all the magazines and bulletins on socio-political problems are word cemeteries. Among them there are ten or 15 (but not more than that) with remarkable exceptions—"Vek XX i mir" [Peace and the 20th Century], the Moscow "Gorizont" [Horizon], and others.

In other words, the magazine system in the country is a reflection of the predominance of the departmental and party-ideology bureaucracy, and their monopoly on information and the printed word. The present lament for culture sounds strange and hypocritical in the land of agitators and propagandists.

As everyone knows, the solidarity of the periodical structure reflects the state of development of public awareness, and its capability to analyze the current processes in science, culture, politics and economics. It means the possibility to present and provide a variety of opinions, views, positions and interests. But this is also a means of reflection on new research results and materials, a mechanism for introducing the new to social and intellectual life. The function of our own periodical press is—to educate and to persuade. There are very few scientific magazines *per se*, even among the socio-political or economic magazines; although in terms of the number of titles scientific magazines (independent of the sphere of knowledge) present at first glance a rather attractive picture: every fourth magazine (415 titles)—is a scientific publication, and as a whole they require an insignificant amount of the paper designated for non-newspaper periodicals—1.0 percent. This is less by a factor of 8.5 than what is required for purely party magazines, which bring to each and every one of us the well-masticated ideological and practical instructions of the leadership. In order to make it clear just how much this is, and how much paper is needed today to publish all the scientific magazines in the USSR taken together, we can say that it requires only a little more than what is needed to print such a publication as MOLODAYA GVARDIYA [Young Guard].

### STARVING FOR INFORMATION

The poverty of our periodicals is shocking even in comparison with 1913. In 1988 1,579 magazines of various hues and purposes were published. But before the revolution, over 8,000 magazines were published in Russia. And there is on the whole no comparison with the developed countries of the West. The FRG, a country with only one-fifth the population of the USSR, publishes 1,268 scientific magazines; while in the USA the figure is 18,500! On sociology alone, a subject close to my heart, 290 publications are issued (We have—two). In the USA as a whole, 59,609 magazines are published on the widest range of topics for the widest range of readers.

Nomenklatura allocation of resources (to include paper and printing facilities) are not tied well to reader attention and demand. Over the past several years the total

growth in periodicals circulation did not exceed, on the average, 2.5-4.0 percent of total volume. But these indicators conceal the radical differentiation in popularity of the publications. The present heterogeneity and the obvious, principal differences among editorial programs are reflected in the nature of reader support and its dynamics, and correspondingly—in the volumes of individual subscriptions in the circulation. To a certain extent certain central publications which enjoy the rights of the "ideologically powerful" could continue to show high circulation indicators while subscriptions were declining, but today this is becoming harder to do.

The dynamic of these fluctuations is an extremely reliable indicator or barometer of the public's mood, which is sensitive to even insignificant changes in the policy of this or that editorial group, its sensitivity to events, and its ability to embrace new ideas which have become important to its readers.

The magazine boom which began in 1987 testifies to society's reaction to the changes going on, and its rapid mastery of the events which took place during the 20 years of stagnation, but which could not be made public earlier. Sociological analysis of the sharp increase in circulation of certain literary magazines (as with OGONEK, since it is available for subscription in close association with other publications) speaks to the fact that this movement has until recently taken place in a single social stratum which represents the most educated group, that is, the most active part of society. The increase in circulation of these publications signified only one thing—a change in the strength of the contacts within a single stratum, growth of consolidation within it, and the formation of a certain civic culture.

If it was not all that important before, when—right now or in a year—one will be able to read Bezanson or Florenskiy in samizdat, today the time factor has become exceptionally important, sometimes decisively so. Therefore it is not books, but precisely magazines, which provide the most effective cycle of interpretation of events, and which were until most recently the principal heroes of the day.

But to the extent that the process of the social and intellectual movement goes beyond the bounds of this stratum (and one can already speak of this), there will be increasing diversity of positions and points of view. Differentiation is also beginning within the previous unity which had existed for several years.

The thick magazines have "pumped over" from the reservoir of social thought, the basic reserves of ideas accumulated since the 1960's. And they transmitted it to those who were capable of assimilating this range of ideas and impressions. But at the same time, you see, they were blocking the development of new ideas, by reserving publication to intellectuals, writers, and scholars whose names were not inscribed in the canon of the "sixties people" and their political ideas. This task should have been taken up by publications of another

type, which do not and cannot exist, because to this day the apparat maintains strict control over the press. An independent press, reacting to this demand and need from society, would be clearly insufficient, for it would begin to expire from lack of new ideas.

First of all, it must be a question of expanding the volume and the type of social information—statistics, archival data and information. The most vivid example here is the take-off of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, which in something like three or four years increased its circulation from 1.5 million subscribers to 33.4 million—circumstances which force one to think about the hunger for information in society, and how distorted all the work of our press and television is! But even more important, in my view, is the fact that publications which achieve public recognition provide above all new means of understanding reality and interpreting just what our society is, how its institutions operate, and where it may find a way out of the paralysis which has gripped the country after 70 years of struggle for a better life.

Only a few central magazines can boast of sharply-increased circulation and, correspondingly, an increased audience—three-, five-, eight- and tenfold: six or seven thick magazines (NOVYY MIR, DRUZHBA NARODOV, ZNAMYA and others); also OGONEK, and the newspaper MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI (which without a doubt, if the ceilings were lifted, would increase its circulation to 10-12 million subscribers in a year or two); and the Baltic magazines and independent newspapers.

In addition to these, youth magazines have increased their audience, circulating through the entire spectrum of new moods; also the popular thick magazines with their general topics of non-ideological, "personal" existence—about the family, the home, health, and care for one's "garden." After a lengthy decline in popularity owing to success achieved in the battle with human thought and with the philosophical and literary culture of the West, academic magazines on the humanitarian sciences have gradually begun to depart from scholasticism and are becoming popular editions, publishing the heritage of the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, which has earned them well-deserved success among the readers.

Also enjoying increased circulation, at least some of them, are the magazines published in the languages of the peoples of our country. At one time it was namely their growth that permitted predicting the present processes of politization and national reawakening (especially in the Transcaucasus, the Baltic, publications of the Crimean Tatars, and others).

On the other hand, during the years of perestroika, there was systematic decline in reader interest in the party and purely ideological press. Let us take only the central publications. As soon as the mandatory requirement for CPSU members and leaders to subscribe to PRAVDA

was dropped in 1987, its circulation immediately plummeted. By January 1990 the number of subscribers had declined by 36.4 percent. At the very same time, PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN [Party Life] lost 50.4 percent of its subscribers. By last year, POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIE [Political Education] and AGITATOR had lost 28.4 and 23 percent of their subscribers (This year these magazines were reorganized and are being published under a new title); in three years, SELSKAYA ZHIZN [Rural Life] lost 27.65 percent; and SOVetskAYA ROSSIYA, 21 percent, in spite of the great many scandalous articles. Last year alone, it lost over one million of its subscribers. KOMMUNIST (a central organ, published along with its union republic namesakes), the theoretical magazine of the CPSU Central Committee, has become much more informative and interesting; nevertheless, it has lost 45 percent of its subscribers since 1987, and KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZHIZN [Komsomol Life], 25.3 percent. In spite of the mandatory requirements for officers to subscribe, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA [Red Star] has lost a third of its steady readers and subscribers (34.2 percent). The decline in subscription last year was even worse for such publications as AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA [Army and Navy Agitator] (22 percent in only one year), KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL [Armed Forces Communist] (27 percent), MOLODOY KOMMUNIST [Young Communist] (35 percent), ZHURNALIST [Journalist] (31 percent), MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN [International Life] (14 percent), and so on. The circulation of many ideologically-sound press organs has fallen, and some of them have closed or have been reorganized.

### THREE PIECES OF SAUSAGE FOR TEN SLICES OF BREAD

It is completely clear that events such as the electoral defeat of functionaries or the epidemic of retirements at the obkoms [oblast party committees] that is sweeping the country are no accident.

The fluctuation in circulation reflect the highest degree of reader selectivity, and the nature of their preferences. Whereas the subscribers of many years comprise the nucleus of party publications (people who have been subscribers to the very same newspaper for 10-15 years and more)—the leadership at all levels, veterans, officers, retired personnel and so on—the audience of the new popular publications is very mobile and unstable. Practically three-fourths consists of new readers (such as at NOVYY MIR, ZNAMYA, DRUZHBA NARODOV, and others). This applies to the highest degree to OGONEK, which has almost completely replaced its former readership. They vary even more widely in terms of social characteristics. The audience for TRUD [Labor], SOVetskAYA ROSSIYA, and even MOLODAYA GVARDIYA is primarily on the periphery; it consists primarily of people with secondary education and a narrow range of sources, people of middle-age or senior citizens. For many people, TRUD or SOVetskAYA ROSSIYA is on the whole their only channel of information;

whereas, readers of NOVYY MIR or ZNAMYA subscribe to 7-10 different periodical publications, and these are mainly people with higher education who continually stay abreast of events in both the literary and political word, own comparatively large home libraries, and so on.

Readers' reactions can be very rapid in the event a publication does not keep up with the pace of public concerns. Thus, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, which initially experienced an increase in subscribers, fell by 32.5 percent this year (when more than 2,000,000 people stopped their subscriptions; in a certain respect this is a record fall in circulation). The press, therefore, does not merely reproduce the various social positions, but also the positions reflecting the various times: the Khrushchev epoch, the Brezhnev period of social stagnation [bezhvremenyie] and so on. In this respect the party newspapers and magazines represent the most ambiguous positions...

The country badly needs hundreds of new magazines. Especially today, when time is so valuable, when only a periodical can just manage to record the flow of events. But the most important thing is still: who is speaking, the apparat, which is concerned with protecting its own interests; or society, in the person of various kinds of social groups, searching for alternative means of withdrawal from an historical impasse.

It is completely obvious therefore, that the question of paper—is a question of power and the future of the country, and it is not at all technical. The fact that there is not enough paper is clear—the paper industry is totally worn out and urgently requires modernization. Today three times as much paper goes for publishing magazines intended for foreign consumption for propaganda purposes (and they are many: almost one magazine in ten; that is, 147 titles), than for all scientific magazines taken together.

How the industry operates, who is rating it and by what criteria—these questions are not hard to answer. And it certainly isn't society that is absorbing its various needs and interests, but the party apparat. For it is only at the CPSU Central Committee and in the union republics that they decide whether to found a new magazine or newspaper or not; and if the answer is yes, then what the price of a single issue will be; how large the initial circulation; what sort of staff and how much to pay the editor; who will print it and at what cost; what sort of rates will be established for honoraria; and so on.

In this structure, USSR Goskompechat is an extremely important organ. Watching over the interests of the client and its own interests (13-15 percent of the profits of the industry goes to maintaining its staff and to the industry's central fund; and 80-82 percent of the publisher's profits go—to the treasury); it "manages" the entire publishing process, pumps money out of the public, and does not allow "outsiders" access to the printing presses. Of course, the entire art of management in this situation, as one wit put it, consists of distributing

three pieces of sausage for ten slices of bread; but you see, one has to know on whose bread to put it, and what kind of sausage to use. And if there is soon a radical increase in the prices of a number of periodical publications—of which there are persistent rumors—then it matters little if someone is unclear on the political meaning of these "measures." And it is not a matter of a paper shortage or the losses of the Ministry of Communications: raising the price, as has already happened more than once, signifies first—limiting the readership of the corresponding publications.

We live in a disintegrating bureaucratic state. Until now, in all spheres of social life, only one principle has been operating—total bureaucratic control. Any question—from kindergarten to entering the international market, from poetry to aircraft carrier construction—is decided by functionaries. There are no exceptions here—whether the "free" or "creative" professions, the Writers' Union, the Composers' Union or the Academy of Sciences, not to mention the Journalists' Union or the Ministry of Culture. The entire system is united by the initial premise, that without centralized distribution and control our society will immediately disintegrate; that this is the most effective and rational principle for eliminating the disproportions in social production, social inequality and so on. The ideological meaning of this postulate today is on the whole obvious. But there is no understanding of the means for withdrawal from this situation, since powerful corporate mechanisms for protecting the system are operating, and also, which is no less important—inertia.

Legally, only the vertical contacts work: the order; the execution. The system of vertical control was and still is the single restraining principle of centralized management. Incompetence is not simply a subjective characteristic of the bureaucrats in the ministries, raykoms or NPO [Scientific-Production Association] general directorates, but the objective heritage of the tensions in the totalitarian structure of social organization itself, including the selection of cadres.

If M.F. Nenashev, former chairman of USSR Goskomizdat, a former gorkom secretary, a doctor of sciences and author of 27 brochures "on increasing the effectiveness of ideological-educational work in conditions of developing socialism," former chief editor of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and presently chairman of USSR Gosteleradio could say of himself—"I am the average reader" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 1 May 1989), then you see this is no gesture, not simply words, but a social self-description: I, like everyone, both up high and down below, I—am average!..

An exceptionally important role falls to the lot of the press today, at least the equal of the activity expected of the central authorities and the parliament. Its essence lies in the need for a leap in public consciousness, the destruction of the remaining stereotypes of totalitarian and mythological thinking, purging our consciousness of the old dogmas, and the rejection of hopes for a kind

uncle with extraordinary powers and blessings whether from above, or from the side. Only with a clear understanding that exceptional times have come; that no one can solve your problems and will not be solving them; that one must think for oneself and right now, and not sometime or other—can society arrive at some other state of being. For now public consciousness is defenseless before the state, has no memory, is disoriented and oppressed. All information, all the practical skills of "command," including above all protection from attempts on its power, is possessed only by the apparat.

Today mass consciousness, if one uses the analogy of our well-known political scientist L.A. Sedov, resembles most of all a healthy but retarded juvenile who finds himself in a world of grown-up people. Confused and offended by his own failures and his inability to live, like they do; rushing from one extreme ("I know no other such country, where one can breathe so freely...") to another ("We are worse than anyone..."), the bearer of such thoughts harbors considerable danger of simplistic impulses and solutions of force ("Divide everything," "Make everyone equal," "Put an end to the Mafia and the cooperatives"); or else the desire to leave everything and cry ("If that's the way things go, Russia will withdraw from membership in the USSR;" or "We must return to our origins and roots, for without this there is no national salvation:"); or else, to go right out and punch someone in the nose ("We shall purge our Fatherland of the alien elements and non-Russians, who are destroying our country").

On the other hand, the capacity to live with an imperfect world and the complex nature of reality, and the ability to understand all the other actors in our theater of life, presupposes not only patience, but also the ability to analyze, contact with reality, a certain information base, and cultural resources—which today do not exist or which only a small group of intellectuals possess, who are rather unskilled in politics or who have no access to the press.

However, in order to achieve a state of maturity and competence in society, periodicals alone are not enough (for the cultural stratum and the historical depth of experience on which one can work is characterized chiefly by the parameters of current events and timely information). But for a mature society, an independent, autonomous one; that is, a society of strong democracy with developed representative institutions—and that means the experience of civic and political culture—requires much more substantial intellectual resources, and many years of internal operation. The reforms of the early 1960's failed not only by virtue of the political weakness of the reformist leadership or the unfavorable convergence of historical circumstances. One of the reasons was, that the intellectual group, certain of whose ideas lay at the basis of Khrushchev's reforms, was unable to create for itself a sufficiently wide medium, capable of systematically assimilating the new values and ideas, and the new views and impressions.

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### Proposed Merger of Latvian Newspapers Protested

90UN2111A Riga CINA in Latvian 26 May 90 p 1

[Independent CINA report: "We Are The Independent CINA"]

[Text] ...*One word is fire, one word is ash. With a word one earns hatred and love.*

Janis Peters dedicated these words to CINA on its 70th anniversary. In those days CINA was a different entity and even the poet himself had not yet succeeded in his main mission, entrusted to him by the national rebirth. And, while writing these words little did he know, that in its 87th year CINA would again have earned its readers' faith and protection, as well as...hatred. For CINA's insubordination, for its unmistakable decision to remain faithful to its readers.

The period of rebirth and the new voice of the people demands that at the end of the 20th century CINA will again be fated to become the voice and protector of the aspirations for national independence, democracy and justice. There is no other way and can be no other way than together with our people, and with all the progressive people in Latvia. During this nation's crucial period CINA no longer has the right to take a stand against these ideas and actions, as it has unfortunately done earlier, giving in to communist illusions and foreign powers. We also cannot stand by in the role of a "healthy force", hoping that with the help of snobbish skepticism we can gain the authority of a neutral observer. This period demands clarity and honesty, but does not allow for fluctuation between iron-cemented dogmas and the realities of life.

The undisputable logic of history and the principles of a true nation-state force us to return to our origins. To the guidelines of the Latvian social democratic - pre-bolshevik - press, to the time, when the conscious priority and calling of CINA's creators was to serve the vital interests of the people. In 1905, the political authority of the Social Democrats of Latvia proved the soundness of the democratic way.

We can be proud that our newspaper is one of the oldest Marxist or social democratic newspapers in the world. Thus, at this particular moment, when CINA's future survival is threatened, the questions about its publisher and its political orientation is acquiring an international tone. Obviously, only a newspaper whose point of view corresponds to that of the majority of the population could be perceived by other societies - especially by the wide circle of leftists - as meaningful.

CINA was founded by the LATVIAN Social-Democratic Worker's Party in 1904. Therefore, it is meant mainly for Latvian people. And in this regard, the spiritual demands of the Latvian working people in particular

(workers, farmers, the intelligentsia) are placed first. CINA has always taken a stand and will take a stand on national equality and brotherhood, but nevertheless it must be Latvian, in the most positive sense of the word. One does not have to be a fortune-teller to predict, that if CINA became subordinated by the ideas of Soviet representative organs on Latvia's territory, the number of readers would fall catastrophically. Who needs the hybrid CINA/SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA double-newspaper idea that A. Rubiks and his sympathizers have in mind? Who will read this SOVETSKAYA CINA? We cannot let this newspaper, that people respect and are accustomed to, come out with thoughts and words that are foreign to them. Thousands of readers, through letters and words, have clearly expressed their viewpoint - we want our own CINA!

It is becoming increasingly obvious, that the Latvian Communist Party [LCP] is leaning away from the interests of the people, and not just leaning away - it is quite openly working against them, publicly, hatefully applying crude pressure on any other viewpoint. With regards to CINA, all attempts so far to achieve a realistic approach, not to mention understanding or some sort of agreement, have met with failure. No one takes into consideration what the editorial staff in the white house on Kirov Street think, no one is even interested. Attempts by the Independent Communist Party to open a dialogue with the other side, in order to lessen the strain on society and on the editorial staff, have been fruitless. They were not listened to. Activities take place behind closed doors. But only notifications come out of there.

Yesterday, the editorial staff united and unwaveringly expressed its attitude about the LCP Central Committee's dictatorial decision - we will not work by SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA's example under CINA's signboard. Otherwise, we would betray our conscience and our people.

Here is a short rundown of the latest events. Just yesterday morning we learned of the decision to publish a new paper based on SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA and CINA, starting with the 5th or 6th of June. Both the Russian and Latvian publications will be completely identical in content - it will be SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA translated word-for-word into Latvian. Ojars Potreki, who has also just been appointed Secretary of the CPSU territorial organization Central Committee, has been chosen as this paper's editor.

At lunchtime, the Independent Communist Party of Latvia Chairman Ivars Kezbers, arrived and confirmed, that the Independent Party of Latvia Central Committee has received a license to publish the newspaper INDEPENDENT CINA. You just have to await the moment before you, esteemed reader, will receive your respected newspaper with this new name, although we will try to retain the historical one. We will all make sure, that this moment will arrive as soon as possible.

### Latvian CP Secretary Potreki Justifies Newspaper Closure

90UN2111B Riga CINA in Latvian 30 May 90 p 1

[Article by O. Potreki, secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee: "To the CINA Workers Collective, CINA Readers!"]

[Text] In Saturday's Latvian press I was informed, in my absence, that I have become the editor not only of your newspaper, but also the Russian language Latvian Communist Party newspaper. I must say, this will be an extremely difficult turn in my career, because my latest foreign assignment was in the interests of the republic's economy. The trip turned out to be useful; I can say, that I have finally been able to "close the lid" on a project, that began last June in West Germany, and continued in October and February in 12 Swedish, W. German, Swiss, Italian, Austrian and again W. German banks. Actually, I have dotted the "i" on one of the alternatives, which will give our republic never before possible opportunities in the future to put international finance systems to use. At this point, there are already short term payment credit maneuvering possibilities, a combination of banking and investment companies, capital and securities markets. These opportunities are there as a result of my ten months of study at the Money and Credit Institute in Bonn, the extreme kindness of the All-Germany Savings Bank Academy's leadership, and the courteous attitude of German banks, all of which allowed us to collect this rich and significant information. Personal contacts and professional advantages made it possible to finish this project, which had previously been given government approval, and I can assure you, that it will help us solve more than one complicated financial management problem in the republic. In the hierarchy of economic priorities, there also cannot be imbalances between the spheres of production and distribution. When we use the term "distribution", we often attribute it to large- and small-scale commerce, forgetting that it also refers to capital and securities markets, to the complicated structure of the entire international credit world, which is the basis for world market relationships. Realizing this primary task, I am deeply convinced, that the next step our country must take in the near future, is to understand economic processes, and I would say, the profound changes in economic ideology. This is why I have agreed to become the Central Committee's Secretary for Socio-Economic matters.

Now the Central Committee Plenum has expanded my duties, and I must show up in a place, where I am not welcome and maybe even hatefully rejected. Unwelcome and rejected because of the opinion, that the Party, whose ranks I have been in for 25 years, is and can only be, orthodox. I consider this assumption and conception unreasonable, in the first place because the leftist position has as much a right to existence as any other, but as to an orthodox position, its transformation is simply a matter of time. That can be slowed down mainly by my



fellow countrymen's and Party member's premature exit from Party ranks. Interestingly, who will be the ones to explain our position to foreign collectives and primary Party organizations? However, that is a different subject, and I must finally get to the problem of the newspaper. Newspaper publication is the publisher's problem, so if anyone wants to publish INDEPENDENT CINA, may they get organized and do it. Regarding the announcement that in the future CINA will be SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA's translation, that can be written down by those who have not seen or heard me. As far as I know, the chief editor himself dictates the newspaper's orientation.

I have always been proud, that CINA has published my articles over 50 times, and if my opponents would turn to my May 13, 1989 article, they would find answers to many questions. PADOMJU JAUNATNE on June 14, published my position on subjects, that later became vital in the whole community. In any case, what is written there, had not been said by I. Kezbers, A. Cirulis nor M. Vulfsons before me. Therefore, I have just one thing to say to the bearers of tragedy, neostalinist worshippers, professional protesters, and all authors of other possible interpretations: CINA will not be shut down; the publishing organization has appointed a new leadership to its newspaper. For our part, the combined editorial staff will only manifest the leftist position until the moment, when the CINA collective publishes the newspaper. On the other hand, if the collective chooses to work for another Party's newspaper, then the combined editorial staff must guarantee the expression of the Latvian CP position in Latvian, until a new editorial staff is established. I do not think that will happen, however, and the people standing in leftist Party newspaper positions will make sure, that CINA will continue to be a publication respected by the community. There is potential and I believe, that the problems up until now will be overcome without panic and constructively.

This letter is not a description of my work program; I have not prepared that yet. However, I do not intend to hide my position, nor pretend, that I will be something other than what I am. I realize the task I have undertaken, and am convinced, that no one will refuse to lend a helping hand.

Reading over last week's press, and having recently read Western publications, I am surprised at the inadequate way the political processes are reflected in our republic's press. This gives us something to think about, and I invite us to take a look at ourselves from the outside. I

believe many will be forced to agree with me, that our "me-ism" is being presented as eclectic and even slightly hysterical. Historical denial and the uniqueness of our egocentric exaggerated "I" are advocated as our only truth and accomplishments. Accents are placed on things that the journalists of the world's press do not understand, and the Western press reflects something completely different from what I as a Latvian know to look for and want to find. But isn't this kind of analysis the assignment of a professional journalist? Can we even afford to talk about a cold-blooded analysis of the whole spectre of the republic's political process? I think not. Former Party members, in essence, are only fooling themselves by attacking the Party, which understands the internal complications of this historic process and is trying to rid itself of its legacy of the past; one cannot build a new Party by dirtying its youth and its prime years with mud. Something new, in one as well as the other Party, can be found through the analysis of a completely different set of values. First, let us clearly state, who we are, and Moscow will certainly not tell the Latvian Communist Party what to say. The question of property is just as important. No one can be forced to believe that property is sacred, if it will be confiscated. The same goes for the Party and Party property. If prohibition couldn't be broken, then no one in Latvia ever would have seen ATMODA. Therefore, let's not use double standards in our internal relationships, simultaneously speaking of democracy and a legal Latvia. In my opinion, the problem of the Press Building can only be solved through an economic agreement. Let the inter-Party emotions remain in newspaper columns, but obviously the workforce has to work and group according to political opinions and life in general.

Let us take into consideration, that Latvia is a multi-ethnic, multi-party republic. I believe, that the resolutions of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee's Plenum on May 24, were a serious turn in the Party's domestic policy and its acts of programmed expression. The creation of a joint editorial board is definitely not a one-way process, rather the opposite. The editors, that I will be in charge of in the nearest perspective, will be centrist-oriented and loyal in both languages, as expected of a Party in the opposition. Constructive criticism is not a curse, nor does it fuel hatred. We are for the mutual understanding of all peoples in Latvia, and I am convinced, that we will find the formula, that will allow all the inhabitants of Latvia to unite under one common goal.

*O. Potreki, LCP Central Committee secretary*

### Conquest Interviewed During USSR Visit on Stalinism, Terrorism

90US0962A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
19 May90 Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Robert Conquest by V. Ivanov and A. Plutnik: "The Cult of Personality—Nothing in Comparison With the Terror and Falsification"]

[Text] Robert Conquest, whose books on Soviet history until recently were banned in our country was born in 1917. He received his education at a college in the city of Oxford. As was stated in the foreword to the Russian edition of his book "The Great Terror" published in Florence in 1974, during the years of World War II he served in the English infantry and ended the fighting in the liaison troops with the Soviet Army in the Balkans. He later worked in the Foreign Ministry and the United Nations. He was awarded the Order of the British Empire. Since 1956, R. Conquest has been employed in research activity at the London School of Economics, he has given lectures on English literature at the University of Buffalo and worked as a literary editor on a journal and a senior instructor at the Russian Studies Institute at Columbia University. In addition to a number of works on the history of our country of the post-October period, he has written several science fiction works and has published collections of critical works and poetry.

Over the last 2 years, Robert Conquest has visited our country twice. Before this he was last here 52 years ago.

Recently, our readers were able to become familiar with his books "The Great Terror" and "Harvest of Grief" which describe the mass repressions of the 1930s. IZVESTIYA announced the arrival of this historian and literary figure in the Soviet Union and his visit to our editorial offices. Then a conversation was held with Robert Conquest and this we are publishing today.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] You have written true books about what happened in our country. Do you think that the dramatic turn of events in the life of our country have been the consequence of the wrong choice made by the revolution? Or are the causes of the misfortunes which befell us rooted in subjective circumstances, that is, in the personalities of those who subsequently came to leadership, Stalin and his close circle?

[Conquest] Perhaps both of those. Very many people feel that the terror and violence were necessary to establish that Utopian state which was conceived of. Under other circumstances, Stalin never could have come to power. But because of the particular features of his personality, on the other hand, this terror was a hundred, a thousand times more terrible. I feel that those persons who, for instance, were deporting the kulaks desired to act exclusively against the kulaks, and could not even allow the notion that the terror inevitably would also turn against themselves. Those who became the weapon of cruelty, like those who recommended terror as a means of political action, were not aware that, in essence, they

were risking their own security and attracting to themselves the very same methods of struggle which they had legalized.

Pasternak wrote that collectivization was a failure, a mistake. And this led to the terror unleashed by Yezhov and the fear for himself had to be suppressed by cruelty against others. A very important difference between the 1920s and the 1930s was, I feel, in the following: in the 1920s, the first forgeries and falsifications were made and these would have been completely possible in any political system. Then total falsification of the entire life of society had not yet been established as the norm. And it is precisely this later falsification which I consider the essence of Stalinism to a much greater degree than even the terror. The terror was to a certain degree a means, that is, to institute a false way of life.

The most terrible thing which happened in the life of the Soviet people was that they were forced to exist as if in two dimensions: the real and the imaginary. The psychological blow dealt to them after a certain period of time was also a physical blow.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] Did Stalinism become an unique, unrepeatable phenomenon in world history? But possibly it was apparent even before this term arose, even before Stalin, and after it has made itself felt in different countries.

[Conquest] When we speak about terror we could certainly give some analogies although very arbitrary ones. For instance, Pinochet in Chile. And there everything came down to eliminating hundreds or thousands of people and that is terrible in and of itself. Each human life is a value of itself. But the fact remains that Pinochet was able to free himself of his violent enemies. Or from those whom he considered as such. But this is something quite different if it is compared with what happened in the Soviet Union. It is not merely a matter of the different scale of terror. Pol Pot in Cambodia has been just as cruel as Stalin. But there there has not been that total falsification of all social life, that extended period of the all-encompassing lie which your country lived through. The other dictatorial regimes have simply not had the time to permeate the entire atmosphere of social life with lies. For you the period of falsification has been much longer than the period of terror.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] The lie was long, unshakable and for this reason seemed to have particular verisimilitude?

[Conquest] Precisely so. We in the West were very surprised when quite recently the first true data appeared on the state, for instance, of the Soviet economy. Certainly we before had known that things were not going so well for you. But all the same, our former assumptions were very far from the real facts characterizing the true state of affairs.

And certainly our knowledge was based on sources which merited confidence. These were the academic circles as well as the CIA. Here I do not mean to say that even at

the beginning of the 1980s, on the basis of again "very reliable data" we were convinced that there was complete unanimity on the political line being carried out among those directly involved in carrying out the nation's policy. But at present there are different data which convince one that there was no such unanimity. Many were against the general line on very major questions, including Gorbachev himself. Clearly it was necessary that affairs go very badly to finally disclose the truth on the real state of affairs.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] Do you feel that only having ended up in a desperate situation it would be possible with our traditions to disclose all the truth about ourselves? We feel that not everyone would agree with you. We have many now who are convinced that before everything was not so bad and that we lived better under Brezhnev than we do now.

[Conquest] I myself have heard such arguments more than once. Actually, before there were more of certain goods. But where have they gone, and for what money could they be bought abroad? The previous leadership, without giving any thought about tomorrow, squandered the natural resources of the nation. Cotton was grown "at any price" even at the price of the Aral, the forests were felled and the oil reserves emptied. And all of this was sold in essence to conceal your flagrant incompetence. Thus, the state rifled the pockets even of the successors of its citizens and this was how the breaches were closed. Certainly the current leadership could have followed this path of plundering its successors for a hundred years to come. But this was the most dependable path to the final destruction of the economy. And Stalin made the start of the unnatural economy. At the basis of such an approach was a flippant, superficial view of what in fact is very complex and at times unpredictable. Behind this stands the conviction that economic results can be regulated by political exhortation and that it was possible by ideological action to control the course of economic processes and in a way even anticipate or predict them like the weather. Although a long-term weather forecast is at present an unattainable dream. All the same, some 55 years ago, Stalin executed the employees of the Gidromettsentr [Hydrometeorological Center] as they had made errors in predicting the weather and this was viewed as intentional sabotage.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] Would it have been possible, so to speak, using peaceful means, to consistently develop those ideas which Stalin was developing, in instituting a party dictatorship in the nation and a command-administrative system?

[Conquest] I feel that the purpose of establishing such a system was primarily to have dependable means of control over everything occurring in the society. In particular, a completely controlled economy was established. The point was that if the economy was not under control, then inevitably there would remain certain zones of independence and Stalin could not tolerate this.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] The planning system in effect at present also clearly was established as an effective means of control depriving the producers of any independence.

[Conquest] To plan the production of each article, even the most insignificant one, means to enslave the producers. I feel that it was no accident that Hitler was very fond of Stalin's five-year plans. He openly praised them. He liked a situation which was completely dependent and into which a person fell doomed to work in such "superplanned" production. Generally, it should be pointed out that Stalin and Hitler liked one another a lot. In 1943, Hitler said that we should praise Stalin as he knew how to make the nation into a fist. Only our own four-year plans are better than his five-year ones.... He said that Stalin had a social order that was much better than bourgeois capitalism. On the other hand, the "knight of the long knives" evoked an exalted response from Stalin. Such a fine fellow, he said about Hitler, knows how to settle up with his enemies. Later, in 1939, Stalin stated that the Nazis were not like the English or the French, they were better and they had few bourgeois prejudices. They were strange relations...it can be said that both Germany and Russia were not lucky. But Europe was also not lucky as it was under both Stalin and under Hitler.

In actuality, I feel, that this to some degree historical bad luck for the Soviet Union was the long rule of Stalin. If this had ended in the 1930s or in 1945, the situation would have been different. I feel it would have been better because it could have been no worse....

In desiring to strengthen their situation, Stalin and the group around him carried out negative selection, that is, they chose for all the more or less important party and state posts, persons similar to them and they raised and fostered not the best "specimens" but the worst. It was no accident that even among the then Soviet leaders there arose a feeling that all of them were conspirators, that they were all in a conspiracy against their people.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] It is generally felt that the October Revolution had an enormous impact on all the world historical process. Did Stalinism have any impact on this process?

[Conquest] In a certain sense, Stalinism, in my view, had even a stronger impact. As is known, the Western intelligentsia as a whole did not welcome the October Revolution. It began to regard the Soviet Union well precisely in the period of Stalin. In the Western universities they began to study Stalinist Marxism. At that time, the Comintern which was completely subordinate to Stalin was solid and monolithic as it had not been in the 1920s.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] How then did "our leader" win favor for himself? What were his accomplishments?

[Conquest] The basic "accomplishment" for Stalin was the lie. The scale of this was unbelievable. As a result, he confused both his own people and the world. For instance, in 1921, when there was starvation in Russia,

Lenin turned to the Americans for aid, that is, he thereby admitted for all to hear that there was a terrible famine. But Stalin in 1932-1933, when the nation was starving, denied this saying that there was no starvation and that all of this was fabrication. It was precisely at this time that the Soviet Union was visited by the French Prime Minister Edouard Herriot. He was taken to Kiev, to Kharkov, to those regions where, according to the rumors, the famine particularly raged. But he was persuaded that these rumors were devoid of any grounds as all the stores where he was met along the way were full of food. He visited a kolkhoz and was convinced how well the kolkhoz members lived. And even the most common-sense persons came to feel that Stalin was telling the truth as why in fact would the nation's leader throw his own people into disaster? In the West in this manner the opinion was spread about that a flourishing, healthy society had been built in Russia. And what if there were courts and political trials underway there, someone was being punished according to what they deserved....

Public opinion in the West was also shaped under the influence of authoritative testimonies of such persons as L. Feuchtwanger and H.G. Wells who showed great sympathy for the policy of Stalin and for him himself. The propaganda said that in the USSR there were no labor camps but there were certain very humane zones where people were learning to work. The opinion about the USSR was also influenced by such a "factor" as Hitler as he was feared and there was also the war in Spain. A majority of the progressive intelligentsia in the West was against the Franco dictatorship and Stalin supported the Republicans. But in 1939, the views of many changed sharply. The West understood a great deal....

At the same time, the policy of falsification in the Soviet Union not only did not stop but also increased. At the end of the war, the U.S. Vice President Wallace made a forced landing at Kolyma. He was given an opportunity to visit one of the "humane zones." All the prisoners, naturally, for this time took down and removed the barbed wire and towers. For the period the "contingent" was replaced. And the vice president was photographed with well-fed content prisoners. The photograph appeared in the magazine NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC with the inscription: "You must be strong to endure the harsh Kolyma winter." Of course, due to their gullibility, people in the West were in part responsible for what was happening at that time in the USSR. But persons with a normal psyche could not even imagine that it was possible to destroy hundreds of thousands and millions of people in the camps and that such an extreme degree of falsification was possible.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] What consequences of Stalinism at present are the most tangible, from your viewpoint, in our social life? What have been the hardest to overcome?

[Conquest] The Stalin era, of course, has distorted the minds of many. Thus, much false information and facts have been driven into human heads so that it seems that

the people are fooled for ages. In my view, one of the severest consequences of Stalinism is the still extant conviction that any problems can be resolved by force. But they are not solved by force, coercion or naked enthusiasm. They come back again and again but each time in a more distorted, hard-to-resolve form.

The Stalinists have constantly asserted that Stalin was one with the people. Even the tragedy of their own life does not convince them of anything. Incidentally, there are fanatics in any country. But at present it is not these persons who are imitated any more. Rather those who did not give way to Stalinization. How many of them there are in your country! It has turned out that force did not work, not only in the economy, but also in the intellectual area. The soul of the people was not destroyed.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] The collapse of the former dictatorial regimes in Eastern Europe was certainly a continuation of the struggle against the consequences of the cult of personality.

[Conquest] Yes, Stalin has now died in Eastern Europe. But just now. And we are seeing with particular force now just how deeply Stalinism penetrated into Europe's state structure and policy. In Romania it has been very difficult to organize the social forces inside the nation. It has been easier in Poland and Hungary. Because there has been more time in those countries to regain one's senses. And what do the data which have recently become known about the state of the East German economy mean? Seemingly until just yesterday, we in the West assumed that this country had in fact achieved great advances in all areas, its population was very favorably disposed to the existing system and that its leaders, although being conservatives, nevertheless had been able, in adhering to Marxism, to move far forward. But then it turns out that the nation's economy has simply collapsed and its leaders were a band of robbers. And here we have a complete falsification of life in the Stalinist image.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] Should mercy be shown toward the overthrown dictator? The today of Eastern Europe provides fresh facts for reflecting on this question.

[Conquest] There should be more mercy for the victims of Ceausescu than for him himself. He ended badly. However, it is better that he ended badly than if he had continued his rule. Hitler also had a bad end but this was a fortunate end for all mankind.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] Would it ever be possible to have a cult of personality in the United States? Certainly in your history presidents are known whom the people worshipped. Or the fact that you have been avoid a cult has been influenced by the fact, for example, that presidential power in the United States has always been limited to a definite term? If you recall, at the Continental Congress of 1776, in discussing the powers of the president in a future American Constitution, proposals were made for him to be appointed for life. But the idea was

rejected as it was said that it was merely a single step from a life-time appointment to a hereditary monarch.

[Conquest] The cult of personality is certainly not the main thing that characterized the Stalinist regime. This is nothing more than a popular expression which was first used by Khrushchev. The most terrible thing in Stalinism was not the extolling of the dictator, but rather the terror and falsification and this was the essence of his policy. If one looks at the problem broadly, then in essence any politician should possess power and power without authority is not power. In extraordinary situations, an authoritative politician should have more power.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] The situation which currently exists in our nation could certainly be called extraordinary. But what would your words mean in terms of the current moment? It has already been said from different rostrums that at present there is no alternative for Gorbachev. Could not the absence of an alternative serve as the beginning for a new cult?

[Conquest] It is a very good thing that the Soviet intelligentsia is so sensitive toward persons who have power. But it is essential to bear the following in mind. In looking from the outside at what is going on, for instance, in the upper echelons of power, it is possible to assert far from always with 100-percent certainty that we are sufficiently informed on the processes occurring there. The situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the economy is in an evermore terrible situation. The people, naturally, are expressing dissatisfaction. Accusations couched in very sharp terms—and I have heard this—are being made against the superior leadership. It would be naive to think that the leadership would not respond to the situation. It cannot be excluded that Gorbachev, even now, does not have sufficient power, power and not posts, to carry out major changes. In order to judge this more reliably, we should watch what happens over the next 2 or 3 years. There are very many persons making various initiatives from both the right and from the left. And Gorbachev must become the person who must preserve the balance between the extreme poles. He is in an exceptionally difficult situation, it must be admitted.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] With the greater democratization and glasnost in our country, emerging on the scene of social struggle are polar political forces. And even now the representatives of the most extreme of them are beginning to prove that for the sake of victory of "true socialism" violence is completely admissible as well as the suppression of those who support fundamentally different positions. How would you view such appeals from the historical viewpoint?

[Conquest] Is it possible for there to be any positive results of a terror? But who would determine here who precisely should be suppressed by force? Who will direct

this? We again reach the old idea of resolving problems by violence. That is, to make them much more complicated.

It is very important that both the left and the right, in working for their goals, act within constitutional limits. In the West, you will not find societies where the right would agree with the left. The clashes are very harsh and the sympathies of many, my own included, are changing. I consider myself as part right and part left. But it is better to let my opponents be in power than initiate violence.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] In order to reason in that manner there certainly must be a high level of political culture, a high intellectual level of civil self-awareness.

[Conquest] I do not quite agree with you. The intellectuals are often or most often fanatics inclined to extremes. They lack the cool-headedness and even, if you wish, the apathy which would be more beneficial than the excessive impressibility and extreme activeness. In those instances when passions flare.... Persons with little political experience are more predisposed to state that my ideas should prevail. It is true that there are more such persons in a society with an underdeveloped political culture. In the civilized nations, the fanatics are made to see reason by various civilian institutions, for example, the courts. Frankly speaking, in becoming acquainted with your program for democratic changes, I discovered not without surprise that you had paid so little attention to establishing independent courts which are the most important social institution in a state under the law.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] In your opinion, is it possible to have a repetition of the "Great Terror"?

[Conquest] In my opinion, two factors make this impossible. (Although, certainly, violence both from the left and from the right cannot be excluded if the persons which you spoke about came to power.) In the first place, the idea of an utopian society, the idea of making sacrifices for the sake of a "bright future" has outlived itself and is no longer current. And this is not only true for the intelligentsia. I have heard repeatedly how your workers and peasants said: We merely want to live normally in a normal country. Hence, the idea on which Stalinism was based is dead. Secondly, each person now knows that the command-administrative economy, the Stalinist economy, does not work. It also is dead. Stalinism without a Stalinist economy is impossible. At present, very many have understood that any attempt to resurrect the command-administrative system would lead to a collapse, to the perishing of the nation. Hence, to decide to attempt to restore the old regime would be to undo the nation and undo oneself. It is impossible to find another Stalin. Not only because Stalin's personality is unique but also because the times are unique.

[Ivanov, Plutnik] How would you armed with all historical experience view the prospects of perestroika?

[Conquest] The Soviet people, I understand, have many reasons for pessimism. But much has already been done so that these reasons have not been affirmed. This alone instills faith and hope.

### **Tuberculosis 'Epidemic' Reported in Labor Camps, Prisons**

90US0929A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 p 2

[Article by O. Chegodayeva under the rubric "We Are Studying the Problem": "Out of Prison and Out of the Kitty..."]

[Text] The time is past when consumption was considered a disease of the intelligentsia. Tuberculosis today is a disease of poor people and prisoners.

"Not only are we not treating those suffering from tuberculosis; we are not even taking steps to prevent healthy people from becoming infected. We two young families lived peacefully in a shared apartment until a neighbor returned from the zone. He was followed by workers from the medical and epidemiological station. It turns out that the neighbor is suffering from the active form of tuberculosis. We are now all registered with the tuberculosis clinic. They try to reassure us, saying that they will carefully monitor our health and will begin treatment as soon as we become ill. We are in a panic. Would it not be simpler to remove the sick neighbor? It would not, it seems. Hundreds of people suffering from tuberculosis are waiting on the list for housing, and our situation is very typical. Just what is going on, if it is an ordinary thing to have a nursing baby in the same apartment with a person suffering from open tuberculosis?"

This letter came from the Bryazgin and Levchenko families in Vladivostok. The situation in which the two young families find themselves is indeed typical for many areas of the nation. Of all the infectious diseases tuberculosis is unique in that it, like alcoholism, is a social disease. It would be difficult to find a disease on which an entire branch of medicine is at work, but tuberculosis is the focus of attention of such a branch, phthisiotherapy. Despite this, tuberculosis has not been conquered. It has not been conquered because the problem of combatting it is not confined to the medical field.

"The harsh climate, all sorts of deprivations suffered in the work, in escape attempts and in confinement, the turbulent life in common wards, the lack of fat in the food, yearning for home—these are the main causes of consumption on Sakhalin." was the conclusion drawn by Dr. A. Chekhov following a visit to the "convict island" of Sakhalin in 1890, which was a Russian prison at that time. Here is a statement from a contemporary study: "the psychological and emotional stress caused by being arrested, isolation from society, replacement of the accustomed way of life, the food ration, unsatisfactory communal living conditions (particularly in the wards),

and heavy labor negatively affect the defensive forces of the convicts." These two quotes are 100 years apart, but the fatality list has not changed at all.

Medical specialists say that the columns and prisons continue to be the main source of infection in the nation. Tuberculosis morbidity at sites of imprisonment exceed that of the nation as a whole by a factor of 16. According to the Medical Directorate of the MVD 100,000 people suffer from tuberculosis within the system of ITU [corrective labor facilities], 6,000 of whom have the active form. A real epidemic.

Strangely, this is not producing any particular alarm among doctors. Tuberculosis is not cancer and not AIDS; it can be cured. The doctors calmly say: Give us the patient in time and we will cure him. And they do. But is this any cause for joy, when the doctors treat only the "effects, because the causes are not in their field? The achievements of modern phthisiotherapy do not reach the most serious source of infection, the corrective labor facilities, to be sure. Our nation does not have penitentiary (prison) medicine as such. The flood of letters to the editors from prisoners being treated in special hospitals never lets up. The average economic loss at corrective labor facilities amounts to around 100 million rubles annually. Approximately one third of the deaths in the columns are due to consumption. And those who survive carry the disease with them to freedom.

In all fairness it should be said that the USSR MVD is concerned about this problem. It has allocated 63 million rubles specially for combatting tuberculosis. Yu. Nikol'skiy and V. Kirsanov, specialists with the Medical Administration of the USSR MVD, believe that for a long time there has been a simplistic view of medicine in the ITU system as just one area of the services field. The medical facilities are therefore poorly equipped and the doctors are not in a position to make accurate diagnoses because they lack modern medical diagnostic equipment. The conclusion: It is impossible to cure tuberculosis without eliminating the differences between generally accepted medical standards and the conditions under which sentences are served. Prison medicine has the right to "legal" existence as a special branch of medicine.

I read the following in the Short Encyclopedic Dictionary published in 1955: "The spread of tuberculosis is aided by difficult economic conditions, poor nutrition, poor housing and heavy labor, and tuberculosis is therefore found particularly frequently among workers in the capitalist nations." But we are the ones who have the difficult economic conditions. Our stores are empty, we have a housing problem and we lack labor protection. Forty-two of every 100,000 people here have tuberculosis. Compare that with 2-4 in the Scandinavian countries and 8-9 in the USA. The tuberculosis specialists also say that the figure of a half-million for people

suffering from tuberculosis in our nation is an understatement, because a large number of all kinds of transients and seasonal workers have tuberculosis. In addition, alcoholics are 20 times as likely to develop tuberculosis as nondrinkers. Unfortunately, there are still very few special facilities in the nation where phthisiotherapists and drug-abuse specialists work hand in hand. This probably explains the "peculiarity" of that medical facility called an "anti-tuberculosis clinic."

"A world which lives according to its own laws, where long months of forced idleness, alcoholism and the traditions of the criminal world are strangely combined" is how a modern tuberculosis hospital is described by one of our readers, phthisis specialist L. Pislaryuk of Tiraspol. His studies have shown that former criminals make up 30-40 per cent of all the patients. And people are not just treated at tuberculosis hospitals; they live there for months. At the Central Scientific Research Institute for Tuberculosis in Moscow, the nation's main scientific center for phthisiotherapy, I was amazed at a simple, everyday detail: laundry hung to dry from the windows of the hospital buildings. Tuberculosis is not cured with medicine alone. It requires good conditions and a tranquil environment. Any difficult experience or stressful situation can undo everything. And here we have normal people, former criminals and alcoholics side by side. In addition, a significant part of the tuberculosis clinics and sanatoria are housed in ramshackled old buildings. The patients cannot bear it and they run off and go home....

Tuberculosis is also described as the "royal disease." Victims of tuberculosis frequently do not suffer any outward symptoms. A person with considerable damage to the lungs may feel perfectly tolerable. The hospital gates are open, and it is not forbidden to take walks in the fresh air. What a life! No need to work; one feels fine and is fed to the tune of 1 ruble and 70 kopecks a day; he can come and go as he pleases; the hospital allowance is paid on a regular basis.... One can drink. He will not be discharged; he could infect others.

But there is yet another reason—the main one, in my view—why the patients are in no hurry to get well. It is profitable to have tuberculosis in our society. It is the only chance many people have to escape the difficult social circumstances in which they find themselves. For prisoners it means trading a bunk for a hospital bed, performing lighter work and receiving better chow. For others it means escaping from communal apartments and dormitories. The Council of Ministers has issued a special decree granting the right to housing out of turn for tuberculars. But this is only for the infectious patients. If they get well, they lose their benefits.

In Moscow, for example, where the tuberculosis situation is relatively good, around 500 people get into the "tuberculosis" line each year and receive separate apartments within a year and a half. The waiting lists are far longer in areas with rampant tuberculosis. In Kazakhstan, for example, there are 60,000 tuberculars and

enormous families. A wait of a year and a half is out of the question there. Children are infected by adults. The "royal disease" ends in death, so that any hopes of receiving the promised benefits are unjustified.

"There were eight of us living in my father's home: my father, mother, two brothers, my husband and I with two children. My brother fell sick with tuberculosis and died. My father contracted it and died. I now have the sickness. I lie here in the hospital and do not know how to go on living. And my second brother recently had a child. There is no way possible for him to move out from the family. In the city executive committee he is told: Not authorized...."

We were informed by the city ispolkom in Saransk, from where this letter to the editors came, that reader A. Konnova's petition was not considered "due to the petitioner's demise."

### Legislation Encouraging Russian Emigres to Return Proposed

90US0892A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 2 May 90 p 1

[Article by V. Nugzarov: "Farmer Rodionov at the Forum of Innovators"; for previously published related articles, see *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*, 4 January, 24 February, 15 April, 1990]

[Text] The 2nd Forum of the country's social innovators took place in Moscow. The organizer—the USSR Fund for Social Inventions—is a public charitable organization, which operates on the principles of self-government and self-financing. *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* delegated its representatives to the forum, who have made a creative contribution to restructuring. Among them is also our fellow-countryman Vasilii Rodionov, who returned with his family to his Homeland from Australia and has put down roots in the soil of Maritime Kray. In reports by our own Far Eastern correspondent, I. Kots, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* told about the difficult "Odyssey" of the farmer from Kmylovka.

With what news did Rodionov come to the capital? At the forum his emotional letter to the President of the USSR was read. In it he writes, in particular:

"... In April 1989, my family and I—my wife and four children—came to the Union on the rights of Soviet citizens. I brought into the country my industry, knowledge, and experience. In addition, I transferred a significant share of my means, part of the capital in hard currency in the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of the USSR. This money, which I had earned through my labor during long years, I did not intend to save without a purpose. I decided to invest them in business. My plans are entirely realistic: On the fertile land of Maritime Kray, abounding in natural resources, I can develop a plot of land, grow grain and vegetables, and breed cattle.



But it will not prove possible in any way to carry out my good intentions because of the paradoxical situation that has taken place: I cannot use my money for the purpose, and for about a year already I have been going through bureaucratic labyrinths.

In a Nakhodka bank they suggested that I open a "B" account. But this means that I must then register a visa and personally travel abroad for the purchase of machinery and equipment. I cannot allow myself such trips. I must work, build my house in order for us to live under our roof next winter. I don't see the sense of acting in such a way. Of course, I know that I can also turn to an Australian bank. They will recall my money, and it will be easier for me to obtain it. But, having taken that action, I would compromise the country where I live and where my children are growing up.

My request is lawful and answers simple common sense: For my funds in foreign currency to be received in a Nakhodka bank, and precisely in an "A" account, for me to be able, without leaving the country, to purchase abroad everything that I need for production and other needs. For interest to be credited to me for the use of my funds in circulation, because only through the fault of the bank officials I am unable to use my accumulations. This money, the interest on my deposit, I intend to turn over to the Nakhodka Children's Home. A father of four children, who himself has experienced need and difficulties, I regard it as my duty to help hapless children. I will know exactly that the money will go to those who are in need of it, and not to those through whose fault I have been experiencing material difficulties for a long time. I suggest that the officials who created the red tape in the receipt of my personal funds should be punished. You see, the question is not the loss they inflicted on me. They are guilty of much more: They take away the belief in the future of our Homeland, in the fact that it will get up on its feet and occupy the honored place in the world, which history has allotted to it.

When I told my acquaintance in Australia that our family is leaving to live in Russia, many Russian people came to us and asked: "How can one leave? Where does one have to turn? Will they receive?" In this difficult hour for our Homeland many would return, but they are afraid of the uncertainty and the difficulties. For this reason I ask you to turn to our fellow countrymen abroad with the proposal about the willingness of the Soviet government and the people to accept their participation in the revival of the Homeland, to commission the preparation of a law on the Russian community abroad and its participation in the reforms in the USSR."

The participants of the forum expressed concerted support of V. Rodionov, especially his proposal of legislative measures to encourage those representatives of the Russian community abroad who want to take a direct part, through labor and monetary assets, in the revival of the Homeland.

The forum adopted a declaration on the establishment, in the USSR, of the nationwide coalition "Independent Sector." It will unite public organizations and the formations of citizens in the economic, cultural and ecological spheres—with a view to the protection of the rights and interests of independent popular initiatives. The way in which the participants of the forum came out in favor of the right of the entrepreneurial initiative of the farmer Vasiliy Rodionov is an example of such citizen mutual assistance.

### **New Public Health Program Implemented in Ukrainian SSR**

90US0892B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
28 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Mariya Andreyevna Orlik, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers: "Health Is Most Precious of All the Riches"; first paragraph is PRAVDA UKRAINY introduction]

[Text] As has already been reported, the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers examined the draft of the Integrated Program for the Prevention of Diseases and the Formation of Healthful Way of Life for the Population of the Ukrainian SSR for the Period to the Year 2000. The collection of ideas for improvement and proposals was made significantly more concrete in regard to a number of points and was recently approved by a decree of the republic's government. Mariya Andreyevna Orlik, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, reflects on the significance and horizons of the new social program.

The 1990's. . . . The health of the individual, and thus, also the health of the nation, must become their basic capital for society. We need a good health care system, which is fitting to civilization.

But meanwhile the facts and figures indicative of health today are extremely alarming. During the past decade, the natural population growth in the republic has decreased by almost one-third, the reduction of infant mortality is slow. There has been an increase in the level of disease, with endocrine and allergic diseases being dominant, malignant tumors, myocardial infarction, and ulcerous stomach disease. Can the growth of hospitals and polyclinics solve the problem?

Yes, we do need health care institutions, equipment, and medicine. But are they the only basis for hope? It turns out, medicine can secure only a small share of the reliability of man's health. But then half of the successes depends on our conduct, the correct rhythm of work and rest, a rational diet, the pursuit of physical culture—everything we call the way of life. A great deal is predetermined by the improvement of the ecological situation. To bring such forces into movement—that is the sense and task of the Integrated Program.

This is a large-scale plan to strengthen the health of millions of people. It is also envisaged to secure, by April



1990, the development of analogous regional plans, common in terms of general conception, however with its applied distinctive features. Here it is necessary to act directly, to sufficiently quickly make the program the property of the masses. One of the leading features of the in the measures being mapped out is the stimulation of health policy. And this is perfectly clear. Let us compare, for example, two enterprises in Zaporozhye Oblast. The Zaporozhye Abrasive Combine does not belong to manufactures that are comfortable in character. But here they show genuine concern for the health of the collective: A powerful sanitary complex has been created, there is a shop for light work, a preventive clinic, and the medical and sanitary unit is equipped with modern equipment for the execution of preventive measures, treatment, and medical rehabilitation. As a result—during the past 3 years, the level of disease with temporary loss of capacity to work is the lowest in the industry, what is more among the enterprises of the oblast. Medicine has really become a productive force here. But not so far away, in Berdyansk, at the Azovkabel Plant, they are formally concerned with health. Compared to the abrasive combine, the disease here is one and half times higher. An instructive comparison, in my view. Managing health, predicting its components in the right way, a great deal can be achieved.

In the program—and this was done for the first time in the country—the priorities of such management are determined. To them pertain maternity and childhood protection, the attack on injuries and infection, including flu, intestinal diseases, AIDS, the development of preventive cardiology and stomatology, and the fight against harmful habits. Health centers capable of forming a highly cultured attitude of civilized people to their organism must become far-sighted here. Only the participation of everyone of us in a distinctive campaign for health and the combination of public efforts can secure the success of the program.

A great deal of work lies ahead. But its point of departure is the improvement of the ecological situation in the republic. The low technical level of many enterprises, the chemical pressing being observed in various spheres of vital functions, and other, at times extreme, factors have led to the fact that many industrial regions are in need of ecological protection. In Severodonetsk, for example, during the past 5 years the prevalence of chronic bronchitis increased by a factor of 1.5, and in Dneprodzerzhinsk incidents of heart disease are noted three times more often than in the republic as a whole. Mariupol, Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Lisichansk, Krivoy Rog, Kommunarisk, and Makeyevka are in the health danger zone. It is clear that such cities and settlements, first of all in the Donbas, the Krivbas, and Pridneprovye require their kind of first aid. The problems of ecology and the questions of environmental protection are on the agenda not for the first time. But now the measures have been made more concrete in scientific-technical respect and have been clearly predetermined with respect to the terms of fulfillment. Thus, plans call for computerizing

the monitoring of the state of the environment in the oblasts and industrial centers with a strained ecological situation. The content of harmful substances in the emissions of enterprises, the quality of water, the introduction of new ecologically safe technologies and the use of ecologically pure fuel are taken under special sanitary supervision. The observance of the parameters of the biosphere and their genetic influence will become systematic, ecological glasnost will be intensified, in particular mobile and stationary light indicator boards will be established that objectively reflect the ecological situation and its dynamic.

The government of the republic and the Ukrainian Trade Union Council have adopted a decree on additional measures to improve the health of people who were affected by Chernobyl. It is important to note that the parts of the Integrated Program organically supplement the range of such measures.

Labor and health are directly dependent on each other. The development and introduction of new technological solutions in the struggle with dust, pollution, noise, vibratory load, and the destruction of the thermal condition in shops and mines, require special attention. Is it really admissible, for example, that dust pathology continues to occupy the leading place in the structure of the professional sickness rate of miners? The level of mechanization remains low in metallurgy, the agrarian sector, and the processing sectors of industry.

Here perceptible scientific-technical advances are necessary. In the next few years, we will have to introduce more perfect ventilation systems for mines and coal strippings and the monitoring of the state and conditioning of mine air, equip metallurgy and foundry production with aggregate machinery that sharply reduce manual labor, maximally mechanize the production processes in animal husbandry, and set going the serial output of highly-efficient devices for the absorption of welding aerosol. Incidentally, such miniature devices, developed in the experimental design office of the Kiev Scientific Research Institute of Labor Hygiene and Vocational Diseases of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Public Health, received a good assessment. They are already being utilized in shipbuilding, the automotive industry, and metalwork.

Another aspect of industrial medicine is necessary. The task has been set to enhance the improvement of the miners, moreover in all groups of health supervision. Thus, new medical-sanitary complexes are needed to secure individual prevention programs. In short, this whole service, which is especially close to the workers, must be given a second wind, and the reserves for this are available at the local level.

We are now moving little, the hypodynamism is growing. Look at the children: Many school children and preschool children have excess weight, have an infringement of carriage. All this is poorly compensated for by lessons in physical culture in their present form—only one-fifth

of the pupils are able to fulfill the norms of the GTO [Ready for Labor and Defense]. Only a few schools and kindergartens have swimming pools. And the adults? Only at every twentieth enterprise are there sports complexes. On-the-job [proizvodstvenny] gymnastics are being introduced slowly. It seems, the question of adopting in the republic a Law on Physical Education has become urgent. Hundreds of health and fitness complexes and sections, the expansion of the network of training halls, swimming pools, rooms for psychological unburdening, and preventive clinics with a physical culture and sanitary bent—this is how we imagine the foundation for the improvement in the attitude toward health envisaged by the program.

Unfortunately, in our life tobacco and alcohol are not absent. Half of the violations of the law and a third of the traffic accidents are connected with the use of alcohol. It continues to worsen the gene pool of the nation. A terrible risk factor in heart and oncological diseases is smoking, and nevertheless more than half of young lads and quite few young women smoke.

I am convinced that it is necessary to search for effective means of encouraging people to pursue safe health and a sober way of life. This, if you wish, answers social justice.

What kind of improvement is seen in the health indicators as the result of the realization of this program? The transition to integrated measures of prevention is capable of securing during the 1990's a reduction in the sickness rate by 5-10 percent, in the loss resulting from temporary incapacity for work—by 10-12 percent, and the reduction in vocational diseases—by 10-20 percent. And if we add to the medical aspect of the program, especially as regards the improvement of preventive medical assistance for women and children, this will lead to the reduction in mortality by approximately 70,000 persons a year. This is what concern about health and disease prevention can give to our republic. For the sake of these prospects it is worthwhile to take the trouble, having begun with ourselves, with our own way of life.

#### **Officials' Indifference Towards Chernobyl Victims Cited**

90US0892C Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian Apr 90 pp 4-5

[Special Report from the Zone of "Strict Control" in the Territory of Belorussia by Mikhail Serdyukov, Khoynikskiy rayon, Gomel Oblast, special correspondent of SOBESEDNIK: "People on the Wounded Earth"]

#### **[Text] A Beginning Without End**

The numerals on the electronic watch began to blink desperately and noiselessly. "Here is the excessively praised West for you," Demedyuk spit out in annoyance. "Just look: I did not wear it 3 days—throw it away?"

The watch was a present from abroad. "For centuries," the friend had assured him. The firm makes such a guarantee!"

The watch did not blink long. At dawn it failed completely.

This strange story happened during the night of 26-27 April 1986. Vladimir Demedyuk, a staff member of the Khoynikskiy Rayon Department of Internal Affairs, was conducting an inspection on the Pripyat. It was the very spawning time. The poachers, count on it, from the entire Gomel region hastened in this improbable place to snatch "for fish soup." The militia was helping the tired-out fish inspectors.

They, of course, did not know what catastrophe was taking place a dozen kilometers from them. True, on the side of the Nuclear Power Station they observed an unclear glow. Well, what of it, it happens. Most likely, they launched the May Day illumination. . . .

What else? In the morning there was a tickling in the throat, the lips began to become dry. But this light ailment could not disturb Demedyuk—an inveterate sportsman and one with a sports rating. In the afternoon they played soccer. A crucial match for the rayon title. You don't cancel such a game.

They met at the stadium of the Strelichevo Sovkhoz. And they already had forgotten the first goal when over the field, directly over the football players, the first helicopters swept past. Further, like in the song, "someone thought, learning is going on." But the game was cut short by a portable radio transmitter that came to life: Alarm. The match was cut short. To this day it has not proved possible to finish it.

They reported: Something had happened at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. But in so doing, they added: Don't start a panic. They have obtained an instrument from a dust-laden box. It did not show anything. . . .

Thus began the new life in the region of the catastrophe which shook the whole world.

TODAY Vladimir Demedyuk has an Order of the Red Star and frequent headaches. The readings during the first days in the region of Pripyat came to 700-800 microroentgens an hour, places were encountered where up to a roentgen was reached. With these data, the militia men came to the operational staff, the chief's eyes popped out of his head: There cannot be such a figure. And they put figures in the report that were much more modest. The report went further—to the raykom, for example. Where they also decided: Something is not so. And again they understated the "accursed radiation". A known method: This is precisely how they acted in their time with drug addiction, prostitution, the cattle plague, and other indicators of trouble. Radiation did not become an exception for the cheerful leadership. But one fine day the register of "personal doses" of radiation

vanished completely. They introduced a new one at once. In compliance with it, they then also introduced medical cards.

Only on 3 May did they start to remove the cattle. The people—later. You see, prior to this they had celebrated May Day, as it is supposed to be done. They comforted the obstinate: For 3 days, not more. Who knew, for how many! They knew the main thing—not to panic.

Where to take the people from the villages of Chamkov, Lesok, and Krasnoselye? Yes, to the nearby Kozhushki, Tulgovichi, and Dvorishche.

In the first of these villages today, no one lives today. It is a death zone, a zone of complete evacuation. In the second it is also recognized: It is impossible to live there. From it, not all, but, thank God, the majority of peasants have left. With the third it is worse. To live there is also not without danger, but the settlement is really very big. The solution of the question of "the great resettlement" has been four years in the making, but, alas, people are still in their places as before. But leave where, if there is no place to go?

Demedyuk himself ploughed round the 30-kilometer zone. He worked on the basis of a map. But it proved impossible to maintain exactly "thirty." Orders were given to pass by the settlements—those which were larger—leaving them behind the line of the 30-kilometer zone. As if the radiation had not reached there where the population is a little larger. The brand-new Kirovets, during the ploughing, caught a dose comparable perhaps with the quantity of horse powers in the motor, they wrote off the tractor and buried it. Demedyuk, having made up for lost sleep, continued to serve in the zone of the radioactive disaster. For weeks on end, without days off. He took a rest later, already in the hospital.

Of course, he was not alone. His comrades were at his side. Few of them wavered. It was necessary to evacuate people, to put a stop to looting, to maintain the maximum possible order in this grandiose turmoil.

They fulfilled their official duty. But, unfortunately, it is impossible to say that about all the services. Today's situation in Belorussia took shape, as with building blocks, not from understated if radioactive doses, not from the arbitrary if convenient "description" of the evacuation zone. When radiation of 35 rems is recognized as a safe norm for human life (in 70 years) on the land wounded by radiation. Very well, let it be so, although this figure was determined extremely approximately. But, you see, we have nothing in our country with which to monitor this "threshold"—there is no such equipment. Moreover, the conception of 35 rems does not at all take into account the individuality of a man. In what state was he at the moment of the accident: Healthy or not, was he young or in his declining years. . . . Not to mention the fact that the dose of short-lived radionuclides, which the inhabitants of the neighboring villages received during the first days of the catastrophes, was not monitored by anyone.

### Where the Winds Blow

The catastrophe took place in the territory of the Ukraine. From the first hours, all the attention was focused precisely on this republic. At 6 am a government commission flew to Chernobyl. During the first days, approximately 2,000 medical brigades were involved in work in the region of the nuclear power station. And, it goes without saying, all the journalists requested passes to come here. The reactor of the fourth block was still boiling and the best minds were struggling to curb it, but the source of radiation emissions, at that time not yet contained by the armor plates of the sarcophagus, syphoned everywhere. Those who had the possibility of comparing understood what this is threatening with. But the experts were unable to share information honestly and fully. The iron will of the custodians of "our prosperity" stood like a firm dam in the path of the truth.

In Poland, for example, the entire population, on the second day of the misfortune, took tablets against some "iodine isotope", but people in hundreds of villages and settlements adjacent to the nuclear power plant were guessing before the wine counter, what is more reliable: "Vodka, port, or "Cabernet"? Unfortunately, the country was fighting "total" alcoholism, the selection was reduced to the minimum, and the simple tractor operator preferred home-made vodka to all medicines. There were simply no others. The district militia officers lost heart: By night it was necessary to be treated by the same.

The country collected money for the elimination of the consequences of the accident. The lion's share of the funds was given to the Ukraine, a respectable piece was seized the perpetrator of the accident—the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry. Belorussia received least of all. But meanwhile more than 70 percent of the radionuclides, stretched through Pripyat by the passing wind, settled in the Belorussian expanses. I repeat, during the first days we did not know anything about this. And I was fortunate to be among those to whom they issued a pass with the laconic inscription "everywhere." I confess, there was no thought of going to the same Khoyniki and to Belorussia in general. We wanted to write about the "hottest spot." Oh, how the nightingales sang those close May nights in the city of Pripyat! "They grew fat on intestinal radiation"—the firemen grumbled, being sent daily over the very fourth block to pump out the radioactive water. By right they deserved the most piercing lines of the journalists. Less thought was given to everything else.

. . . The Belorussian regions that fell within the 30-kilometer zone were visited by Nikolay Nikitovich Slyunkov, at that time the first secretary of the republic CP Central Committee. A cavalcade of automobiles like the wind swept along the freshly-deactivated routes. The secretary also visited the Sudkovo Sovkhoz. A short meeting with the perturbed people. And persuasive assurances: Your alarm is unfounded. One can live, one

can cultivate cornfields, it is necessary to increase the milk yield! Well, what of it, comrade Slyunkov is not the vice-president of the Academy of Medical Sciences and not the chairman of the National Commission for Radiation Protection. He is also a man for whom this misfortune is an unaccustomed misfortune. He is a communist and an optimist, and he wants very much for everyone to live as well as possible. He calmed, he assured, and he promised to help with supplies, for example. The cars began to whirl off farther, into the zone. But they did not go long, as long as there was asphalt. Farther there was dust. There was no point in going farther. . . .

They were waiting for the high guest in the rayon center. They prepared a good table, they did their utmost. But here a blunder turned out: The first secretary and. . . the first comforter of his people did not begin to assess the art of the home-bred culinary experts. His personal cook prepared something more accustomed from personal products and carefully stored water. After a brief dinner, the guest beat a retreat, not without the feeling of a duty fulfilled.

I am imagining the whole seditiousness of the subject. Only I must note: The story with the dinner received publicity. And to this day the local inhabitants do not understand: Was their leader joking about the fact that one can and must live within a dozen kilometers of the barbed wire, or was he simply deceiving them. But, perhaps, this is such a style of work: Be a guest with your own piece of bread and sip of water? Then, of course, it is another matter. . . .

As a pearl of glasnost, of course, one can also consider the words of the (now already former) USSR minister of public health, Academician Y. I. Chazov. Opening an international scientific conference "On Medical Aspects of the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant" in Kiev, he declared, not without pride: "Today we confidently state that the accident has not been reflected in the health of the population." But how then will it be with the consequences of the accident after some 10 years or, let us say, 10 dozen years? You see, the half-life of some of the radio isotopes ejected by the reactor of the fourth block are calculated in centuries. And the fact that to date only caesium 137 is taken into account, well also, perhaps, strontium and they speak completely in undertones about plutonium, whose particles are difficult to call a vitamin—what is the explanation for this? It can be explained as follows: By the absence of equipment capable of detecting these and by no means only these radionuclides. But, you know, they destroy cells and bone tissue, weakening the immune system, provoking by this practically any disease that is difficult to cure.

In that same settlement of Sudkovo, they recently carried out a medical survey of 129 children. The result is scandalous: 143 diseases were discovered, among which practically all had lesion of the cardio-vascular system and the digestive organs. But meanwhile the Sudkovo Sovkhoz, even according to today's revised norms and

the sharply-expanded strict zone of radiation monitoring, does not fall under evacuation. There are, it is true, recommendations to the parents of children under 14 years of age: Leave from here as far as possible and as soon as possible. But again the question comes up against a wall—nowhere. Not excluded is only one kind of search for a way out of the trap: A free search. Svetlana Vakusheva, with her mother, husband and brother, came here from Shushenskoye. Two years ago. For a long time they had wanted to come to Europe. Well, they came. Only here the Siberians found out: They were given double salaries for their work.

"As we found out, for no special reason mother got bad," Svetlana, the art director of the local House of Culture, told me, "you see, nobody had warned us that there is radiation here. And then Romka was born to me. But is this really a life: It is impossible to go into the street, or to drink milk—categorically. Vitamins, ordinary ones, in globules—not even a trace. My brother, a seventh-grader during this time, became weaker in the eyes. He frequently feels sick, headaches. We decided to leave."

The Vakushevs had luck. From their second attempt, having traveled through almost all of Krasnodarsk Kray, they succeeded in finding refuge in the Kommunity Kolkhoz. They received de-registration coupons and monetary compensation: R500 each for adults, R250 for the children. And so they left.

I came directly to the seeing off. The cheerful lad and machine operator Sergey and his comrades were loading simple goods and chattels. "Are you not afraid to carry "radiation" with you?—I could not keep from asking. "Yes, I am a little. Only given the present times, to purchase new furniture is unthinkable. I did not fight anywhere, I don't have decorations. . . ."

One can understand the lad. In the Kommunity Kolkhoz people showed understanding for the refugees. Unfortunately, this does not happen everywhere. If on another farm they find out that the people are from the zone, they drive them away, like people stricken with the plague. What is, is.

Nataliya Kobzik saw the friends off. She nearly cried. Her search—she spent the entire holiday—was not crowned with success. And there are three children in the family—10, 12, and 14 years old. Up to now no one has been in a hurry to accept them. And, you see, all the children are ill. . . .

Of the fact that medical assistance—even for children—in the Chernobyl region is at the most hopeless level, I did not have to convince myself very long. They are swiftly closing (not opening, no!) medical-obstetrical stations staffed by medical assistants and midwives in the villages and settlements. There is no personnel. The graduates of medical VUZ's, whom they send here for distribution, disappear somewhere half-way. Flying visits of physicians from the same Gomel and Vitebsk are not especially effective.

The senior midwife of the Sudkovo kindergarten, Mariya Vergyichik testifies:

"For the first time in these 4 years, only now a group of serious physicians from Minsk has paid us a visit. They examined, without being in a hurry. Previously the doctors came literally for half an hour. They look the children in the throat, they look at their head, and not all, what for all—and greetings. Thus, the doctors from Minsk ran blood checks on the children. A mass of deviations were exposed, which, alas, is not a discovery. We have still another misfortune—they are not supposed to take the youngsters out into the street. The radiation background is too high. It exceeds the norm by a factor of 5-7. And this in the settlement. So it turns out that the children spend all 12 hours inside the premise. How do they like it? They hate kindergarten.

"The same story in school," Grigoriy Zamerko, the man in charge of a medical station of the Novoselki village, confirmed. The children are clearly weakened. But there are no vitamins. It is spring and—empty. There is nothing with which to inoculate, disposable syringes I have seen only on television. And I am not even talking about any sort of serious medicine. Everything is a continuous shortage.

A familiar picture, is it not? One can find quite a few places in our country where the situation with medical supply is, possibly, even worse. But, you see, we are talking about the lives of children in the danger zone! Only 2 months ago, the obstetricians of the Khoynikskiy Maternity Hospital were terrified by a six-fingered child. So how is one to assess the recent declaration of 92 scientists working in the sphere of radiation safety and medicine in connection with the situation at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, addressed to M. S. Gorbachev? In this declaration it is stated: "The children are encompassed by a careful health center observation, and in case of necessity, also by the corresponding treatment." It would not be a bad thing for our luminaries to know that, in that same Khoynikskiy Rayon Hospital, only four out of 13 staff pediatricians are working. What observations and what treatments are they talking about?

#### A Deputy Throws Down the Gauntlet

We are going along a field where tractors everywhere are taking a rest. Across the road—"thorn". There it is quiet, there is a contaminated locality, and only wild boars trample it down by night. And here they are sowing grain. Next to it is another field, in it they are planting potatoes. Not far away a herd of cows is grazing. Life, as we still like to say, continues. This is the reality of today. The Strelchevo Sovkhoz is a fragment of that reality. Its inhabitants only intend to evacuate in the next year or two. A decree of the BSSR government makes this mandatory. But nevertheless the plans for grain, potatoes, milk, and other products for the years of the calamity have not become lower. On the contrary, they

increased. The head of the poor director of the millionaire sovkhos, Anatoliy Martynenko, is spinning. He knows perfectly well that his food products are not safe. But, on the other hand, who will allow him to stop production? And what will people live on? If they do not sell the products stricken with radionuclides, they themselves will starve. But to whom, at the same time, will they sell? Yes, to us and to you, to the State. In addition to everything else, Strelchevo is the largest farm in the region. So that it ploughs, sows, and reaps the whole ball of wax.

The pollution of the lands here ranges from 15 to 40 curies per square kilometer. True, measurements are carried out only for caesium. "But we also have strontium, plutonium, antimony, and cobalt," reports the director dejectedly. It is already not even terrifying to him to be proud of such a collection from Mendeleyev's table. But to Moscow scientists this seems to be the norm. They are far away, perhaps that is why it seems that way. The Belorussian specialists, who are anxious about the fate of their people, think differently. There, where it is impossible to obtain produce without contamination with radionuclides, or else why produce them—it is impossible to live. Who is right? The voice of ordinary reason suggests—he who lives on this land.

But you go and prove it. . . .

And how the farm was revived after the accident! New roads and whole streets of small stone houses have grown up during these years and are still growing up—in blocks. Except, the very "first" of the party obkom (he now commands in the republic CP Central Committee), Aleksey Stepanovich Kamay already in 1988 ordered funds to be allocated for housing construction. And here they are, brand-new people obsessed with cleanliness, they glare with fresh brick in the April sun. . . .

But, you see, it is impossible to live here. Among those who have small children and for whom long ago it would have been time to move, the machine operator Vladimir Kashperko. But he will not succeed before the others. Volodya is a USSR people's deputy.

"It was precisely only because of our accursed radiation," said Vladimir, "that I agreed to stand for election." You know, it is impossible to live this way. Very well, we are not thinking about ourselves. But about those who receive our products, about our children and children's children—we are obliged to?"

"You spoke at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies of the country. What did you accomplish?"

"It is very vexing to me to realize that many deputies, and our government as well, do not completely understand all the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. For example, our farm, during all these 4 years, has been producing potatoes, which we send throughout the whole country. To Moscow, Leningrad, to the Volga Region, and to the North. You see, some of our scientists believe that in this way we are spreading the radioactive dose of

the contaminated produce to all, throughout the Soviet Union. We mix pure produce with "an insignificant" share polluted with radionuclides. This will supposedly not bring harm. But, you see, this is not so. It is necessary to at once withdraw and prohibit so-called VDU—temporary permissible levels of food product contamination with radionuclides. You see, this is deception of ourselves. Absurd."

"And you deceive superbly?"

"Judge for yourself: Last year we successfully sold to the state about 9,000 tons of grain, 7,000 tons of potatoes, and every year we sell 2,000 tons of meat. On whose table does all this end up? On whose table you like. Our dairy plant accepts milk, which goes for butter. And then—is widely marketed. Throughout the whole country. But, you know, this product is a hundred, a thousand times more polluted than the normal product. Although it meets the temporary permissible levels."

"Are you not afraid that we will publish these facts?" I asked him when I said good-bye.

"I will only be grateful. Since the time I became a USSR people's deputy, I have had to circumvent the entire structure of our authorities—from the rayon authorities to the USSR Supreme Soviet. And I am simply surprised how indifferent people are to our misfortune. Even among the very highest persons of our state I did not find full sympathy. For 4 years we have been living on the contaminate land. For 4 years we have been feeding the country with polluted produce. For the fourth year, our children have been living in this situation, in fact deprived of their childhood. And how many more years will they have to live this way is not known. Why up to now no one will bear the responsibility for this? You see, only today we are finding out that it is impossible to live here, although all these years the opposite has been repeated over and over again. How can one treat these people so inhumanly?"

The Chernobyl catastrophe is not only the calamity of the nuclear power station. It is a threat to millions. This is what is important to understand.

I encountered it another time. Well, how can one be within some 30 kilometers there and not drive up to have a look. We came up from the direction of Pripjat. In the haze of the sun the sarcophagus turned black. A pussy-willow was blossoming on the shore. A fat crow walked across the deserted bridge. Only storks I did not see anywhere. Although the nests, like a forgotten reproach, can be seen on the roofs of the deserted houses. To such houses, the storks do not return.

#### Commission On Repressed Writers Sums Up Work

90UN1874A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 20, 16 May 90 p 1

[Article by N. Vystavkina: "Our Duties"]

[Text] They ground them into the camp dust of the Zhernova Gulag. They threw them down the shafts like

processed, worthless, harmful ore, superfluous to our shining future. But their rebellion lives in us and in our children through their unpublished poetry circulating in manuscript, they break through the concrete slabs of the Belomorkanal [canal joining White and Baltic Seas] with the shoots of a new life, becoming its nutrient medium, its black earth. And they will live forever, as does the eternal word, which we will pass on to our descendants, this time not in hand-written manuscripts, but in books...

The All-Union Commission on the Literary Heritage of Repressed Writers was convened under the chairmanship of V. Karpov to discuss the results of its work. Scarcely more than a year has passed since the commission was formed. However, the first issue of its annual collection "Return," and the books "Poetry of the Prisons and Camps" and "In the Name of the Living," and a number of other publications have been completed and submitted for publication. A card file of repressed writers (containing hundreds of names) has been compiled and will form the basis for a future Memorial Book. These writers are the subject of a 1-hour documentary film produced jointly with British television, which has already been shown in London.

Several minutes were required for the sadly famous "troyka" to "close out" the affair of arrested writers. For many long months painstaking work was conducted at the current "anti-troyka"—representatives of the commission, KGB, and USSR Procurator's office in order to "open" these affairs, to study and publish documents that had been carefully hidden under the "top secret" stamp. The last matter which the commission managed to find out about was the case of Boris Pilnyak, who was accused of terrorism and spying for Japan. The last words of the accused were: "I very much want to work. After my long incarceration in prison I have become a completely different person and have seen life in a new light. I want to live and do a great deal of work, I want to have paper in front of me so I can write something that will be useful to the Soviet people.."

The trial lasted 15 minutes! The chairman read the sentence: "The former writer Pilnyak, Boris Andreyevich [is condemned] to the maximum sentence—execution. The sentence is final and will be carried out immediately." From time to time they entered writers' manuscripts as material evidence. Poetry by Klyuyev and Mandelshtam, a novel by Platonov, works of other famous, little known, and completely unknown writers which had miraculously survived in state and personal archives, have been extracted from the darkness of restricted libraries and have been made been made available.

Through the commission's efforts, a whole stratum has been opened up, an enormous unknown world of our literature. The time has come for critical interpretation, analysis, recognition of its role in the history of our

culture. The commission's plans include preparation for a theoretical conference devoted to this problem.

"Why, to this day do we humbly beg, why don't we demand that the archives be opened, that the innocent be exonerated and the guilty named? Why don't we ever do anything but bow and scrape?" exclaimed one of the participants in the meeting emotionally. "This guy was never locked up," immediately determined someone else, who had personally experienced the camps. And indeed, many of them today speak carefully when they talk to those in power, careful not to insist or demand. They act this way just in case. And they remember what cases can occur. It is bitter to see that even today they do not know their rights, that they have still not gotten what they deserve.

This is precisely why the commission has turned to the secretariat of the board of the USSR Writers' Union with a proposal to accept into the Union, after the appropriate discussion, those repressed writers whose works are included in the collections the commission has published and is preparing for publication. [They argue that the union should] accept these people, bypassing the long waiting list of young writers, since they have already endured the requisite waiting period in the prisons and camps and through their suffering have long since earned the acknowledgement of society.

The Commission believes that the USSR Writers' Union must place before the organs of the state the issue of the rehabilitation of certain writers who have not yet been rehabilitated, starting with Nikolay Gumilev.

### **Book Publishers Association Formed**

90UN1874B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 90  
p 4

[Article by V. Malukhin: "Paradoxes of the Transitional Period: Association of Book Publishers Formed"]

[Text] The founding congress of a new unofficial organization, held in the conference hall of the "Progress" publishing house, was attended by 250 delegates. Less than one half of those gathered there had a mandate from publishers groups giving them the right to sign the agreement on the founding of the association and this right was taken advantage of. Thus, the previously existing council of directors of publishing houses was replaced by an Association of Soviet Book Publishers, which is conceived of by its founders as an "independent unofficial professional creative organization."

The director of the "Progress" publishing house, A. Avelichev, formulated in his report the reasons the establishment of the association has become urgent today.

First and foremost is the need to defend the professional interests of publishers during this period of transition to a free market economy and the development of a general economic strategy. The ultimate goal is seen to be the

de-nationalization of book publishing and the redistribution of authority among organs of state management of the sector and structures of unofficial self-management in the form of the association. The initial goals include: use of economic means to eliminate the contradictions between publishing, printing, and book selling; preparation of a package of proposals for a draft law on book publishing and a tax policy in this area; financial support of small or non-profit publishing houses.

In addition, the association intends to finance the expansion of paper production and the creation of additional printing capacity. Plans call for creation of their own book distribution network under the aegis of book publishers, which will be parallel to the state Knigotorg [Book Trade] system. Hiring of workers on leasing arrangements and other forms of collective administration of property will initially receive financial support from the association. It is also proposed to create a network of literary agencies in the country finally allowing publishing houses to sign independent contracts with foreign partners.

But what resources will be used to finance all these wide-ranging projects for extricating book publishing from the crisis it is currently in? Evidently, the money cannot be deducted from the associations' founders: the financial position of many publishing houses is such that even an annual contribution of 5,000 rubles could not be raised and was reduced. For the time being, the Association of Soviet Industrialists, the Ford Fund, the Soros Fund, the All-Russian Agency on Authors Rights, and a number of other organizations and enterprises have expressed the desire to provide financial support to Soviet book publishers. It is expected that the major share of the profit will be obtained from their own book selling system, income from investing in paper production and printing, and special purpose sums levied from [the profits of] the most successful publishers from the publication of the most popular works.

How does the USSR State Printing Committee view these plans and the fact of the appearance of the Association of Soviet Book Publishers?

"For us there is no question as to whether such an association is necessary or not," stated the chairman of the USSR State Printing Commission, N. Yefimov. "We even provided part of the financing for the founding meeting. Not long ago I spoke at the Association of American Publishers. There they do not get involved with issues of production, finance, or supply, but see their goal as defending the interests of the publishers. These interests involve, first and foremost, making sure that laws that are passed in the country are not directed against books.

We have obsolete and worn out printing equipment, there are no Soviet machines and there is not enough foreign exchange available to purchase imports. But if the current 45 percent deduction paid into the state



budget were increased to 65 percent, many printing combines would go bankrupt within a year or year and a half and cease to exist. And after all, book publishing is not merely industry, but culture, and for this reason the tax policy returning us to the "left-over principle" is unacceptable. In our view, taxable profits must be reduced by the total of expenditures associated with the publication of children's books, texts, small edition scientific and technological materials and also literature in languages of the smaller ethnic groups of the USSR and books for the blind. This is what the State Commission on Printing and the Association of Book Publishers should be thinking about together today, this is the field of activity where they must be allies and partners.

But nevertheless no one can yet be completely sure what their attitude to the association that has been created will be. Among those who spoke in the discussion there was not a single one who did not share his doubts and fears with the audience. M. Khitrov (of the "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" publishing house) described the paradox inherent in the situation as follows: without leaving the "sovkhoz," we have joined the "kolkhoz." And it is true. Here all the publishing houses are subordinate, only some have direct subordination, and others subordination once removed. Now their interests will be represented by a non-government, independent association. Voices were heard saying that the administrative-command system, with all its shortcomings, guarantees at least minimal protection to the publishing houses, but what will happen with the democratic association, where the voting procedure may make the minority hostages to the majority? This gives rise to the problem of how to reconcile the interests of the "fat cattle" and the "lean cattle?" And if the association does not intend to become either the double or the rival of the State Commission on Printing, then what functions will be reserved for it and what will guarantee that it does not turn into a democratic-bureaucratic structure? In any case, today the appeals of the publishers for economic emancipation accord very well with their petition in the USSR Supreme Soviet on establishment of rigid paper quotas. And the fact that M. Shishigin, who was elected president of the association, until now was a member of the college of the USSR State Commission on Printing, may be interpreted, if one wishes, as a paradox of the same type.

Such obvious contradictions as the compatibility of a common strategy for association members and competition among them, of the free market and book education, of antitrust measures and setting of profit norms for publishing houses, of the interests of the consumer and the interests of commerce were not touched upon, even in theory. No one even mentioned the readers, if one doesn't count the fact that they will be invited to participate in a charitable lottery, the proceeds of which would go to the fund of the Association of Book Publishers. The publishers did not formulate their attitude toward cooperative and private (which cannot be ruled

out for the future) publishers, although, as was emphasized at the congress, the Association of Soviet Book Publishers is open to all.

Be that as it may, the new organization sees itself as an "association of civilized book publishers" and for the time being does not have any intention of subdividing on the basis of nationality or some other principle. And I do not know of another organization in the country which so many different people can unanimously wish success.

### **Ideology Chief Kapto Views Culture Policy**

90UN1857A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 19, 12 May 90 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Kapto, deputy chief of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee: "Answerable for the People's Fate"]

### **[Text] From Obedient 'Lever' to Understanding Ally**

We are going through a difficult time, when the stability of our convictions and our sensible choice of the path of life and our ideological and moral positions are being tested.

The stress of restructuring in all spheres of society is connected with the revolution in public consciousness. For this reason, it is natural that the creative, scientific, and technical intelligentsia has proved to be at a forward position of the process of the renewal of socialism.

Never before in our Soviet history has the word of the writer and cultural figure been so free and has had such weight as now. The spiritual life of the people is being enriched by previously prohibited values. The independence of the creative unions, the organizations and institutions of culture and art, is growing. The cultural forces in the provinces are freeing themselves from the fetters of levelling bureaucratism. The initiative that is being revived has given rise to new structures and forms of the cultural life of the country.

The relations between the party, the state, and the cultural figures are taking shape in a new way. Gradually and with difficulty, the attitude to literature, art and cultural-educational activity as an obedient "lever" of ideological activity, the role of illustrator and commentator of higher decisions assigned to the cultural figure, and that of "the transmission belt" of power assigned to the creative unions, publications, and cultural institutions, are nevertheless being overcome.

True, up to now by far not all are delighted with the aspiration of the artist to an independent vision and comprehension of life, for some of the leaders, including party leaders, the role of the person who gives orders and the appraiser is still more preferable. What is more, among the creative intelligentsia, there are quite a few opportunists, who feel more comfortable with the role of "assistants." But the chief trend today is the businesslike and respectful partnership between the CPSU and the



cultural figures, their cooperation on the basis of the ideology of the renewal of socialism, which is increasingly acquiring the character of a dialogue. The creative intelligentsia of the country is becoming an active, independent and fruitful subject of the political, social, and spiritual life of society. It is sufficient to say that among the USSR people's deputies about 500 people are workers in the sphere of artistic culture. These figures bear out the inclusion of the artistic intellect in the restructuring processes.

But today is a time of open and frank discussion. One cannot be but alarmed by the cases where the ambitions of cultural figures enjoying reputation and influence are put by some of them above their civic responsibility, unthinking nihilism is becoming a means of struggle for personal popularity and their career as well. Some people have already crossed the dangerous line that separates the pluralism of ideological-moral positions from the intoxication of uncompromising clique formation, including on the basis of nationality membership. Phenomena of that sort are not the "internal affair" of cultural figures, they influence the spiritual life of the entire society.

V. I. Lenin frequently enclosed the words "member of the intelligentsia" and "intelligentsia" in quotation marks ("members of the intelligentsia who hate Belinsky"; if one may say so, the "intelligentsia", etc.) or made reservations: "The intelligentsia in the good sense of the word," the "genuine intelligentsia."

Today we value especially the "understanding" intelligentsia, which quite deliberately perceived the ideas of restructuring and giving the entire power of its talent and intellect for the practical realization of these ideas.

All this is not taking place without a struggle. For from the midst of the same intelligentsia erupt most often today the volcanoes of unconsidered and at times even irresponsible judgments, assessments, and ideas. The nihilist attitude to the historical experience of socialist construction is spread in the public consciousness, the idealist faith in the bright future is replaced by the admiration of a one-sidedly "selected" past, internationalism—by nationalism, class ideology—by ethnocentric ideology, the materialist world view—by religiosity, and in the final analysis one type of dogmatism is replaced by another. Does one need to talk about the futility of such sort of "searches"?

#### To Command Culture or to Help Its Development?

One of the conditions for the constructive character of the joint work of the party and the creative intelligentsia is the outpacing initiative of the party committees in all questions. Otherwise they will also continue to turn out to be in the position of those who justify themselves and lag behind life.

Now the harm of the administrative-command forms of management in the sphere of culture has already been perceived sufficiently profoundly. The experience of

self-management in the creative collectives and self-regulation of culture as a whole is rapidly becoming enriched.

At the 27th CPSU Congress, the important thought was expressed that self-management principles should be developed, above all, within our statehood, and not outside it.

In this respect, already a great deal has been done in the publishing houses and editorial boards of journals, in film studios and theaters, the first steps are being taken in some museums and libraries, and the democratism of the activity of the state organs for culture is being expanded. However, on the whole, the state structures, which had absorbed almost all and everything, proved to be more inert, including in the sphere of culture, than this appeared at first. Here is a wealth of work for the primary party organizations. The democratization of the state departments, institutions, and organizations for culture, perhaps, is now the chief task of these organizations. In addition to everything else, it is important alone because of the fact that it is capable of preventing the rise of destructive phenomena, which are being intensified by "informal groups" of various sorts that are springing up here increasingly often. Frequently their activity is entangled in group egotism, in the shattering of labor discipline and morality, it takes the form of "Italian strikes", the composition of petitions of various sorts, rivalry between groups into which the collectives split, etc.

Of considerable significance is also the democratization of non-state cultural organizations, above all the creative unions.

It is well known that the status of the creative unions, their functions, structure, and the statutory provisions regulating activity were formed basically in the 1930's. While creating significant opportunities for the professional and public activity of the creative intelligentsia, the creative unions, in the course of time, essentially became transformed into an instrument of the suppression of searches and to a significant degree were subject to being taken over by the state [ogosudarstvleniye].

At the present time, the creative unions are experiencing a period of stormy renewal. Ways are being sought to expand the independence of the creative intelligentsia both in the center and in the union republics. The process of decentralization in the life of the creative unions is attended by certain difficulties.

Recently we have had to observe (including in the creative unions) an extremely dangerous process of delimitation on the basis of nationality. It would seem, the officials in the sphere of culture and the people in the world of art know that national culture cannot exist in isolation. It constantly "shares" its own currents and absorbs the achievements of other peoples. You see, the talented works of national culture are a spiritual message to all mankind.

In our multinational country, the exchange of artistic values is of especially great significance. But it is clear, the former forms of contact (Days and Decades of Culture, etc.), which frequently had a ceremonial and report character, have exhausted themselves, and the new methods for propagating the achievements of national cultures up to now are not very effective. For example, the USSR Union of Theater Workers and the republic unions 2 years ago began to hold regional theater festivals, but the artistic level of many such actions, in the opinion of the critics, frequently remains low. Inter-republic exchange in the sphere of literature and art continues to contract. The Moscow and Leningrad theaters and musical organizations reluctantly go for the development of creative contacts with nationality groups or carry them out in a formal manner. All-union showings of drama and theater art of the peoples of the USSR, inter-nationality musical and film festivals, and opening days, which previously were held on a regular basis, today have practically ceased to exist.

The Friendship of the Peoples Theater, created not very long ago, in the birth of which the USSR Union of Theater Workers played such an active role, has already taken the first steps. But we can hardly say that this theater has announced itself at the top of its voice, that it has found its identity and is fulfilling its destiny. That which seemed still sufficient yesterday today requires new and high-quality advancement. Significant reserves exist in the spiritual contacts between our peoples. For this reason it is extremely necessary to impart a genuinely international, permanent, and stable character to these relations.

The fate of perestroika is the fate, above all, of all the young people and the present children. Today's "growing up" of literature and art for the children and the youth is an evidently natural process. But it is also true that art that is addressed to the child and adolescent must subject itself to strictly professional laws, but also to the laws of pedagogy. There are no subjects that are prohibited for this distinctive auditorium, it only needs its own tone of discussion, its logic, and its arguments.

The feeling is taking shape that, working on a children's story, play or film, which is devoted to the rising generation, many artists are more preoccupied with the problem of self-expression and their prestige. But as daddy and mommy, grandfathers and grandmothers, such artists do not allow their own children to hear, to see, and to read what they address to the children of someone else. We are speaking of shows of tyuzi [not further identified] with the note on the posters: "Children Under Age 16 Not Admitted," about children's films that are awkward for adults to see, about books which deform the psychology of children by relishing the dark sides of life.

What should the literature, cinema, and music for children and young people become?—these questions are for the practitioners and theorists of the "children's movement" in art to decide. But the party organizations, too,

cannot occupy a neutral position. The concern for the moral health of the rising generation must be at the foundation of their political activity. And here is something else in this connection. Here one needs to treat the national traditions of the peoples very carefully. What is acceptable in one republic is perceived as an insult of traditions in another. Is this really still not clear to some people?

Public opinion today regards as extremely unsatisfactory the musical education of children and young people. The artistic tastes of the greater part of the young people are formed mainly under the influence of mass music genres. According to the results of a selective survey, conducted by the All-Union Music Society among students of schools and vocational-technical schools in Moscow, only about 8 percent of the school children and 4 percent of the students in vocational-technical schools are interested in classical music and symphonies.

Along with objective reasons, connected with the acute shortage of music education teachers in the public schools, the mass media, in particular television, contribute their mite to this dismal picture.

I would like to underscore that literature and theater, as well as cinema and musical programs for children and young people in recent times have been losing their humanist character. Painting a graphic picture of every sort of abomination, showing cruelty and violence, subjecting their listener and viewer to an onslaught of decibels and other fashionable show programs and variety ensembles, some cultural figures test timidity in the representation of normal human feelings, in the creation of lyrical and bright melodies and images. One of the most important tasks of art—and of art for children in particular—is its ability to awaken in man good feelings and mercy, to elevate the individual. We will not forget about this.

#### And Again About the 'Residual Approach'....

At every step, we see that many difficulties in political life, in the economy, in the relations of man and nature, in inter-nationality relations, and in everyday life are generated by the inadequate level of culture of many people.

All this is the result of the so-called "residual approach" to culture, where man, and with him his spiritual world, receded to the periphery of public interests. A certain type of state thinking took shape, which regarded culture as something secondary. Thus, in 1990 the appropriations for culture and the mass media amounted to only 1.2 percent of the state budget. In the RSFSR, not more than 1 percent is expended for these purposes. For comparison: The share of expenditures for culture in the budgetary [as published] of Hungary and Poland comes to 1.7 percent, in Czechoslovakia—2 percent. On the average per person for the country as a whole, expenditures for cultural and educational work and art in the current year come to 9.6 rubles, and for some regions even less than 5 rubles. Enormous are the differences in

the possibilities of the access of the people to cultural values between town and village, between union republics they reach a factor of 20, and in a number of RSFSR oblasts, even 30. I say this with deep regret, understanding that among the "obstructions" in the paths of civilization and progress, which the legacy of the command-administrative system has left to us, the socio-cultural problems are some of the main ones. Consequences of the "residual approach" became all the growing trends of the spiritual degradation and the oblivion of the best patriotic traditions that have seized a significant part of the young generation. Regardless of the "theoretical" basis which some culturological specialists have brought up previously under the "residual approach," it, this secret principle of investment policy, is in its essence completely discredited and, frankly speaking, criminal.

All the more complicated now to break the stereotypes that have become fixed and to develop Leninist norms of cultural policy aimed, above all, at the man whom Vladimir Ilyich dreamed of seeing as genuinely free and harmonious, including as spiritually developed. Evidently, the acuteness of the socio-cultural situation in the country, the importance and large-scale nature of the work which must be launched to raise the cultural level of the Soviet people is still not realized. And this is an all the more topical task as the reviving of the cultural life in the country generated by the restructuring is extremely unequivocal.

On the one hand, a multitude of interesting cultural initiatives are generated and realized, new theaters, music collectives, exhibition halls, and various forms of leisure organizations for the population are springing up. On the other hand, during the past 3 years there has been an 11-percent decrease in the attendance of movie theaters, theaters and concert halls fell short by millions in their count of spectators, many libraries and clubs stand empty, amateur talent activities have proved to be in a crisis situation. The sway of "mass culture" is growing, the commercialization of cultural life is taking place. The country has become inundated with thousands of video shops which show low-grade video products. The air waves, stadiums, and concert halls are jammed with pseudomusic, a significant part of which does not stand up to any criticism in artistic respect. At times there is no point to even talk about the ideological-moral respect.

For the first time in the entire history of Soviet power, the increase in prices for books, theater tickets, tickets for concerts, exhibitions, and museums is becoming a barrier between culture and a significant part of the population. All this contradicts the most important public task of increasing the cultural level of the masses.

In our conditions, this task cannot be solved without state support, patronage, if you will, and the educational endeavor of the intelligentsia.

Restructuring is creating the prerequisites for the renaissance of such endeavor. Already there are quite a few

cases of its revival, including the experience of educational activities, which the intelligentsia of our homeland gave birth to in the prerevolutionary years and during the first stage of socialist construction in our country. We will have to revive such traditions and somehow to create them anew.

### This Key Concept Is Tact

The process of the democratization of culture, which began at once after October, was replaced by the theorists and practitioners of "socialism of the phrase" by schematization, levelling, and vulgar simplification. The cultivation of the culture of Soviet man was reduced to an order-based [prikaznaya] system of propagating postulates and dogmas. The one-sided politicization impoverished the aesthetic diversity of styles and approaches in art and was unable to fully open up the national polychromatic nature of the cultures of the peoples of our country. V. I. Lenin, according to the words of people who were close to him, treated literature and art "remarkably sympathetically, intimately, and lovingly." In this lies concealed the real attitude to which we must return today and continue its development, enriching it with new realities of life.

It is extremely characteristic that in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, for the first time in many decades, we returned precisely to such an understanding: "The leadership of spiritual and cultural life is a far from simple matter, which requires tact, an understanding of the nature of creativity, and certainly love for literature and art, respect for talent. A great deal depends here on the ability to propagate the cultural policy of the party, to implement it in practice, and on the correctness of assessments and benevolence, when we are talking about the creativity and the strivings of the writer, composer and artist."

In the present-day conditions, a key word and concept—tact—is being singled out. Incidentally, for the first time it was used in a party document on questions of the development of art and literature in the well-known resolution of the RKP(b) Central Committee of 18 June 1925, which had a genetic connection with the Leninist instructions in this sphere. In particular, in the rejection of the "legalized monopoly" of any artistic and creative world view.

But tact, understood as the utmost weighed, sensible, intelligent and benevolent attitude of the party to culture, cannot exist without deep competence, without love for the work which you serve. Otherwise, tact can give rise to patent suspension and diplomatic evasiveness, can acquire the destructive features of ideological intrigue and moral unscrupulousness. The borderline is extremely thin here, it is not difficult to cross it.

Today a tactful, but at the same time competent, treatment of culture and a regard for the psychology of the creative intelligentsia enters increasingly confidently and deeply into the style and methods of party work. But it

still has not risen to genuine respect for talent. The command-administrative apparatus has in psychological terms deeply "implanted" in itself the pernicious method of petty tutelage and estrangement from the concrete man and creator. One acutely feels the lack of keenness and passion, at times there is a lack of the ability to hold a discussion and engage in arguments, to defend an objective point of view.

With rare exceptions, these qualities are supplanted by accentuated coldness, which most often goes over into condescension, into a disinterested semi-official stance, a kind of apparatus snobbery. But you see, this is an aspect of that very communist self-conceit against which Lenin came out. Such daily manifestations call forth special painfulness in questions of inter-nationality relations.

Sometimes they say that the reasons for the negative phenomena in the sphere of culture lie in the passive positions of party organizations. And this is so. Party, soviet, and Komsomol officials, and local organizations have become accustomed to prescriptions and directives from the center in regard to every concrete occasion and question. Let us take such concrete example: Membership of talented and creative young people in the party. It would seem, in this matter everything is clear—the CPSU, as any party, needs the influx of new forces which do not think in terms of stereotypes, which are capable of claiming intellectual potential. But many rayon committees, what is more frequently (!) also the primary party organizations of the creative unions, replace painstaking work with young people with the notorious "selection" into the ranks of the CPSU. The weakening of ideological influence on young talents and the unwillingness to search for personal approaches to the formation of their world view has led to the fact that the proportion of communists under 35 years of age in the Union of Writers comes to 2 percent, in the Leningrad organizations of the Union of Artists—6 percent, and in the Union of Composers there is none. This example is typical also of many other party organizations of the creative unions. Are not some "special directives" necessary here?

There is no doubt that the party must develop general principles of a new cultural policy, which bases itself on adherence to socialist principles, all-human values, the ideas of humanism and democracy. However, this must be done not in the silence of the office, not in isolation from the seething diversity of life.

This is why the question of the independence, initiative, and responsibility of the local party organs and every party official is closely connected with the emancipation of the individual, with his free will, and on the broader plane with the process of strengthening the sovereignty of the union and autonomous republics. Inter-republic and interregional programs of economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation may acquire great significance. They require a search for new forms of

interaction of the republic and local party organizations, and, perhaps, even new structures in the party.

New structures of the state direction of the development of culture are also being formed. Their functions and the arsenal of the methods of activity are being renewed. In-depth analysis and the development of all-union programs and strategies for the cultural development of the country are taking the place of petty regulation and administrative methods of management.

These and other questions, obviously, will be solved in the Integrated Program for the Development of Culture in the USSR for the Period to the Year 2005. The decision concerning the development of such a program was adopted by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. It is obvious that the party organs of all levels, too, should not remain aloof from this work. All public organizations, party committees of creative unions, artists who are communists—all for whom the destinies of culture are dear, who are not indifferent to its tomorrow, are simply obligated to join in the preparation of such a document—and it, by the way, will be developed for the first time in our country. The new cultural policy of the CPSU is being developed in the restructuring on the basis of the conception of the renewal of socialism and in the context of political, socio-economic and ideological changes.

Perhaps, this is the most delicate and most complex sphere of party work. Here far-sightedness, delicacy, and, if you will, tolerance are especially important, but at the same time also political soberness, adherence to principle, and scientific equipment.

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A.I. Herzen called the intelligentsia "the advanced phalanx of mankind," which is "the first to be illuminated by a rising idea and the first to be struck by a thunderstorm." The Soviet intelligentsia was the first to be illuminated by the idea of restructuring. Now it is, perhaps more than all others, interested in the success of restructuring, so as not also to provide confirmation of the second part of Herzen's determination of its fate.

But the freedom of creativity is coincidental to the responsibility of the artist. In principle, in the final analysis, this is precisely so. Thus, the voices that are being heard with demands to "bring into limits" the freedom of creativity, the ideas of "shores of freedom", and measuring it out in doses in actuality signify also a demand to lower the social responsibility of cultural figures. Freedom, for all that, is not only taken, it is also given. But to give responsibility is impossible—a man can assume it only himself.

Our intelligentsia has taken upon itself the responsibility for the fate of restructuring. But the freedom of its creativity is still too limited and the dependence of the artist on arbitrariness and chance is too strong. The dictate of the publishers and editorial boards, film studios, and theaters, the lack of material provision, the

lack of social protection, especially of creative young people, the lack of simple human attention, sympathy, and trust are bringing harm to all of society. We frequently remember this when it is already late, when a talent has been lost by society. Perhaps, the most important method of party work with the creative intelligentsia is human contact with it, trust, unintrusive participation in the concrete fate of the artist, and sincere interest.

Such competent and tactful attention, better than any words and declarations, will raise the prestige of the party organizations, will increase their role among the creative intelligentsia, and will revive their authority in the critical stage of the history of our country.

### **Belorussian SSR Education Official on VUZ Entrance Exams**

*90UN1852A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Apr 90 p 4*

[Interview with V.I. Strazhev, director of the main administration for higher education of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Education, by O. Gorshkov: "Some Innovations"]

[Text] [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Vasilii Ivanovich, in the last two years the rules for acceptance into the republic's higher educational institutions have been substantially changed. What rules are in effect this year?

[Strazhev] The rules for acceptance into the country's higher educational institutions, defined by the March 14, 1988 order by the USSR State Committee on Public Education, are still in effect this year. They can be found in reference books for entering students and in the press (NASTAUNITSKAYA GAZETA of March 18, 1989). All of the changes and additions to the rules are the initiative of the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Education's board.

Last year these additions were in effect in 10 of the republic's higher educational institutions. This year, we have succeeded in extending them to practically all the higher educational institutions.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] In 1989, graduates from schools in the high radiation zone were given the right to enter university teaching departments and teachers' colleges on a noncompetitive basis. What privileges do they have this year?

[Strazhev] Upon receiving positive scores on the entry exams, all persons permanently residing in the regions of strict health control of the Mogilev and Gomel oblasts will be registered in the entering classes of middle special and higher educational institutions of the republic on a noncompetitive basis. If they do not enter, they retain the right to be registered on a noncompetitive basis in training departments.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] "National" rules contain Article 13, which allows special acceptance of agricultural youth into higher educational institutions. How does that rule apply in our republic?

[Strazhev] The countryside still lacks teachers. Universities and teachers' colleges still have special acceptance of graduates from rural areas. As of last year, this rule has been extended to residents of urban and workers' settlements and rayon centers experiencing a serious shortage of teaching personnel. Practice has shown that graduates from schools in rayon centers are well-trained and willing to work in the countryside after graduation.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] The main direction of educational reform these days is the discovery and development of young students' abilities, an orientation towards the individual. How has this affected the rules for acceptance into the republic's higher educational institutions?

[Strazhev] Supporting talent is our particular concern. Last year's experiment in direct registration into higher educational institutions of the winners of the republic and national olympiads, as well as the practice of eliminating entrance exams in corresponding disciplines for the winners of oblast olympiad rounds, is being extended in 1990 to all of the republic's institutes and universities. The only exceptions are creative and medical institutes, and law and journalism majors.

The republic's teachers' colleges have created departments for pre-university training in which the final exams count as entrance exams into a higher educational institution. The unique, profession-oriented centers make it possible to choose the brightest, most enterprising students for an institute from among studying and working young people. Only those young men and women who have fully completed the course work are allowed to take the final exams.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] The recent republic theoretical and practical conference on democratizing educational management focused in particular on combining final exams in middle schools with entrance exams into higher educational institutions...

[Strazhev] This form of entrance exam will probably not be widely used in the near future. This experiment will most likely affect schools and courses offering intensive study of a certain subject.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] The republic's higher educational institutions are presently working to revive the national culture. One of the first steps in this regard was the decision by the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Education to introduce an entrance exam in Belorussian language and literature in teachers' colleges and university teachers' classes. The "Law on Languages in the Belorussian SSR" will go into effect on September 1 of this year. The republic's young people are worried about how this new law will affect future exams...

[Strazhev] The practice of conducting the entrance examinations will be continued this year. The acceptance boards will determine the type of exam and the manner in which it is given and graded. It might be a composition for philology majors and an oral exam in nonphilology departments. This type of exam is not foreseen this year in technical institutions.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] Graduates might include persons who do not know Belorussian. Will the doors of higher educational institutions be closed to them?

[Strazhev] Students come to us from neighboring republics, as well as children of military personnel stationed in the Belorussian SSR. These students can take an (oral)

test in Russian language and literature instead of Belorussian language and literature if the acceptance board so decides. But I should point out that this applies only to nonphilology majors.

[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] This year, 1990, is the last one in which the Rules for Acceptance Into Higher Educational Institutions of the USSR will be in effect. What document will replace them?

[Strazhev] The "Basic Regulations for Acceptance Into Higher Educational Institutions of the USSR" are presently being developed. Higher educational institutions will be given complete independence in developing their acceptance rules. The Ministry of Education will retain only a few regulatory functions.